This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 NAIROBI 003927 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E 
USAID FOR AA/AFR, AFR/DP AFR/EA 
TREASURY FOR ANN ALIKONIS 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
DEPT PLEASE PASS MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP - KEVIN SABA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2015 
TAGS: ECON EAID KCOR PGOV KE
SUBJECT: CORRUPTION IN KENYA: LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FORWARD 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 539 
 
     ¶B. IIR 6 854 0118 05 (NOTAL) 
     ¶C. IIR 6 854 0169 05 (NOTAL) 
     ¶D. NAIROBI 1425 
     ¶E. NAIROBI 1593 
     ¶F. IIR 6 854 0211 05 (NOTAL) 
     ¶G. NAIROBI 0278 
     ¶H. IIR 6 854 0217 05 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: ECON COUNSELOR JOHN HOOVER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: More than six months after the Government of 
Kenya's anti-graft credentials all but disappeared, the 
country is at a crossroads in the war on corruption.  On the 
one hand, senior civil servants are driving a series of 
systemic reforms and improvements in the country's legal and 
institutional framework - with some good results.  A fully 
staffed and competent Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, 
combined with other reforms, has made it harder for networks 
of well-placed officials and businessmen to engage in grand 
scale theft.  On the other hand, structural impediments in 
the legal system continue to make it almost impossible to 
secure convictions of corrupt high-level officials.  More 
disturbing, however, is the continued lack of political will 
on the part of President Kibaki and his ministers in leading 
the charge and taking decisive action to restore the 
government's still-battered credibility.  In fact, the senior 
political leadership seems determined to avoid any 
investigation into its own membership. The GOK is keeping 
secret the details of a series of large, security-related 
 
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procurement scams, and Kibaki took the path of least 
resistance when recently confronted with evidence of grand 
scale theft on the part of the country's senior-most military 
leadership.  We expect no change in the leadership's lack of 
willingness to act against specific cases of high-level 
graft, but believe we should continue to support the 
underlying institutional reforms that are slowly beginning to 
make a difference.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Corruption Still at the Top of the List 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Corruption - and what the Kenyan Government is or is 
not doing to fight it - continues to be a central issue in 
the broader debate over the country's political and economic 
future.  However, the tenor of this debate, both in public 
and privately among development partners, has shifted slowly 
and subtly in the months since early February, when the 
resignation of anti-corruption czar John Githongo sent shock 
waves through the donor community and plunged the GOK into a 
crisis of confidence - a crisis fed by valid perceptions of 
unchecked high-level corruption within the government's own 
senior ranks (refs A and D). 
 
¶3.  (C) Since that time, some things have changed for the 
better; others not at all.  In the context of the upcoming 
World Bank/IMF meetings and the imminent review by the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) of the latest draft of 
Kenya's Threshold Program concept paper, now is a useful 
moment to look at what has happened, what hasn't, and to 
suggest where the USG might go from here in dealing with 
corruption in Kenya. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Emphasizing Laws and Institutions - With Success 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4.  (C) On September 12, Justice Minister Kiraitu Murungi 
re-emphasized the GOK's oft-stated intention to focus 
primarily on strengthening the country's legal and 
institutional framework as the best way to wage war on 
corruption.  The occasion was a "stakeholders forum" 
organized by the GOK to report and assess progress on the 
GOK's "Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Strategy Action Plan." 
As some will recall, the Action Plan was unveiled in haste 
prior to the GOK-World Bank Consultative Group meetings in 
April (ref  E).  The Action Plan was (and still is) an 
attempt to assure donors - and the Kenyan public - that the 
GOK is serious about fighting corruption.  Perceptions of its 
success shift depending on how one looks at the issue. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) From the perspective of strengthening the country's 
legal and institutional machinery for fighting corruption, 
the September 12 review of the Action Plan revealed that the 
GOK has indeed made important substantive progress over the 
past several months.  First, on the legislative front: 
 
-- The Procurement Bill: A concerted campaign by the Finance 
Ministry and others led to passage August 4 of the Public 
Procurement and Disposal Bill, which is meant to overhaul the 
country's procurement practices, in which many observers 
believe as much as 80% of official corruption in Kenya takes 
place.  The bill still awaits Presidential assent and 
implementation. 
-- The Privatization Bill:  Kenya's many remaining 
parastatals continue to function more as springboards for 
patronage and corruption than as genuine service providers. 
The Privatization Bill, passed by Parliament on August 10, is 
meant to convert parastatals into competitive private firms, 
with the ancillary benefit of reducing the major role played 
by the parastatal sector in the corruption problem in Kenya. 
The bill still awaits Presidential assent and implementation. 
 
