This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 006125 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL MARR PARM UP FR NATO EUN RU
SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED'S SEPTEMBER 1 MEETINGS WITH SENIOR 
MFA AND PRESIDENCY OFFICIALS ON IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH 
EUROPE 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Karl Hofmann, Reasons 1.4 B and 
D 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 1, EUR A/S Daniel Fried met 
separately with French MFA Political Director Stanislas de 
Laboulaye, A/S-equivalent Director for Strategic Affairs 
Philippe Carre, and Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Maurice 
Gourdault-Montagne.  They discussed Iran, NATO, the EU, 
Russia, Ukraine and the Balkans.  (Middle East issues and 
Turkey/EU reported septel.) Fried said that the purpose of 
his visit was to examine ways to improve the efficiency of 
the French-U.S. relationship, already much improved since the 
President's and the Secretary's efforts last February.   The 
U.S.-French relationship, he said, should be measured in 
terms of what it can accomplish, especially beyond Europe. 
On NATO-EU, Fried's French interlocutors agreed on early and 
informal consultations in order to identify the most 
appropriate institution for action, a step that would help to 
mitigate institutional infighting.  Laboulaye and Carre 
looked forward to upcoming meetings in New York to discuss 
such issues as the role of Iran, Islam, counterterrorism and 
NATO-EU relations.  Carre cautioned that the workings of the 
EU are often not clearly understood in the U.S. and that 
political symbolism is as important as action for EU 
institutions.  He said that the key to referring Iran to the 
UNSC lies with Russia and China, a point reiterated by 
Gourdault-Montagne.  Laboulaye said that France has developed 
a good working relationship with Russia, in which it is 
possible to discuss difficult subjects at a high level. 
Gourdault-Montagne stressed the importance of Franco-German 
engagement with Moscow, and worried about Russian sensitivity 
to an eventual Ukraine accession to NATO.  On Kosovo, 
Laboulaye said that France will do what it can to help the UN 
Special Envoy Eide.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Iran and the EU-3:  Russia and China Hold the Key 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (C) Laboulaye said he delivered an "impassioned speech" to 
Russian Deputy FM Sergei Kislyak on August 31, urging him to 
support sending the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN Security 
Council.  Kislyak maintained that it would be impossible to 
do so at present given the limitations of the 
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), but Laboulaye said he 
insisted, saying that it came down to whether Russia "wants 
the Iranians to build the bomb or not."  The NPT, Laboulaye 
added, has been useful; however, it could take another ten 
years to amend the NPT to make nonproliferation protections 
stronger.  Laboulaye admitted that while countries have 
rights under the NPT, they will still need to prove that 
their programs are strictly for civilian purposes.  France 
therefore is trying to convince the Russians of the 
importance of this added piece, i.e., placing the burden of 
proof on the country developing a nuclear program.  Laboulaye 
said that Kislyak fell back on procedural questions, while 
noting that no one should conclude that the Russians are set 
against taking action.  Laboulaye described the Russian 
perspective as "the answer is no, now what's the question?" 
Kislyak will probably go back to Moscow and discuss with 
Putin, only then can their answer be known, Laboulaye 
observed. 
 
