This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 003201 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR/FO; EUR/WE; WHA; NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SP XF XM XL XG
SUBJECT:  AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH DEPUTY FM LEON: 
KATRINA ASSISTANCE, BMENA AND LATIN AMERICA 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS Kathleen Fitzpatrick for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Ambassador Aguirre met with Spanish Deputy 
Foreign Minister Bernardino Leon Sept. 7 to review key issues 
in the US-Spain agenda in the coming months, including BMENA 
and Latin American issues.  He thanked the GOS for its 
sincere and concrete support for the victims of Hurricane 
Katrina, noting that he planned to go to Torrejon airport 
later that day for the departure of two Spanish Hercules 
aircraft bearing assistance to the US.  He also thanked Spain 
for assisting in the aftermath of the bridge collapse in Iraq 
by sending a Hercules aircraft to remove victims.  The 
Ambassador noted that though NEA PDAS Cheney had to postpone 
her visit to Spain, she and the Secretary remained keenly 
interested in Spanish participation in and contribution to 
BMENA, including the Foundation for the Future.  Leon said he 
would make sure the Minister was aware.  On Latin America, 
Leon agreed with the Ambassador on the utility of holding a 
high level "working group" style meeting between the US and 
Spain on Latin America issues, including Cuba and Venezuela. 
Leon put forward the possibility of a meeting on the margins 
of UNGA in either NY or Washington rather than in late 
September in Madrid, noting that all of the key Spanish 
players would be in the US next week.  The meeting also 
touched on Turkey-EU and Western Sahara.  End Summary 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The Ambassador stressed to Leon USG's desire for 
Spanish contribution to the BMENA Foundation for the Future, 
noting Secretary Rice's personal interest and our desire to 
make the Bahrain conference a success with European 
involvement.  Leon said he would convey this to Moratinos but 
acknowledged that he, Leon, did not have full details on 
where Spain stood on the subject.  He stressed Spain's 
interest in ensuring the complementary of the Barcelona 
Process, the Spanish President Zapatero's Alliance of 
Civilizations proposal and BMENA, underscoring his 
government's strong desire to for the Secretary's 
participation in the 10th anniversary meeting of the 
Barcelona process in November. 
 
¶3.  (C)  While pointing to progress in the Barcelona process, 
Leon lamented the impact of these and related efforts 
remained at the "micro" rather than the "macro" level.  The 
impact needs to be made as profound at is widespread, Leon 
noted.   He said the Alliance of Civilizations project, now 
adopted by the UN, remained a key focus of the Spanish 
government as it sought to bridge gaps between the 
Arab/Islamic worlds and the "West" and to dispel perceptions 
that Islamic extremist terrorism was an attack by the entire 
Islamic world rather than an extremist component.  Leon 
thought that a division of labor within several concentric 
circles (BMENA, Barcelona Process and Alliance of 
Civilizations) would be useful.  He noted that Moratinos, now 
in the Middle East (and meeting with the Palestinian 
Authority as well as Israeli government officials) was 
focusing on the security sector and that Spain had 
contributed some 20 million Euros in this and related 
efforts. In underscoring Spain,s strong national interest in 
the Middle East, Leon likened the current situation to the 
Cold War, when states on the border with the Warsaw pact had 
to develop and "Ostpolitik."  Spain, with its proximity to 
North Africa,  now stands on the border of today's challenge 
of Islamic extremist terrorism, and for this reason was 
taking a leading role in efforts, like the Alliance of 
Civilization, to deal with the Arab/Islamic world. 
 
¶4.  (C)  On Latin America, Ambassador Aguirre expressed his 
desire for a high-level working group session with 
appropriate GOS counterparts on Latin America, where the US 
and Spain share interests but where we also have differences. 
 Leon agreed that such a meeting would be useful, 
particularly to review our policies on Venezuela and Cuba and 
our cooperative efforts and concerns in Bolivia, and other 
states.  Leon said Chavez is particularly worrisome to Spain, 
given his capacity for mischief in a variety of areas, 
including the oil sector and regional security.  Spain sought 
to create a group of moderate concerned  governments to 
influence Chavez, balancing outreach efforts with clear 
statements of expectations on Chavez' behavior. 
 
¶5.   (C)  Ambassador Aguirre told Leon that he saw the 
upcoming Ibero-American summit in Salamanca, Spain, as a 
possible accident waiting to happen.  Leon acknowledged that 
the presence of Castro and Chavez would need to be managed, 
and said the government was working on how it would deal with 
public events with these two leaders.  He pointed to Spanish 
President Zapatero's strong statements on Cuba at last year's 
summit in Costa Rica.  Leon said Salamanca would be a "closed 
city" during this time,  intimating that this could serve to 
limit opportunities for grandstanding by Castro and Chavez. 
¶6.  (SBU)  Leon and the Ambassador undertook to find an 
appropriate time frame for a working level meeting.  The 
Ambassador said he was exploring scheduling options for the 
US side in late September.  Leon said that time frame would 
be difficult for the Spanish, given the demands of planning 
the Ibero-American summit in mid-October.  Leon suggested 
that the working-group meeting take place on the margins of 
UNGA, either in New York or Washington, when all of the key 
Spanish players would be in the US.  The Ambassador undertook 
to look into this possibility as well. 
 
¶7.  (C)  At the close of the meeting, the Ambassador raised 
Turkey-EU negotiations.  Leon said that the GOS was concerned 
that the recent Turkish declaration on Cyprus non-recognition 
had complicated the process.  Leon told the Ambassador that 
Moratinos might travel to Ankara and Nicosia to try to help 
ameliorate the situation.  Leon noted that Spain had 
excellent relations with both Turkey (a member co-sponsor of 
the Alliance of Civilizations group initiative) and with 
Cyprus. Thus, Spain felt it could play a positive role. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Leon also noted Spain's concern about resolving the 
Western Sahara issue.  He said at the moment the issue was 
not a front page problem, not connected with terrorism, and 
benefited from a fairly reasonable Saharwi leadership.  In 
the medium term, as Saharwis remained in tent cities, these 
three positive factors could disintegrate and the Western 
Sahara could quickly become a front burner issue.  With its 
good relations with Morocco and Algeria, as well as 
significant Spanish parliamentary interest in the human 
rights aspects, Spain sought to play a role in resolving the 
situation and hoped the USG would also.  Leon suggested the 
US and Spain could work together similar to US-French 
cooperation on Lebanon, and in this way develop a solution 
that would be palatable to Morocco and Algiers. 
AGUIRRE