-- The Statute Law (Miscellaneous) Bill: This omnibus bill 
contains a potpourri of amendments to existing laws, 
including the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and the 
Public Officers Ethics Act.  Inter alia, it would strengthen 
the powers of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) and 
require senior GOK officials make their declarations public 
and to submit them to the KACC for verification (currently, 
the declarations are confidential and thus virtually 
meaningless - see para 14 below).  The bill was submitted to 
Parliament in April, but withdrawn by the GOK so that 
additional, unrelated amendments could be added.  The GOK 
says it will resubmit the bill and secure passage in October. 
 
-- Other Bills: Other anti-corruption-related legislation, at 
various stages of preparation but not yet submitted to or 
passed by Parliament, include: a Whistleblowers/Witness 
Protection Bill, a Political Parties Bill (which, it is 
hoped, will reduce incentives to steal public funds to 
finance political campaigns), an Anti-Money Laundering Bill, 
and a new Companies Bill to improve accountability in the 
private sector. 
 
Despite this progress, it remains unclear whether the 
momentum established by passage in August of the Procurement 
and Privatization Bills can be sustained in the face of a 
generally unproductive Parliament and the inevitable 
distractions of the country's upcoming Constitutional 
referendum.  The fate of key bills not yet passed, such as 
the Statute Law, thus remain in limbo. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Strengthening the Institutional Capacity Against Graft 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) On the institutional front, there has also been 
progress, most notably at the Kenya Anti-Corruption 
Commission.  The KACC, on which the hopes of many rest, was 
fully staffed as of August 1 with 212 officers, and KACC 
Commissioner Aaron Ringera and other KACC officials claim the 
investigative body is pressing full steam ahead in 
aggressively uncovering corruption cases for prosecution by 
the Attorney General.  Ringera told Econ/C on August 29 that 
KACC is investigating over 400 cases of alleged corruption 
currently, including several involving government ministers. 
While there is little transparency concerning the details, 
the KACC also claims that it has referred 61 cases to the 
AG's office that are now in court, and that 22 additional 
cases have been conveyed to the AG awaiting disposition. 
Eight of the cases under investigation, Ringera claims, are 
among the 20 presented early in 2005 by British High 
Commissioner Edward Clay to President Kibaki as highly 
suspicious and worthy of investigation. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In its Action Plan update, the GOK also claims 
credit for other improvements in the country's investigative, 
preventive, and prosecutorial infrastructure, including: 
 