¶3. (C) Fried said that Iran would only respond to political 
pressure and that there needs to be political consequences 
for Iranian actions.  He said that U/S Burns was right when 
he stressed to the EU-3 that there needs to be a "plan B" and 
added that it is important not to whittle down the EU and 
U.S. approach in an effort to placate Russia, South Africa 
and others, only to be left with a UNSC Resolution that 
carries no real consequences at all.  Laboulaye said that 
China and Russia held the key to success with Iran, a point 
seconded by Gourdault-Montagne in his later discussion with 
Fried.  Gourdault-Montagne added that President Chirac would 
soon call President Putin to remind him that we have 
consensus on the NPT interpretation on the basis of the 
August 11 BOG resolution, with the entire NAM on board, a 
consensus that must be cherished and preserved.  Chirac would 
meet his PRC counterpart in New York to make a similar point 
and press for P-5 unity on Iran.  Gourdault-Montagne added 
that he had recently had good discussions with NSA Hadley on 
what to do once we get to New York, with GoF thinking leaning 
towards seeking a UNSC decision, backing the goals of the 
EU-3's Paris Agreement with Iran.  At every point at which 
Fried stressed the need for consequences for Iran, 
Gourdault-Montagne revisited the issue of forging P-5 
consensus, noting it would be a "disaster" if we went to New 
York without it. 
U.S., NATO, and Europe 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) A/S Fried briefed the French on U.S. desire to 
informally share views on U.S.-European relations and related 
issues of mutual interest.  He emphasized to Laboulaye and 
MFA A/S-equivalent Director for Strategic Affairs Philippe 
Carre that the U.S. wanted to work with both NATO, the 
primary instrument of transatlantic security, and the EU. 
Towards that end, it was important that both sides first 
agree on objectives, and then sort out institutional 
arrangements afterwards.  Referring back to the strong 
messages from the President and the Secretary last February, 
he stressed that the U.S. continued to support a strong 
Europe as a partner.  Fried said he would like to see France 
accept a NATO lead on issues where NATO is clearly the most 
appropriate actor (i.e., including security issues broadly 
defined) and that we would do the same when the EU is the 
more appropriate agent (as was the case, for example, in 
supporting democracy in Ukraine).  Fried also observed that 
the U.S. recognizes that the EU is the more appropriate 
partner in the context of development in the broader Middle 
East with NATO playing a supporting role.  Determining which 
institution is most relevant, he said, would perhaps best be 
accomplished through informal consultations. 
 
¶5. (C) Fried suggested that informal meetings on NATO and the 
EU could continue in New York. Carre said France had already 
consulted with the British on how best to work the informal 
lunch.  Fried offered that one potential topic was "engaging 
Islam."  Carre suggested discussion of Darfur (where the EU 
and NATO were each contributing to a solution), Islam and CT 
cooperation.  Fried noted that the Secretary might also want 
to discuss the frontiers of freedom (Ukraine, Georgia, etc). 
However, there should not be a set, formal agenda. 
 
¶6. (C) Laboulaye opined that NATO was the appropriate 
institution to turn to when faced with crises, common threats 
or joint military operations.  For strategic questions, he 
suggested, it would be the EU/U.S. -- perhaps in a more 
limited and informal format.  He cited the "quad" format as a 
possible format, calling it efficient and effective.  He said 
that other countries could be invited as appropriate (such as 
the Poles and the Italians), but that the core remained the 
quad (though he suggested calling it something else, "EU-3 
plus U.S.").  Inventing new formats for discussion, he 
suggested, could prove complicated or counterproductive. 
Fried replied that the U.S. would not reinstitutionalize a 
"quad" per se, but that the variable geometry of 
decision-making dictated a need for coordination among the 
four and additional countries depending on the issue.   Carre 
agreed that political discussions should precede 
institutional decision, but also took the opportunity to 
voice concern that many in the U.S. do not understand the EU, 
how its institutions work, and how they affect 
decision-making.  While they are often perceived as unwieldy, 
European institutions and procedures themselves constitute an 
essential element of EU cohesiveness.  Political symbolism is 
important in the EU. 
 
¶7. (C) Carre said another point to bear in mind is that 
Europeans do not look at world problems immediately from a 
security perspective, and hence do not turn instinctively to 
NATO as the starting point for solutions.  He said the U.S. 
had a tendency to seek military solutions to security 
problems, which could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  The 
French understand, however, that NATO is the conduit for the 
U.S. to discuss challenges with Europe.  Fried agreed that 
there are problems for which NATO is not the answer, but 
countered that the U.S. needs to be able to discuss strategic 
issues at NATO even in instances where no action is required. 
 Fried cited past criticisms by some in Europe that the U.S. 
had not taken NATO seriously as an institution; now that we 
are showing our renewed commitment, we need French support. 
When it comes to action, however, he reminded Carre that we 
want to use both the EU and NATO.  Carre agreed, but 
cautioned that discussions do not always imply action and 
that there are issues that could not be discussed in the 
NATO-EU context. 
 
