This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 001407 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2015 
TAGS: PREL EZ TU EUN
SUBJECT: CZECHS ON OCT 3 GAERC 
 
REF: STATE 177048 
 
Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Michael Dodman for reasons 
1.4 B+D 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The Czechs are optimistic that the upcoming 
GAERC will find a way forward on Turkey.  The GOCR has 
formally stated that they support launching talks with Turkey 
without establishing a privileged partnership or other status 
as an option.  They also insist that there is no linkage with 
Croatia, although remain strongly in favor of a decision on 
Oct 3 to launch accession talks, and at the working level 
complain about unequal standards being used to evaluate 
Croatia and Turkey.  On other GAERC issues, the GOCR supports 
an EU decision to impose sanctions against Uzbekistan, will 
push for an EU consensus on next steps to induce Iranian 
nuclear cooperation, and wants to set a path towards 
accession for Serbia.  End Summary. 
 
Czechs Support EU Accession of Turkey, Croatia, and Serbia 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Pol-Econ Chief and Poloff met separately Sept 30 with 
Petr Kaiser, Director of the Czech MFA's CFSP Department, and 
Juraj Fogada, Acting Director of the Department of EU 
Institutions, to discuss the Oct 3 GAERC.  According to 
Fogada, the official Czech position on Turkey (stated by 
Deputy FM Mueller in Parliamentary testimony on Sept 29) is 
that the accession negotiations should begin on Monday and 
the outcome should remain open-ended. The GOCR does not 
support the Austrian position that an alternative to full 
membership needs to be stated in advance.  However, Fogada 
restated previous GOCR views that full Turkish compliance 
with the customs union is essential (although the Czechs are 
content with the agreed compromise of compliance by late 
2006), and Turkey must recognize Cypress before the 
conclusion of negotiations, not after.  Fogada evidenced 
considerable frustration with Turkey's negotiating practice 
of repeatedly threatening to walk away from the negotiations, 
and complained that the GOT had done a poor job of making the 
security argument for why Turkey needed to be a part of the 
EU. 
 
¶3. (C) CFSP Chief Kaiser deferred to his colleagues on 
accession questions, but readily accepted Poloff's point that 
the decision on launching negotiations with Turkey cannot be 
made without taking into consideration the strategic 
importance of Turkey.  He added that there had been numerous 
pointed debates within the MFA in recent weeks over Turkey, 
which accounted for the more forward leaning official GOCR 
position on the question. 
 
¶4.  (C) On Croatia, Fogada confirmed that GOCR does not 
support linking Croatia,s candidacy to Turkey.  Yet in the 
same breath, he expressed the optimistic view that the GAERC 
meeting would result in the commencement of the Croatian 
negotiations, or at least positive steps forward in the 
process.  He agreed that Croatia,s full cooperation with the 
ICTY is imperative, but repeated the GOCR position that 
Gotovina's delivery to the ICTY should not be a prerequisite 
for progress on accession.  Fogada also expressed frustration 
with what he saw as unequal standards being applied by some 
to the questions of Turkish and Croatian membership, i.e., 
the Croatians were expected to fully meet all requirements in 
advance of talks, but the Turks were able to negotiate a 
schedule for compliance with the obligations applied to them. 
 
¶5. (C) In addressing accession,  Kaiser added that the GOCR 
supports efforts to agree on a framework for Serbia's 
accession or on an Association Agreement.  Serbia must not be 
left out of the EU for reasons of stability and security.  As 
in the case of Croatia, Serbia must cooperate fully with the 
ICTY.  The level that constitutes full compliance, however, 
must be reasonable, as deemed by the ICTY. 
 
Czechs Favor Promoting Human Rights in Uzbekistan, Belarus, 
and Russia 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶6. (C) Turning to other GAERC issues beyond accession (and 
Kaiser was optimistic that FMs would have time for other 
business) Kaiser said he expected tough EU action in 
Uzbekistan, noting that the Czechs and others are very aware 
that the previous Council decision on Uzbekistan was too 
weak.  He said that while the GOCR supports some EU 
sanctions, it is concerned that sanctions may be ineffective, 
as they have been in Belarus. 
 
¶7. (C) Kaiser said the EU is uncertain how to handle the 
situation in Belarus.  Currently, there is no official 
dialogue between the EU and the Belarussian government. 
Issues that may be considered at GAERC include whether the EU 
should monitor the upcoming elections in Belarus, and how the 
EU can influence the outcome.  The GOCR continues to support 
civil society in Belarus. 
 
¶8. (C) Addressing EU-Russian relations, Kaiser described the 
Czech approach as pragmatic: the EU must speak with one 
voice.  The EU expects the Czechs and other Visegrad 
countries to put aside their history with Russia, and the 
Czechs are prepared to do that.  However, western European 
powers that have focused solely on their economic ties with 
Russia also need to follow a common approach.  The EU must 
consider common values, such as human rights, when 
negotiating with Russia.  Kaiser expects difficulties 
renegotiating the EU-Russia agreement, which was negotiated 
10 years ago.  GOCR favors simply amending the existing 
agreement because it already addresses human rights issues. 
GOCR is concerned that a new agreement with Russia may not be 
tough enough on human rights. 
 
Czechs Favor Referring Iran to the UN Security Council 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶9. (C) Turning to EU negotiations on Iran's nuclear program, 
Kaiser said a recent IAEA decision finding the Iranians out 
of compliance with their obligations requires referral of the 
issue to the UNSC.  The question is what sort of penalty the 
UNSC ought to impose to entice Iranian cooperation.  The GOCR 
believes something less than sanctions should be considered 
as a first step, and hopes that EU FMs will agree to open 
consultations with the USG and others on what sort of UN 
response is appropriate. 
CABANISS