-- ongoing efforts to expand and strengthen the capacity of 
the Department of Public Prosecution (DPP).  The DPP is 
widely seen as a bottleneck in the prosecution of justice 
generally.  (Note: USAID and the Embassy's Resident Legal 
Advisor are intimately involved in training DPP prosecutors 
as part of this effort.  End note). 
-- expansion of the authority and capacity of the Kenya 
National Audit Office. 
-- publication of the Ndungu Land Report and the beginning of 
efforts to recover land illegally or irregularly allocated in 
the past. 
-- completion by October of the final report of the 
Goldenburg Commission, established to investigate a massive 
foreign exchange rebate scam which occurred over a decade 
ago.  The GOK says it will develop an Action Plan for 
prosecuting or sanctioning wrongdoers by December. 
-- a series of inter-related reforms and modernization, 
spearheaded by the Finance Ministry, of Kenya's budget 
planning, public expenditure and debt management systems. 
-- imminent increases in the number of judges in the judicial 
system. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Grand Scale Corruption: Frozen in Place - For Now 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶8.  (C) In his September 12 remarks, Minister Murungi 
reiterated an oft-heard claim: that due to improvements in 
the legal and institutional framework for fighting 
corruption, grand scale corruption along the lines of the 
Anglo-Leasing scandal has been stopped in its tracks (see 
para 12 below for more information on the Anglo-Leasing 
scandal).  KACC Director Aaron Ringera made the same point to 
Econ/C August 29, arguing that KACC's growing investigative 
prowess and greater general scrutiny of large government 
procurement projects have meant that the longstanding 
networks of corrupt businessmen who insinuated themselves 
into the NARC administration in 2003 are now "frozen."  This 
sentiment is echoed by a number of observers in the 
international community, who see little evidence of 
newly-hached, large-scale scandals within the senior ranks of 
the Kibaki government.  Like Ringera, they credit ongoing 
improvements in the way major procurements are being 
processed and scrutinized, especially by the Finance 
Ministry, and they also sense a more general change -- from 
an atmosphere of impunity to one of greater fear on the part 
of government officials of being investigated, exposed, 
and/or prosecuted for wrongdoing. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
One Major Glitch: Prosecutions Next to Impossible 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶9.  (C) The Embassy agrees that at the very least, it has 
become harder to engage in grand scale theft, and we commend 
the progress being made, primarily by officials at the 
Permanent Secretary-level of the Finance and Justice 
ministries, on the legal and institutional fronts.  That 
said, there remain major problems and weaknesses that 
continue to undermine the success of the overall effort 
against graft.  One such issue is the inability of the GOK to 
secure successful prosecutions in corruption cases.  In his 
speech to donors and civil society in April (ref E), Justice 
Minister Murungi called 2005 "the year of action," by which 
he meant cases would be investigated and wrongdoers tried and 
convicted.  Unfortunately, not a single major corruption 
conviction has been obtained since then.  Indeed, only one 
senior level GOK official has been convicted while in office 
since the NARC regime came to power in 2002, and that 
official was subsequently released under a general amnesty. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The wheels of justice grind slowly in Kenya in 
part because of a severe lack of both quantity and quality in 
the DPP, as noted above.  After being eviscerated politically 
under the previous regime, the DPP requires more prosecutors, 
technical assistance, money, training, internal reform, 
greater independence from the political leadership - and not 
least, time - before it will be fully effective in 
prosecuting justice across-the-board, let alone in complex 
white-collar crime cases in which they are up against 
well-paid defense lawyers. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Increasingly emerging as another, related 
impediment are the rules of court procedure, which hinder 
even competent, aggressive prosecutors.  The weapons of 
choice are constitutional challenges by defendants, which 
lead automatically under current court rules to a stay of the 
criminal case until the constitutional challenge (or 
"reference") is resolved.  Clever defense lawyers defending 
corrupt officials often file a never-ending series of 
back-to-back constitutional references (and/or use other 
delaying tactics), effectively making it impossible for 
criminal cases against corruption to ever move forward and 
see the light of day.  Currently, there appears to be neither 
a mechanism nor the will to weed out frivolous constitutional 
appeals, or to allow criminal cases to run concurrently while 
constitutional references are being heard.  The GOK is 
beginning to recognize this problem as a major impediment and 
participants at the September 12 event were told the Chief 
Justice has been asked to look into how it can be fixed. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Anglo-Leasing Prosecution: Going Nowhere 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) The inability of Kenya's legal system to prosecute 
corruption is nowhere more evident that in its pursuit of the 
$93 million Anglo-Leasing scandals, which rocked the Kibaki 
administration beginning in April, 2004, and which continues 
to hang over the administration like a dark cloud, still 
unresolved.  When the GOK finally went to court in February 
2004, no ministers were named as culprits, but the GOK 
charged three former permanent secretaries and three other 
mid-level officials.  A preliminary hearing in March was 
postponed when the DPP failed to provide defense counsel with 
requisite documents, and then the six defendants all filed 
constitutional references in the case.  With this 
constitutional reference in play, it appears likely the cases 
will drag out until at least October, when a ruling on the 
reference is finally expected. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
The Still-Missing Elements: Transparency and Political Will 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Of greater concern than the inability of the justice 
system to prosecute corruption cases is the one critical 
element in the war on corruption that is still missing: 
political will on the part of President Kibaki and the 
country's senior leaders.  The difficulty in obtaining 
convictions only highlights the need for Kibaki to use the 
administrative powers and political authority at his disposal 
to take tangible action to restore the administration's 
still-tarnished credibility and provide momentum in the war 
on graft.  The simplest such action would be dismissing or 
asking ministers or others suspected of wrongdoing to step 
aside pending full investigations.  In a refreshingly candid 
comment, new World Bank Country Director Colin Bruce told GOK 
officials at the September 12 stakeholders forum that the 
government's credibility in the graft war remains low, and 
would always be in question until the GOK leadership begins 
to follow the international trend of holding high-level 
officials more accountable for their actions, and of 
dismissing ministers, fairly or unfairly, when a perception 
of wrongdoing undermines confidence in government.  But the 
advice seems to fall on deaf ears. 
 