¶8. (C) Fried apprised Carre, Laboulaye, and 
Gourdault-Montagne of our thinking for the NATO summits in 
2006 and 2008.  The 2006 summit, he said, should focus more 
on capabilities (NRF, funding, ESDP-NATO cooperation), with 
possible enlargement decisions for 2008.  He said we need to 
see how ESDP and NATO can come together to produce a whole 
package of options -- without worrying about institutional 
sensitivities.  The idea would be to line up the EU's and 
NATO's capabilities next to each other to create a sort of 
sliding scale that would enable seamless transition from one 
to the other.  On NATO enlargement and Georgia and Ukraine, 
Fried indicated the U.S. did not have a secret plan.  We have 
told both countries that NATO is performance-based.  Carre 
agreed on the enlargement approach.  He said France does not 
want to risk or generate political fallout in Ukraine by 
offering membership -- "we told Ukraine to just do it, create 
reality, and don't ask yes or no questions."  He observed 
that Georgians needed to be handled more delicately as they 
possess a sense of entitlement.  The French have only told 
them to move forward on their reforms.  Carre said that 
France is keen on NATO transformation discussions, but 
cautioned against certain assumptions.  France, Laboulaye and 
Carre added, would not be able to accept a de facto common 
army at the disposition of SHAPE.  In response to Laboulaye's 
concern about EU autonomy, Fried again explained that the 
U.S. was not seeking an integration of NATO and EU forces. 
 
¶9. (C) Carre said the NAC system at NATO was sometimes being 
circumvented.  NAC should be a place where we can make a 
political compact or validate a decision sheet.  He wasn't 
sure whether the problem is with the NAC, but France feels 
that too many policy decisions are de facto being taken 
haphazardly or by technical bodies.  In particular, he 
complained that France was not happy with how the Military 
Committee (MC) was being increasingly used as a decision 
body.  He pointed to the decisions on expansion of ISAF as 
one such an example.  Political decisions have to be cleared 
at a high-level and not at the MC, which had become the 
default for the NAC, Carre charged.  NATO structures should 
not take on a life of their own.  Fried responded that the 
fix is to recognize that the NAC is a proper instrument of 
political discussion -- and that we need prior consultations. 
 Fried said the U.S. believes that NAC decisions should have 
real weight.  A NAC decision has to lead to 1) forces that 
are capable to be brought into action, 2) and to a shortened 
timeframe between political-strategic decisions and required 
action. 
 
¶10. (C) In parting with Carre, the latter informed Fried that 
on ISAF issues, Defense Minister Alliot-Marie likely would 
soon announce that France was prepared to take the lead role 
in the Kabul region.  Discussions on this issue were ongoing 
with the Turks.  On ISAF-OEF links, France believes that it 
needs more clarity on what the U.S. plans to do with its 
forces.  He also voiced concern that there are discussions at 
NATO on how to develop anti-insurgency strategies, which 
could lead to a duplication at ISAF of OEF's mission. 
 
¶11. (C) A/S Fried concluded discussions on NATO by reminding 
Laboulaye and Carre that he would visit Brussels more 
frequently and talk with counterparts at both NATO and the 
EU.  He also noted that U.S. Ambassador Nuland was working 
hard to build a NATO-EU strategic partnership and to develop 
a good working relationship with her French NATO counterpart. 
 Carre reciprocated French support for Amb Nuland and noted 
that incoming French Ambassador Richard "Ricardo" Duque would 
prove an equally flexible and agreeable partner. 
Gourdault-Montagne agreed that the arrival of Duque, who had 
family ties (through his wife) to the U.S. and a close 
relationship with Chirac, should lead to better bilateral 
consultations before decisions were taken. 
 
