This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006580 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL LE SY PTER FR UNSC
SUBJECT: MFA AND ELYSEE UPBEAT ON CORE GROUP MINISTERIAL, 
CAUTIOUS ON SYRIA REGIME STABILITY 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and comment: Elysee and MFA officials 
described the September 19 Lebanon Core Group ministerial as 
a success, and expressed relief that consideration of a draft 
UNSCR on arms transfers to Lebanon had been dropped from the 
agenda.  Gof officials expressed similar satisfaction that 
military cooperation had been kept off the Core Group agenda 
and confirmed that a third French military assessment mission 
will go to Lebanon in October. Elysee officials commended PM 
Siniora's performance in New York and the concurrent 
isolation of President Lahoud at UNGA, and stressed that the 
GoF has no preferred candidate to replace Lahoud.  The GoF 
maintains that any Lahoud successor should truly emanate from 
the Christian community and should be acceptable to Lebanon's 
Sunni community and regional countries, criteria which, in 
the French view, Aoun does not meet.  On Syrian regime 
stability, MFA contacts remain typically more cautious than 
Elysee counterparts, who speculate that direct implication of 
Syria in the Mehlis report could result in fall of the Asad 
regime to Alawite strongmen, a Sunni overthrow, or further 
consolidation of power by President Bashar al-Asad.  On the 
latter point, Elysee contacts speculate that Bashar could 
give up Rustom Ghazaleh and Ghazi Kanaan, but will draw the 
line at family members.  Elysee contacts described the visit 
of Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) head Asif Shawkat to 
Paris as both unfortunate and part of regular bilateral 
consultations between security services; Elysee contacts 
claimed that the DST (internal security service) had not 
informed the Elysee in advance and that the DST chief was the 
only GoF official to receive Shawkat.  End summary and 
comment. 
 
LEBANON: CORE GROUP, UNSCR, LAHOUD SUCCESSOR, 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) We met with Presidential Technical Advisor on Middle 
East/Americas Dominique Boche September 22 and separately 
with MFA DAS-equivalent for Egypt/Levant Herve Besancenot 
September 20 to review Lebanon and Syria developments. Both 
Boche and Besancenot described the September 19 Core Group 
ministerial as a success, judging Arab and Russian 
participation to have been particularly important.  Boche 
described the Siniora's effective performance at the Core 
Group as an excellent complement to Lahoud's isolation at 
UNGA. 
 
¶3. (C) While commending the Core Group success, both Boche 
and Besancenot referred to USG-GOF disagreements resolved 
prior to the September 19 meeting. Boche commended the U.S. 
for understanding that now was not the right moment for a 
draft UNSCR limiting arms transfers to state actors in 
Lebanon, noting that such a resolution would have undermined 
GOL cohesion as well as international consensus on Lebanon. 
Boche reiterated GoF reticence on sanctions in general, but 
conceded that the GoF was not closed to discussing possible 
Syria sanctions, particularly after issuance of the final 
Mehlis report. Besancenot was more negative on the draft 
UNSCR, noting GoF discomfort with the proposed mention of 
Iraq in the draft text, and reiterating that the Core Group 
should address Lebanon only.  He stressed that we needed to 
move sequentially and put priority on UNSCR 1595 over UNSCR 
1559; implementation of the former would help pave the way 
for the latter, with Hizballah gradually losing justification 
for maintaining its military capacity. 
 
¶4.  (C) Boche and Besancenot expressed similar satisfaction 
that military cooperation was kept off the Core Group agenda. 
 Boche noted that including military cooperation on the Core 
Group agenda would have given Hizballah a pretext to accuse 
the international community of interference and to separate 
from the GoL.  Boche confirmed that a third French military 
assessment mission would visit Lebanon in October, but did 
not provide a date. 
 
