This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 006903 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2015 
TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV PHUM IN NP BT
SUBJECT: BHUTAN FEARS MAOISTS IN REFUGEE CAMPS 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 5480 
     ¶B. KATHMANDU 1638 
     ¶C. KATHMANDU 1755 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Bhutanese MFA officials expressed concern 
over Maoist intrusions into refugee camps in Nepal and 
indicated the government's main priority is keeping radical 
elements out of Bhutan during August 24-25 meetings with 
Poloff and Econoff in Thimphu.  The MFA reiterated the Royal 
Government of Bhutan's (RGOB) commitment to the Joint 
Verification Process, however they also signaled that it 
would be impossible to screen out refugees with Maoist 
sympathies.  Government and UN interlocutors unanimously 
agreed that under no circumstances would the RGOB repeat the 
type of expulsions that occurred in the early 1990s, 
regardless of the results of the May 2005 census.  The RGOB 
is issuing new identification cards to ethnic Nepalese, but 
No Objection Certificates (NOCs), needed for government jobs 
and higher education, are still being denied.  Poloff 
informed the MFA that Nepalese Foreign Minister Ramesh Nath 
Pandey is open to meeting Foreign Minister Wangchuk to 
discuss the refugee issue, if requested.  The MFA responded 
that they had not heard this and would forward the request to 
the Foreign Minister. (Note: Polcouns delivered this message 
to Bhutanese Ambassador Tshering in New Delhi on July 13 (Ref 
A) and it appears the message did not make it to the official 
to whom we spoke to in Thimphu.  End Note.)  The RGOB 
suggests that the two Kings meet at the next SAARC summit 
scheduled for November to discuss the refugee issue.  End 
Summary. 
 
The Red Scare 
------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) During four separate meetings with MFA officials over 
two days, the RGOB repeatedly expressed concern over Maoist 
infiltration into the refugee camps in Nepal and underlined 
the need to keep such ideology out of Bhutan.  MFA Policy and 
Planning Under Secretary Karma Rinchenn stated that the RGOB 
could not allow refugees who had been influenced by the 
Maoists to return.  He reiterated Bhutanese fears that 
radical elements in the refugee population, if repatriated, 
would cause havoc and incite the type of violence that 
proceeded the expulsions of the early 1990s.  When asked if 
there would be a way to screen out refugees involved in the 
Maoist insurgency, which the would have RGOB confidence, he 
responded, "how can you screen for people's thoughts?" 
Rinchenn commented that the recent attempt by refugees to 
return to Bhutan (Refs B and C), were organized by the Human 
Rights Organization of Bhutan (HUROB) and the Bhutan Gorkha 
National Liberation Front (BGNLF).  He noted that he had only 
recently heard of the BGNLF and questioned whether it had 
Maoist ties.  There is no Gorkhaland in Bhutan, according to 
Rinchenn, and the attempt to associate the Gorkha movement 
with "the people in the camps" was troubling. 
 
¶3.  (C) MFA Under Secretary Chitem Tenzin also told us that 
the RGOB is worried about Maoist infiltration into Bhutan. 
He asserted that the Bhutanese are desperately attempting to 
save their heritage and culture, and are worried that the 
Maoists would try and destroy this history.  He acknowledged 
that the refugee situation was most regrettable and the 
government was struggling with how to deal with the problem. 
He also reiterated RGOB beliefs that the refugee numbers 
being quoted in the press are much higher than the actual 
number of Bhutanese, and that many of the residents of the 
camps are actually Nepali and Indian citizens. 
 
Committed to the Repatriation Process? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) MFA's Rinchenn told us the RGOB will abide by its 
commitments made under the Bhutan/Nepal Joint Ministerial 
meetings and that his government was not backing away from 
prior agreements.  MFA Under Secretary (Multilateral) Tenzin 
Wangchuk also asserted that the RGOB would not back away from 
the accords made regarding the refugees, particularly the 
agreement to repatriate Category 1 refugees from the 
Khudunabari camp. Tenzin reiterated that the RGOB would not 
resist taking back Category 1 refugees, but that they were 
waiting for the GON to respond to their overtures for 
meetings. 
 
¶5.  (C) Resident Representative for UNDP Renata Lok 
Dessallien, a senior and knowledgeable resident diplomat, 
told us that it is unlikely the RGOB will backtrack on the 
agreement to repatriate Category 1 refugees.  She said that 
the Bhutanese often take a long time to make a decision, 
because it must be by consensus, but that once a decision has 
been made they carry it through.  However, she acknowledged 
that the Bhutanese -- the people and the government -- feel 
very vulnerable politically at this time and may postpone any 
action on the refugees until after the constitution is 
adopted and a new government elected.  She concluded that in 
the end, it is unlikely that large numbers of refugees will 
ever return to Bhutan and that the international community 
should immediately focus its efforts on third country 
resettlement. 
 