EU Internal Developments 
------------------------ 
 
¶12. (C) Laboulaye said that the EU is going through a 
difficult time, but that it aims to become a global actor and 
a U.S. partner while maintaining its ability to make 
decisions autonomously.  This last element, he said, 
guarantees that, from time to time, the U.S. and the EU may 
not agree (he said that this may arise, though he hopes it 
does not, when it comes time for China to fully emerge on the 
global scene).  Laboulaye said that he appreciates the new 
U.S. respect for the EU.  He said that, more recently, the EU 
tried (and was successful) in avoiding what had happened 
during the first Bush administration in Sweden when the 
President was forced to listen to 15 EU countries basically 
repeating the same (and negative) message.  Laboulaye said 
that at times the meeting might have felt "artificial," but 
that with 25 member states it is a "difficult game to play." 
Laboulaye observed that, in large part due to the 'no' 
victory in the French constitutional referendum in May, the 
EU would have to play that game for some time to come.  He 
said that the EU constitution would have made a common EU 
foreign policy more achievable by establishing a common 
diplomatic corps and leadership.  He added that the people 
who voted against the constitution did not do so because of 
common foreign policy concerns.  Momentum, he said, is still 
towards an integrated foreign policy.  He stressed that the 
U.S. should understand that the EU is in a "building process" 
and that the U.S. should avoid being perceived as an actor 
that is trying to pull it apart. 
 
¶13. (C) Fried said that U.S. support for any project or 
institution would not be given based on the theoretical 
merits of the institution, but on results.  He cited U.S.-EU 
cooperation in pressuring the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon 
and the EU-3's willingness to undertake difficult 
negotiations with Iran as concrete examples that reinforced 
U.S. respect for those institutions.  He said that the U.S. 
would work with any partner that shows the conviction and 
strength to achieve results.  The U.S., he reiterated, 
welcomed a Europe that aspires to be a partner and not a 
counterweight, yet the U.S. will continue to foster bilateral 
relationships with individual European countries.  NATO, 
however, remained the pivotal transatlantic link. 
 
France - Russia and Ukraine 
--------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Laboulaye said that France and Russia would hold 
their next regular bilateral meeting on October 11, 
explaining that these meetings began after former U.S. Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage organized a meeting to 
 
SIPDIS 
discuss terrorism with the Russians three years ago.  Since 
then, Laboulaye stated, the Russians and the French have been 
regularly holding strategic talks.  He noted the talks 
between the French Foreign and Defense Ministers and their 
Russian counterparts were at first rigid and formal, but have 
since become more relaxed and productive.  The parties 
discuss a range of topics from nonproliferation to terrorism, 
and more recently have added regional issues such as Georgia 
and Moldova.  He said that France had been helped by Putin's 
willingness to support the talks.  Russian FM Sergei Lavrov 
was difficult at first, he said, given Lavrov's traditional 
hardline Russian approach to diplomacy, but the French have 
broken through and have been able to discuss subjects like 
Ukraine with him candidly. 
 
¶15. (C) Fried noted that it is challenging to work with the 
Russians.  Much of the bureaucracy and leadership is 
anti-Western.  Putin, however, does listen to world leaders, 
such as Chirac, Schroeder and the President, which, he said, 
reinforces the necessity of having a consistent message. 
Fried added that that Putin finds it tactically advantageous 
when the U.S., Britain, France, and the UK quarrel because it 
diverts attention away from Russia.  He said that Russia is 
not moving in a consistent direction, but admitted that 
realpolitik would not work either.  Fried noted that the U.S. 
would work with Russia whenever it could, but was realistic 
about the challenges.  Laboulaye agreed that Russians are 
difficult to deal with and added that they pretend to be in 
line with the rest of the world as regards terrorism, but 
really use their position "to cloak Chechnya."  Laboulaye 
also said the Russians would have to radically alter their 
working and negotiating style as they prepare to assume the 
G8 chair next year.  He said that Russia's success in leading 
the G8 is an important goal, and a special concern, given 
that a number of U.S. congressmen believe Russia should be 
kicked out of the G8.  France is trying to help the Russians 
to learn how to better negotiate with a collection of 
like-minded countries.  Fried assured Laboulaye that there 
are no Administration plans to try to remove Russia from the 
G8. 
 
