This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 002392 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR 
DRL 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR 
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) 
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA 
DS/DSS/ITA 
DSERCC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC HA
SUBJECT: HAITIAN PM REFUSES TO RESHUFFLE CEP; UPDATES ON 
NEPTUNE 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Douglas M. Griffiths, reasons 1.4 (B) 
and (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: PM Latortue told visiting S/CRS Carlos 
Pascual and WHA Patrick Duddy on September 7 that the 
Electoral Council (CEP) could not simply be brushed out of 
the way. He argued that UN Elections chief Gerardo 
LeChevailier lacked the necessary political finesse and was 
not the right person for the job of representing the 
international community to the CEP. The PM proposed creating 
a "liaison group" of 4-6 eminent persons who could act as an 
"executive secretariat" to guide the CEP through the process 
of running the elections. Regarding Neptune, Latortue 
reported he had five ministers working on a solution based 
upon the idea of addressing Neptune's case as part of a 
broader attempt to build a national dialogue. The PM also 
issued an invitation for a visit by the Secretary in order to 
send a powerful message to voters about elections. End 
summary. 
 
Working with the CEP 
 
¶2. (C) On September 7, Charg Tim Carney, S/CRS Carlos 
Pascual and WHA Patrick Duddy met with Prime Minister 
Latortue at his residence.  Latortue expounded on the 
challenges of working with the Provisional Electoral Council 
(CEP), and offered his perspective on how to improve the 
relationship between the CEP and the international community. 
 He said the key to working with the CEP was "building up 
their confidence in themselves" so that they could go along 
with difficult decisions.  Haitian pride is a significant 
issue, the PM explained, and the CEP could not simply be 
brushed out of the way. He also encouraged the international 
community to speak with a single voice to the CEP on 
electoral issues. 
 
¶3. (C) Accepting that the CEP has performed poorly, Latortue 
underscored his view that although the Haitian context is 
politically challenging, Gerardo LeChevallier, currently the 
lead UN electoral expert, is not the right person for the 
job.  The day LeChevallier departed would be a good day for 
the process, Latortue opined. Offering up an anecdote about 
LeChevallier's lack of political finesse, Latortue noted that 
it was well-known in Haiti that LeChevallier had joked to a 
local diplomat that the "best solution for dealing with the 
CEP" would be to "poison the lot of them."  Latortue argued 
that LeChevallier had poisoned his relationship with the CEP, 
probably irredeemably, and LeChevallier was not capable of 
having the sort of productive relationship the international 
community required with the CEP. 
 
Next Steps on Elections 
 
¶4. (C) Latortue argued that the electoral dates the CEP chose 
provide a framework for further progress.  He noted that he 
was exploring the idea of creating a "liaison group" of 4-6 
eminent persons who could act as an "executive secretariat" 
to guide the CEP through the process of running the 
elections.  He wanted people with experience and "moral 
authority" on the liaison group, and offered up the name of 
Cabinet advisor Alex Richard as one candidate.  Latortue 
expressed frustration with "international experts who aren't 
necessarily experts" and argued that it was a grave error to 
try to reshuffle the CEP. He acknowledged that although it 
was clear that CEP member Duchemin would have been a better 
CEP president, it was a mistake, since Duchemin had not been 
elected, for LeChevallier to give Duchemin the idea that he 
could be imposed as CEP head over the wishes of the CEP. 
 
¶5. (C) The PM said it was necessary for the international 
community to work with the existing CEP, not one that doesn't 
exist.  In this regard, he emphasized it was critically 
important for international experts to be neutral in their 
dealings with the CEP and not play favorites.  (He implied 
that this was a key error on the part of LeChevallier.) 
Latortue argued that there were "too many cooks in the 
kitchen" of international actors dealing with the elections 
(though he had many kind remarks for SRSG Valdes).  The 
international community needed to have a single voice in 
speaking to the CEP on electoral issues, he said. 
 
Addressing the Neptune Crisis 
 
¶6. (C) Latortue reviewed his efforts to resolve the Neptune 
crisis, which he called "a problem for you and a headache for 
me."  Latortue said he could have released Neptune by decree 
but "we might have been forced to resign three days later." 
He implied that Neptune's fate -- and the prospect of 
impunity for him -- was a neuralgic issue. He reviewed his 
efforts to liberate Neptune; noted that each time Neptune was 
offered release, he responded that he also wanted 
exoneration.  This was a bridge too far for the IGOH, the PM 
said.  If Neptune wanted exoneration from the justice system, 
his case needed to pass through the justice system. 
 
¶7. (C) Latortue emphasized he had five ministers (Finance, 
MFA, MOJ, Culture, and Interior) working on a solution, which 
would be based upon the idea of addressing Neptune's case as 
part of a broader attempt to build a national dialogue.  He 
noted that he had heard that Neptune's judge did not 
necessarily see a good case against Neptune, although he then 
contradicted himself by noting that there might be new 
evidence from an international source that was damning for 
Neptune. 
 
The Secretary is Invited 
 
¶8. (C) Latortue closed by issuing an invitation for a visit 
by the Secretary, which he said would serve as a powerful 
political message.  The sooner the better, Latortue added. 
Pascual, Carney, and Duddy told the PM that they would relay 
this invitation back to Washington. 
GRIFFITHS