Mass Expulsions: Never Again 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Government officials, UN contacts and international 
aid workers unanimously agreed that the RGOB would not repeat 
the expulsions of the early 1990s.  Ministry of Information 
and Communications Secretary Tashi Phuntsog told us in 
confidence that a friend in the census bureau said the new 
populations figures would be lower than current estimates, 
and could "be in the 600,000 range."  However, interlocutors 
asserted that lower population figures will not presage a 
recurrence of expulsion of "non-Bhutanese."  Austrian 
Coordination Bureau Program Manager Ramesh Chhetri told 
Poloff that there are many positive developments in southern 
Bhutan, which point to an acceptance of the ethnic Nepali 
populations there.  He noted that, starting in February 2005, 
the Government began issuing new identity cards to ethnic 
Nepalese, giving them status as genuine Bhutanese, which was 
a marked change in policy.  Chhetri, who is an ethnically 
Nepali Hindu and travels to the south often, commented that 
"a large majority, likely over 90 percent, of ethnic 
Nepalese" meet the citizenship qualifications to be genuine 
Bhutanese and will receive the ID cards.  He noted that most 
of the others would fall into one of the other categories of 
citizenship and that the government would not evict them.  He 
reported he had not heard of any Nepali-origin Bhutanese 
being denied cards by the government since February.  He 
opined that this change in policy was timed to occur before 
the implementation of the constitution, ensuring the minority 
Hindu population currently living in Bhutan would be included 
in the process. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Chhetri acknowledged that discrimination against the 
ethnic Nepali population in southern Bhutan remains and that 
the government continues to withhold No Objection 
Certificates (NOCs) from some of these people.  NOCs are a 
form of security clearance needed to receive government jobs 
or education past the 10th grade level.  Chhetri said that 
"you must be very clean, with no (family) connection to the 
camps in Nepal, to get an NOC."  When Econoff questioned 
MFA's Tenzin about the denial of NOCs, he privately 
acknowledged it was an unfortunate circumstance of the 
refugee problem, that it was discriminatory, and that the 
RGOB would have to work to correct this problem. 
 
RGOB-GON Meeting: Will It Ever Happen? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Poloff informed the MFA that Nepalese Foreign 
Minister Ramesh Nath Pandey is open to discussing the refugee 
issue with Foreign Minister Wangchuk, possibly on the margins 
of SAARC or UNGA, if the RGOB requests the meeting.  The MFA 
responded that they had not heard this and would forward the 
request to the Foreign Minister.  (Note: Polcouns delivered 
this message to Bhutanese Ambassador Tshering in New Delhi on 
July 13 (Ref A) and it appears the message did not make it to 
the official to whom we spoke with in Thimphu.  End Note.) 
Under Secretary Wangchuk expressed doubt that such a meeting 
could take place at UNGA, signaling that the RGOB would be 
occupied with other "very important items," such as UN 
reforms, the Millennium Summit and energy issues.  He 
indicated that if the GON requests the meeting, and time 
permits, it was possible. (Comment: Do not hold your breath. 
End Comment.) 
 
¶9.  (C) Tenzin suggested the meeting should not be at the 
Foreign Minister level, but between Kings at the next SAARC 
summit schedule for November 2005.  He noted that the 
Nepalese ambassador in India has repeatedly asked for 
meetings with the King to discuss the issue, but had been 
rebuffed. 
 
Comment: Time to Move On 
------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) The Bhutanese Refugee problem has dragged on for 
close to 15 years.  Although the RGOB has repeatedly stated 
its commitment to repatriate bona fide Bhutanese citizens, it 
has consistently stalled the process.  Political instability 
and the lack of security in Nepal have recently compounded 
the problem and made the likelihood of a bilateral solution 
even more remote. 
 
¶11. (C) Attempts to use a "carrot and the stick" approach to 
resolving this problem will not be successful.  The countries 
with a financial presence in Bhutan (India, Denmark, 
Switzerland and Austria) that could force RGOB action through 
withdrawal of aid or cancellations of loans have not shown a 
willingness to do so.  Although the GOI publicly states it is 
pressing the two sides to find a solution, New Delhi will be 
wary of anything that could give rise to another neighbor 
with a Maoist insurgency, or active terrorist network working 
against it.  In the Bhutanese mind, there is no incentive 
worth risking the importation of large number of possible 
dissidents or Maoist sympathizers.  The RGOB fear of Maoist 
infiltration of the camps, whether real or perceived, has 
completely colored their judgment. 
 
¶12.  (C) Bhutan views the refugee issue as an extension of a 
much larger issue, that of being a tiny Buddhist country 
sandwiched between the giants of China and India.  The 
Bhutanese have a very real fear of being swallowed up by one 
of the two and recent history supports their case.  China's 
invasion of Tibet and India's annexation of Sikkim weigh 
heavily on the Bhutanese conscience.  Rinchenn noted there 
remains widespread fear in the government and the population 
that, without very careful planning, Bhutan will eventually 
be seized by one of its neighbors. 
 
¶13.  (C) There is no excuse for the actions that the RGOB 
undertook in the early 1990s.  Expelling its own citizens was 
wrong and that message should be made clear.  However, it is 
time to admit that it is very unlikely that a large portion 
of the refugees will ever return to Bhutan.  Even if the 
Category 1's from all of the camps are repatriated, the 
number would only be about 2,500 (extrapolating the number of 
Category 1's from Khudunabari to overall number of 
refugees).  Even if that number is doubled, it still 
represents only a small fraction of refugees, currently 
languishing in the camps, that may ever reach Bhutan.  It is 
time to focus on other solutions.  UNDP's Dessallien agreed 
that that third country resettlement is the correct option. 
The Australian Embassy informed us that they are currently 
making plans for a large scale resettlement program for the 
Bhutanese refugees, if the political will for such an 
endeavor arises.  It is time to focus our efforts on third 
country resettlement, giving relief to the refugees, 
acknowledging Bhutan's security fears and closing the book on 
this saga. 
 
¶14.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http//www.state.sgov/p/sa/newdelhi) 
MULFORD