This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2311
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
DARFUR COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L  NDJAMENA 001412 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, H, INR, INR/GGI, 
PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS 
FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, 
ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF KAWC CD SU
SUBJECT: WEIGHING IN WITH THE DARFUR REBELS: SLM CONFERENCE 
PLANS MOVE FORWARD 
 
REF: STATE 168722 
 
Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Ambassador Wall met with members of Mini 
Minawi's camp of the Sudan Liberation Movement on September 
12 to discuss their views on the recently held Joint 
Commission, their conference plans, and the Abuja talks.  The 
high-level group explained the importance the field 
commanders are placing on the conference to establish a 
negotiating mandate and better organize the movement's 
leadership.  The SLM members feel ignored by the African 
Union and want international support for a two-week delay in 
the talks.  The Ambassador emphasized the importance of tying 
the conference to a firm date to return to the negotiating 
table and offered several alternatives scenarios for SLM to 
accomplish its objectives and re-start the negotiations.  For 
their part, SLM members say they will remain flexible, but 
Abdelwahid's exclusion of them from the negotiating team list 
has only deepened their distrust and hardened their resolve 
to move ahead with the conference.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On September 12, prior to receiving reftel, 
Ambassador Wall, DCM, P/E Officer met with eight leaders from 
the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), including top members of 
the negotiating team, to discuss their plans for the 
conference and the Abuja negotiations.  The group included 
lead negotiator Abduljabar Dosa, Trai Ahmed Ali, Mohammed 
Tijani, Abakar Abubashir, Abdelhasiz Moussa, Mahmoud Adam 
Mahmoud, Suliman Omar Dahiya, and Mohammed Harin.  Over 30 
SLM members are already in N'Djamena and more are arriving 
daily to participate in the conference planning. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Ambassador Wall asked the group how their plans for 
the conference and negotiations were progressing.  Taking the 
lead Abduljabar Dosa, explained that the SLM asked the 
African Union (AU) for a postponement of the Abuja talks 
until October 1.  The field commanders are insisting on a 
meeting to help the SLM avoid an irreparable split.  The SLM 
cannot negotiate effectively if there is no resolution to its 
internal conflict, according to Dosa.  Abakar Abubashir added 
that when the SLM requested additional time, it was based on 
the knowledge that it was important not to lose momentum.  He 
also questioned continued international pressure on the SLM 
to get to the table while the Government of Sudan is 
undertaking another series of attacks. 
 
¶4.   (SBU) Abubashir described the conference planning 
workshops now underway in N'Djamena conference's execution. 
The group is determining who is going and how will they get 
there.  They have also sent a budget request to the SLM's 
friends.  Continued interventions and distractions continue 
to affect the conference time table.  Abubashir noted that 
changing plans will be difficult because the field commanders 
are also working on their contributions to the conference. 
 
¶5.  (C) The  Ambassador asked if given the short amount of 
time, the field commanders might come to N'Djamena to discuss 
their agenda with the SLM negotiators prior to their 
departure for Abuja as an interim measure rather than trying 
to rush into a full-blown conference.  Dosa replied that 
bringing the field commanders to N'Djamena also means moving 
some forces with them and this cannot be done while the SLM 
is under attack by the GOS.  According to Dosa, it is easier 
to move the politicos to the field. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  For the SLM, the conference is a pre-condition for 
the next round of talks.  Abubashir added that the ongoing 
workshops are preparing the discussion papers for the 
conference and other Dafurians are invited to begin the 
Darfur-Darfur dialogue called for in the Declaration of 
Principles.  The movement needs to transform into a political 
organization and behave democratically to ensure that any 
peace agreement reached represents the aspirations of the 
Dafurians.  Trai Ahmed Ali pointed out that the field 
commanders control a sizable piece of land and have forced 
the government of Sudan to negotiate with them.  More than 60 
percent of the conferees will come from within Darfur.  Those 
inside Darfur distrust the motivations of those outside, they 
are demanding to see their chairman inside Darfur.  They 
insist on giving their delegates to the peace talks a proper 
 
 
mandate. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Tijani Mohammed added that SLM cannot go back to 
the Abjua talks in its current fragile state.  The trying 
experience in the discussions over the Declaration of 
Principles (DOP) was a low point for the movement and exposed 
its vulnerabilities to the GOS.  Tijani said SLM has been 
working on the conference since February and promised the 
field commanders it would be held by October 31.  SLM 
requested a postponement of the Abuja talks in order to 
finish the work underway.  According to Tijani, Jan Pronk 
publicly supported a postponement to the end of September. 
However, according to Tijani, the African Union (AU) never 
responded and did not issue an invitation to them for the 
talks.  Despite a meeting with Salim in N'Djamena last week, 
the SLM members did not feel genuinely consulted by the AU. 
In a separate conversation, the same group told P/E officer 
that from their perspective Salim deliberately ignored the 
needs of the largest military force on the ground as he 
arbitrarily set the resumption date, first for August 24 and 
then for September 15.  They view Salim's "compromise" as 
meeting the needs of the GOS, JEM, and Abdelwahid, among whom 
a deal has allegedly been struck for government positions. 
As a result, the politicos say that they are having 
difficulty explaining the AU's positions to the field 
commanders, who are threatening to re-start hostilities. 
 