¶5. (C)  On possible candidates to replace President Lahoud, 
Boche stressed that the GoF was remaining cautious and had no 
preferred candidates. Rather than focusing on personalities, 
the GoF had identified two criteria: 1) the candidate should 
truly emanate from the Christian community (i.e., not be 
picked by Sa'ad Hariri); and 2) the candidate should be 
acceptable to Lebanon's Muslim community and countries of the 
region.  The second requirement eliminated Michel Aoun as a 
valid contender, Boche concluded  He said he had no 
information about a possible Aoun visit to France, but 
confirmed that were the Free Patriotic Movement leader to 
visit, he would be received at the MFA only, as part of a 
deliberate GoF policy not to receive any presidential 
contenders at the Presidency.  Boche expressed concern that 
Sa'ad Hariri might be tempted to seek a weak, easy to manage, 
elder Christian politician to replace Lahoud, which would be 
a huge mistake.  Lebanon needed both the PM and President to 
play political roles; the President represented the 
aspirations, if not the existence, of the Maronite community 
and should not be reduced to a figurehead role. 
 
SYRIA: IMPACT OF MEHLIS REPORT ON STABILITY, SHAWKAT VISIT 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶6. (C) On Syrian regime stability, Boche reiterated that the 
content of the final Mehlis report would be decisive.  If the 
report established direct SARG responsibility for Hariri's 
assassination, Boche speculated that Bashar may give up 
second-tier officials up to the level of Interior Minister 
Ghazi Kanaan and former SMI Chief in Lebanon Rustom Ghazaleh, 
without touching brother-in law Asif Shawkat, in-laws the 
Makhlufs, or his brother Mahir.  Boche added that he could 
not exclude any possibilities for regime stability after the 
Mehlis report; there could be a "palace coup," with other 
powerful Alawis taking over; the Alawites could lose control 
to the Sunnis, who lack leaders; or Bashar could seize the 
moment to consolidate his authority and marginalize others, 
as he has started to do since the last Ba'th party congress. 
Besancenot was more cautious than Boche in reiterating to us 
that the GoF did not want a "total destabilization" in Syria, 
nor did the GoF want isolation of Syria to lead to it 
increasing its "nuisance capacity" in the region. 
 
¶7. (C)  Boche stressed that Egypt and Saudi Arabia remained 
essential to the international effort to maintain the 
isolation of Syria.  Egypt wanted to play a role and be 
useful, and Mubarak had agreed to receive Terje Roed-Larsen 
in direct response to a phone call from Chirac. The September 
25 Bashar visit to Cairo would be another opportunity for 
Egypt to deliver a tough message to the Syrian leader.  The 
Saudis were "a bit behind," in Boche's view, as King Abdullah 
was closer personally to Syria via his tribal and family 
connections.  Boche described Saudi Arabia as not wanting to 
be seen as plotting against the Syrian regime, and therefore 
unwilling to receive Larsen in Riyadh.  Boche speculated, 
though, that, in the end, Saudi Arabia would not mind having 
a Sunni government in Damascus "break the Shi'a arc" between 
Lebanon and Iran.  Saudi ties to the Hariri family were also 
a positive factor; Saudi Arabia had been helpful at the time 
of the Syrian blockade of its border with Lebanon, offering 
use of the port of Yanbu for the transit of goods blocked at 
the border. 
 
¶8. (C) Boche confirmed that SMI Chief Asif Shawkat had 
visited Paris and met with DST head Bosquet and no other GOF 
officials, before departing France.  Boche described 
Shawkat's visit as part of long-standing liaison relationship 
between French and Syrian security services, and noted 
Shawkat usually visited France twice a year.  Boche described 
timing for the visit as "unfortunate," and claimed that there 
was a lack of coordination within the GoF, with the Elysee 
learning of the visit only after Shawkat had arrived.  He 
added that Shawkat has a sick child, which could have been 
another reason for the visit.  Boche offered no details on 
the contents of Shawkat's discussions with the DST. 
 
¶9. (C) COMMENT: The GoF appears satisfied with the Core Group 
ministerial, not only because it provided an opportunity to 
reaffirm international support for the GOL reform agenda, but 
because the GoF managed to keep a draft UNSCR and military 
cooperation off the agenda.  While the GoF mantra remains, 
"UNSCR 1595 before UNSCR 1559," it remains unclear what 
happens after the Mehlis report is issued, with the MFA 
expressing typically more caution than the Elysee on 
prospects for SARG destabilization.  End comment. 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
STAPLETON