¶14.  (C) The leadership's behavior suggests it remains 
utterly unwilling to lead the charge in this way.  One 
illustration has been the GOK's response to calls for greater 
transparency and scrutiny of wealth declarations.  Under the 
current law, the declarations are sealed, and can only be 
unsealed in cases of probable cause in a criminal 
investigation.  As such, they are in many respects a sham. 
The GOK response to pressure to make the declarations more 
useful is to propose changing the Public Officers Ethics Act 
to require submission of declarations to the KACC for 
verification (para 5 above).  Donors and civil society have 
repeatedly suggested that the President short-circuit what 
could be a drawn out legislative process by simply asking his 
ministers and advisors to voluntarily submit their 
declarations - as a way to restore credibility and enhance 
transparency generally.  But such calls have been met with 
silence, largely due to a political culture at the top that 
refuses to see the need for maintaining higher standards of 
ethics for government officials. 
 
¶15.  (C) Even more revealing is the unwillingness of the 
leadership to make transparent and act decisively on the 
findings of an audit of 18 large, security-related 
procurement deals begun in the Moi era but inherited by the 
NARC government in mid-stream, many under the purview and 
then-Minister of National Security (and now Minister of 
Transport) Chris Murungaru, widely seen as the NARC's 
corruption kingpin.  Following preliminary investigations by 
former anti-corruption czar John Githongo in 2003 and 2004, 
the GOK under the leadership of the Finance Ministry froze 
payments on the 18 suspect deals, which are believed to have 
followed a similar pattern to the Anglo-Leasing scam: 
identification of often non-essential but big-ticket, 
security-related projects by a small network of private 
businessmen working with senior insiders in government; 
secretive procurement processes cloaked under the guise of 
 
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national security; and massive overpayment for goods and 
services received - if goods and services are received at all. 
 
------------------------ 
The Navy Frigate Scandal 
------------------------ 
 
¶16.  (C) One such scam among the 18 is the acquisition by the 
Kenyan Navy of a frigate being procured from a firm called 
Euromarine, which in turn contracted construction to Spanish 
shipbuilders Astilleros Gondan SA Shipyard (refs B and C). 
The existence of the ship tender was the subject of rumors 
for months after the Anglo-Leasing scandals broke, but was 
not confirmed until February, 2005 by the Kenyan Department 
of Defense (KDOD).   KDOD vehemently denied any 
irregularities in the tender, which it claimed was 
competitive and proper.  This, however, is not the case. 
Subsequent credible reports have the ship being delivered to 
Kenya as a civilian vessel that will require expensive 
military retrofitting later, fueling suspicions that the 
purchase price was vastly inflated.  Further, reporting in 
other channels puts veteran corrupt businessman Anul Perera 
in the middle of the deal, though he is now frustrated that 
payments are not being made.  Finance Permanent Secretary 
Joseph Kinyua told Econ/C on August 16 that the internal 
audit of the frigate deal found that the country was not 
"buying air," i.e. that the ship actually exists, but that 
the purchase price (believed to be around $51 million) is 
four times what it should be.  He said payments on the 
contract remain frozen, but that the GOK faces a quandary 
because it is contractually obligated to pay.  Kinyua said 
the GOK will likely attempt to renegotiate the deal for 
better terms. 
 
--------------------------------- 
The Communications Center Scandal 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (C) A similar scandal, but one which crossed the finish 
line before all payments could be frozen, was the 
construction of a communications center for KDOD on the 
southern outskirts of Nairobi.  Little is known about the 
deal except what is reported ref F: that the commcenter 
appeared almost mysteriously out of thin air, with no 
reference to KDOD's procurement plan, and was likely 
constructed for "personal gain" on the part of senior KDOD 
officials. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Reaction to KDOD Scandals: No Accountability, No Will 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶18.  (C) The official response to the frigate and commcenter 
scandals (and whatever else is being uncovered in the audits 
and investigations into the remaining security-related deals) 
speaks volumes about the contradictions in Kenya's stance on 
corruption.  On the one hand, institutionally, the scandals 
are being investigated by the KACC, just as they should be. 
KACC Director Ringera told Econ/C that he successfully pushed 
for unprecedented access to KDOD files and personnel in 
investigating both the frigate and commcenter cases.  He 
built strong cases, directly confronted then-Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Kibwana, and took the files 
twice to President Kibaki to present evidence of graft on the 
part of Kibwana and others. 
 