¶8.   (C) Ambassador Wall asked if the group feared that the 
conference would divide rather than unite the SLM.  Abubashir 
said that it is all right to be divided if the case is put 
before all Darfurians and that is what the Darfurian people 
decide is the best way to move forward.  He added that the 
international community's assistance could help the SLM avoid 
the possibility of deeper division.  He questioned whether 
the SLM's current situation of fragility is good for the 
international community's interests.  Tijani commented that 
the GOS and others (i.e. the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) and the SLM Chairman Abdelwahid Nur) are capitalizing 
on the discussions and sabotaging the movement's ability to 
become stronger.  P/E officer asked if all the non-Zaghawa 
field commanders were involved in the conference planning. 
Various members of the group responded that all the 
commanders on the ground, not just Mini's, are involved. 
(Note: Later, Ali told P/E officer that this is exactly 
Abdelwahid's fears most.  End Note.) 
 
¶9.   (C) Ambassador Wall told the SLM members that the U.S. 
would welcome being able to consider a concrete proposal for 
helping the SLM organize itself, but needs a clear timeline 
for the conference which must be tied to a date to return to 
the peace talks.  In addition, the budget, dates, location, 
and invitees to the conference would be useful.  Tijani 
agreed with the Ambassador that the SLM's plans are 
ambitious, but noted the internal struggle over the DOP 
awakened members and strengthened their commitment to 
negotiations.  Ali added that a two week postponement is not 
life or death to the AU.  A two-week delay is important to 
organize and strengthen the representation for the people of 
Darfur.  He asked what are the material benefits of 
re-starting the talks on September 15 versus October 1.  In 
addition, given the recent GOS attacks, including one on a 
mosque at Tawilla, the conference has become more important 
than the Abuja talks. 
 
¶10.   (C) Ambassador Wall proposed another alternative to the 
group.  This would include the AU's idea of holding workshops 
on power sharing, wealth sharing, and security arrangements 
in the coming two weeks; beginning the talks in early 
October; and breaking for the Muslim holiday.  This could 
allow the SLM to have its conference the last week of 
October.  Serious negotiations would take place after the 
conference.  The SLM members said they would consider this, 
but for them, support for postponement is the best sign of 
the international community's understanding of the gravity of 
the situation. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶11.   (C)  P/E officer meets with the SLM conferees on a 
daily basis and has observed their work on the conference. 
 
 
Committees are writing discussion papers, making decisions on 
structural issues, and sorting out travel arrangements.  The 
group has been holding day-long consultations focused on 
different aspects of an organizational structure.  Chad is 
helping with logistics and has rented an additional house for 
arriving SLM members.  The SLM team expects the conference to 
define a clear negotiating strategy, a coherent body with a 
unified vision for the future, and the development of a 
structure to facilitate the resolution of disputes within the 
movement. 
 
¶12.  (C)  Additional discussion papers include the return, 
reintegration and rehabilitation of refugees and 
internally-displaced persons; manifesto and constitution; 
transformation of the movement into a political party; human 
rights issues; development of Darfur's economic and social 
infrastructure; role of civil society, women, and youth; and 
Darfur's place in Sudan's macro-economic picture.  Political 
issues to be discussed include federalism, foreign relations 
with neighboring countries, land tenure issues, relations 
between farmers and herders, and the reconstruction of 
Darfur's social fabric. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
ABDELWAHID EXCLUDES MINI'S CAMP 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶13.  (C)  On September 14, Mohammed Harin and Abubashir came 
to the Embassy with a letter of protest regarding the 
exclusion of 12 members of the SLM from the Abuja 
negotiations by Abdelwahid.  The group, all of whom are in 
N'Djamena, were removed from the list after Vice Chairman 
Khamis Abdullah last saw it.  All of the various SLM factions 
agreed in Abuja in July to maintain the same negotiating team 
until their internal problems were resolved.  Abdelwahid 
allegedly waited until Khamis had traveled to edit the list 
and send it to the AU.  It is not clear how the AU will 
respond to the list which excludes key players from the Abuja 
negotiations.  On September 11, Abdelwahid's advisor Dr. 
Ahmed Abdulshafi, who was in N'Djamena, told P/E officer that 
he was supposed to travel to Jebel Mara to visit Abdelwahid's 
field commanders and make plans for the Chairman to travel to 
Darfur after the next round of talks. However, because 
Minister of Territorial Administration Gen. Mahamat Ali 
Abdallah was traveling, he did not obtain the necessary 
permission to cross the border. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶14.  (C)  Abdelwahid's attempt to sideline Mini's camp has 
only deepened the distrust between the two groups.  The SLM 
list given to the AU does not represent all of the SLM 
factions.  The irony is that Abdelwahid has now given Mini's 
camp a good excuse to go ahead and hold their conference 
regardless of the Abuja timeline.  Abdelwahid's hamhandedness 
will eventually backfire and undermine his credibility even 
further within the movement.  It may even give Vice Chairman 
Khamis Abdullah, and the non-Zaghawa ethnic groups, reason to 
ally with Mini's camp.  He is already on thin ice with many 
Fur, who are looking for an opportunity to replace him, but 
have not yet done so for fear of Zaghawa domination.  Should 
this happen, it undermines Abdelwahid's claims the conference 
will not be representative.  Angered by Abdelwahid's 
duplicity, the group in N'Djamena is resolved to continue 
with its planning.  They are remaining flexible, however, 
especially in light of their own ambitious timetable and the 
tremendous logistics effort the conference will require.  In 
our view, if the current plan holds, the conference may be 
held the first or second week of October.  It could be held a 
week or two later if some members of Mini's camp go to Abuja. 
 Bahar Arabi arrives back in N'Djamena on September 19.  He 
is currently stranded in Nairobi.  P/E officer is attempting 
to reach Dr. Sharif Harir and Adam Shogar in the field. 
WALL 
 
 
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