¶16. (C) Gourdault-Montagne stressed the urgency and 
importance of Franco-German-led efforts to settle the EU's 
relations with Moscow, opining that the whole world balance 
could depend on this.  Gourdault-Montagne described Putin as 
doing what he could to bring Russia to a Western standard, 
while being surrounded by a crowd seeking to serve itself. 
The Russian G-8 Presidency would be a key test of Putin's 
resolve, and we should take the opportunity to achieve 
something.  Gourdault-Montagne added that the GoF would seek 
to continue with Germany the Franco-German-Russian dialogue 
launched in 2003, which Angela Merkel wanted to utilize for 
more direct criticism of Moscow.  Gourdault-Montagne noted 
that these trilateral meetings, despite their anti-Iraq war 
origins, could play a useful role and were not anti-U.S. in 
nature. Instead, the meetings were an opportunity for the 
French and German leadership to speak frankly with Putin, who 
was listening. 
 
¶17. (C) Gourdault-Montagne noted that Chirac planned to go to 
the Ukraine and Kazakhstan in October, and that the GoF had 
developed a good rapport with Yushchenko and could speak 
openly with him.  Gourdault-Montagne warned that the question 
of Ukrainian accession to NATO remained extremely sensitive 
for Moscow, and concluded that if there remained one 
potential cause for war in Europe, it was Ukraine.   He added 
that some in the Russian administration felt we were doing 
too much in their core zone of interest, and one could wonder 
whether the Russians might launch a move similar to Prague in 
1968, to see what the West would do.  Gourdault-Montagne 
cited the example of Finland as a country which became a 
prosperous democracy on the USSR's doorstep, but added he was 
not suggesting that the Ukraine should become Finland.  A/S 
Fried responded that the biggest impediment, in his view, to 
Ukrainian NATO accession was not Russia, but instead was the 
lack of national consensus towards NATO in the Ukraine, in 
contrast to public opinion in Poland and Romania.  He 
dismissed prospects for Russia intervening militarily in the 
Ukraine, noting the capacity of the latter's army and 
cautioned against exaggerating the split between the Eastern 
and Western Ukraine.  Fried summed up that we are not moving 
"breathlessly" towards NATO accession for Georgia or Ukraine, 
a point welcomed by Gourdault-Montagne. 
 
Balkans 
------- 
 
¶18. (C) Fried explained the U.S. position regarding the 
Balkans, which includes plans to encourage Bosnia to 
undertake necessary reforms in advance of the tenth 
anniversary of the Dayton Accords in November.  Fried said 
that he would like to coordinate with the French if they plan 
on commemorating the actual signing of the accords, which 
took place in Paris in December.  Laboulaye said that France 
had great respect for UN Special envoy Kai Eide, who, he 
said, has been agonizing that the "standards are not up to 
standard" in Kosovo.  Decentralization efforts, Laboulaye 
said, have been far from adequate.  He added that the GoF 
would help Eide however it could, though it feels that public 
statements would do little at this point.  The question, he 
said, is how to get Serbs to give up Kosovo without losing 
face.  Gourdault-Montagne agreed on the need for a continued, 
international approach on the Balkans, and the need to keep 
all parties involved, especially the Russians.  On a separate 
note, he added that the question of Croatian EU accession had 
direct implications for French domestic politics, as French 
public would a hard time accepting tougher conditions for 
Croatia (i.e. insistence that General Gotovina be delivered 
to the ICTY in the Hague) than those demanded of Turkey. 
(Gourdault-Montagne's Turkey/EU comments are reported in more 
detail septel). 
 
¶19.  (U) This message was cleared by EUR A/S Fried. 
STAPLETON