¶19.  (C) The response by President Kibaki to Ringera's 
findings makes clear the corresponding failure of political 
will to deal with massive corruption within the GOK's own 
ranks.  As reported ref I, Kibaki on August 10 announced a 
major change in the KDOD leadership, including the retirement 
of Kibwana and Vice Chief of Staff Nick Leshan.  Both were 
given post-retirement jobs as Chairmen of the Kenya Ports 
Authority and the Kenya Meat Commission respectively. 
Ringera argued that the shake-up amounted to "administrative 
action" by Kibaki against corruption, and sees it as a 
personal victory.  Econ/C pointed out that not only are the 
KDOD brass not being prosecuted and/or exposed publicly, but 
are being given plush golden parachutes in retirement.  In 
short, with his back to the wall, and with overwhelming 
evidence from Ringera in hand, Kibaki did the absolute least 
possible to avoid actually having to name, shame, and/or 
prosecute fellow senior officials on his watch. 
 
-------------------- 
Is KACC Compromised? 
-------------------- 
 
¶20.  (C) More disturbing are persistent claims that Ringera 
himself is on a short leash, and that aggressive 
investigations into standing ministers are off-limits to 
KACC.  Environment Minister Kalonzo Musyoka told the 
Ambassador in July that he had heard from two sources, 
including a close advisor to Kibaki, that State House had 
instructed KACC to stay away from investigating standing 
ministers (ref G).  A visiting IMF official told the 
Ambassador August 18 that Ringera himself had told him that 
KACC had recently sent several case files to State House 
implicating senior GOK officials, and that the files had been 
sent back with instructions not to proceed.  In our own 
discussions with Ringera, he refutes these allegations, 
claiming no interference or limits on his actions.  In 
oblique terms, however, he acknowledges that KACC operates in 
a highly politicized (and thus restrictive) environment. 
 
------------------------ 
Comment: The U.S. Stance 
------------------------ 
 
¶21.  (C) In essence, we have a government committed at the 
senior civil servant level to pushing ahead with important 
institutional and systemic reforms, some of which are 
beginning to have an impact in terms of closing off avenues 
used for corrupt activities.   But we also have a political 
leadership that remains utterly unwilling to transparently 
and aggressively root out high-level corruption within its 
ranks.  This lack of will on the part of the leadership in 
turn threatens further progress on the longer-term 
institutional front.  The old corruption networks may be 
frozen, but they have yet to be named, shamed, and 
dismantled.  Other reporting indicates they are chomping at 
the bit to get back into business - when the time is right 
again.  Those earnest permanent secretaries driving the 
reform process now can be dismissed or bullied out of office 
the same way John Githongo was when his efforts hit too close 
to home.  This precarious situation won't change for the 
better anytime soon.  Given the complex equities in a 
coalition government deeply divided over region, tribe, 
politics, and personalities, and in which there is probably 
at least a little dirt on everyone, we view it as highly 
unlikely that the Kibaki administration in its present form 
will ever be more transparent and aggressive in pursuing the 
corrupt ministers and presidential advisors operating in its 
midst.  As such, it has no chance of ever recovering the 
credibility it owned when it came to power. 
 
¶22.  (C) Where does this leave us?  In our view, we should 
continue to engage and, where it is sensible, assist in the 
longer-term effort to improve the legal and institutional 
framework for combating graft, including by strengthening the 
DPP as we are doing now, and perhaps venturing into new 
areas, such as procurement reform through the MCC's Threshold 
Program.  In addition to the substantive impact our 
assistance can have, it has the added benefit of signaling to 
reformers in the GOK that we stand with them.  At the same 
time, we need to regularly make clear both privately in our 
conversations with the leadership, and in our public 
statements, that we remain deeply disappointed by the lack of 
accountability and political will on the part of the Kibaki 
administration. We need to also make clear that our 
assistance and support is conditional and that any 
backsliding on the legal and institutional fronts will 
threaten our cooperation and assistance in the same way as 
happened when John Githongo resigned in February. 
BELLAMY