This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 LIMA 004078 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR DS/DSS/ITA AND DS/IP/WHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2015 
TAGS: ASEC PTER PE
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) 
 
REF: STATE 162859 
 
Classified By: RSO JAMES D. LEMARIE FOR REASON 1.4 (C) 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) In response to Reference A, Embassy Lima provides 
the following information for use in the preparation of the 
DS/DSS/ITA Security Environment Threat List (SETL). Responses 
are cued to questions posed in the SEPQ reporting guideline: 
 
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POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
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¶1.  (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS: 
 
¶A.  Yes.  There is a small Islamic community in Lima that is 
capable of carrying out Anti-American demonstrations.  The 
same is true of an even smaller Pakistani community centered 
in Tacna. 
 
¶B.  Yes.  There are occasional anti-U.S. or anti-imperialist 
demonstrations in Peru on behalf of coca growers or groups 
who protest against the U.S. Government's counter-narcotics 
support for the Government of Peru's (GOP) program.  There 
have been none by Muslims or Pakistanis, however. 
 
¶C.  Yes.  There were several demonstrations in Lima at the 
COMR and the Chancery.  Also, there have been minor protests 
near U.S. counter-narcotics facilities in both Tingo Maria 
and Pucallpa. 
 
¶D.  Varies from less than 100 to more than 3,000. 
 
¶E.  Domestic issues and U.S. foreign policy initiatives often 
trigger these demonstrations. 
 
¶F.  These protests are generally peaceful, but protestors 
have been known to destroy or vandalize property in the past. 
 
¶G.  Yes.  Protestors have damaged Narcotics Assistance 
Section operated USG equipment.  In one instance, NAS 
helicopters received relatively minor damage from 
rock-throwers during a counter-narcotics operation in the 
Monzon Valley.  NAS officials believe the rocks were thrown 
by militant cocaleros operating in the valley.  In April 
2005, three NAS helicopters, manned by Peruvian police, were 
damaged by automatic weapons fire when suspected SL 
operatives attacked an eradication operation. During the past 
year, no U.S. personnel were injured during any 
demonstrations or hostile action.  The threat from the 
combination of cocaleros and narcotraffickers potentially in 
conjunction with local terrorists poses a very real threat to 
USG and host country alternative development projects and 
policies in Peru. 
 
¶H.  No.  Demonstrators have not penetrated our perimeter 
security lines. 
 
¶I.  Yes, anti-government demonstrations occur on an almost 
daily basis. 
 
¶J.  Yes.  Demonstrations have taken place near U.S. 
diplomatic facilities.  The Ambassador's Residence (CMR) is 
located on one of the main routes typically used by 
demonstrators, and it is not uncommon for up to 2000 
demonstrators to pass by the CMR on any given day. 
 
¶K.  The size of demonstrations can vary from a few dozen to 
several thousand. 
 
¶L.  These demonstrations are generally peaceful, but 
destruction of property and vandalism can occur.  Moreover, 
there were several instances when crowds turned hostile, 
blocked the streets and/or highways, and burned tires in 
protest of either the GOP or poor working conditions. 
 
¶M.  No.  To date, these demonstrations have not resulted in 
damage to USG property. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS: 
 
¶A.  Yes.  The host country is currently engaged in an 
intrastate conflict consisting of Government military and 
police fighting an intermittent irregular war with domestic 
terrorists.  The terrorists have expressed support for 
illicit coca growers and provide protection to drug 
traffickers. 
 
¶B.  This conflict is generally limited to specific regions 
(i.e., mainly the drug producing areas of the Upper Huallaga, 
Apurimac, and Ene River Valleys).  However, the main domestic 
terrorist group, Sendero Luminoso (SL) has proven it can 
carry out operations in Lima.  In March 2002, SL operatives 
detonated a car bomb across the street from the U.S. Embassy 
in Lima, killing 10 and injuring more than 40.  In early 
September, 2005, the National Anti-Terrorism Court convicted 
one of the eight defendents on trial for the attack and 
sentenced him to a 30-year prison term. The seven other 
defendents were acquited of involvement in the attack, but 
three were found guilty of belonging to the Sendero Luminoso 
terrorist organization and sentenced to prison terms of 20-25 
years. 
¶C.  There are no declared diplomatic facilities, but there 
are U.S. counter narcotics Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) 
in the listed areas outside of Lima. 
 
¶D.  Yes.  Sendero Luminoso has demonstrated an anti-American 
orientation. 
 
¶3.  (S) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES: 
 
¶A.  The level of professionalism and training varies between 
units (poor to average), with specialized units (such as 
SWAT, Bomb Squad, Rescue, etc.) being more professional and 
better trained/equipped than the regular police forces.  Low 
salaries and morale detract from professionalism. 
 
¶B.  Yes, many of these units have been trained by U.S. 
agencies to varying degrees. 
 
¶C.  Yes, corruption is endemic and debilitating, with 
appropriate vetting and precautions the mission is able to 
work effectively with local law enforcement agencies. 
 
¶D.  The intelligence services have a varied ability to deter 
terrorist actions.  Some of the police intelligence (DIRIN) 
and counter-terrorist (DIRCOTE) units are effective at 
deterring terrorist actions, but other units lack the 
necessary funding, manpower, and training to fully deter 
terrorist actions. 
 
¶E.  Peruvian intelligence services have been very cooperative 
with U.S. Embassy requests for information and support.  The 
National Intelligence Council (CNI) is being rebuilt from 
scratch following several years of being suborned by its 
former intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, for personal 
political and financial gain.  However, the CNI has 
demonstrated a willingness to fully cooperate with the U.S. 
Embassy and shares information on a regular basis. 
 
¶F.  Host country services have scored anti-terrorism 
successes within the last 12 months.  In November 2004, 
DIRCOTE captured Arturo Chumpitaz ((AGUIRRE)), the head of 
the Sendero Luminoso Metropolitan Committee in Lima. Also, 
Peruvian authorities arrested Jaime Zuniga ((CORDOBA)) in 
November. Zuniga was considered one of Sendero Luminoso's 
primary leaders of the Proseguir faction. On the other hand, 
host country officials also suffered setbacks in their war 
against SL.  In February 2005, SL operatives ambushed and 
killed three PNP highway patrol officers, in the Department 
of San Martin.  In April 2005, narco-terrorists, presumed to 
be SL, attacked an eradication operation in the area south of 
Santa Lucia, opening fire on helicopters belonging to the 
Embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section manned by Peruvian 
police.  Two weeks later, police arrested three individuals 
believed to have been involved in the ambush. In May 2005, 
suspected SL operatives detonated an explosive device in 
front of a NGO office in Aucayacu, causing slight damage to 
the front of the building.  In July 2005, narco-terrorists 
ambushed a PNP patrol squad in the San Martin province, 
killing three people. One of the suspected ringleaders in the 
attack was arrested three days later by DIRCOTE police. 
 
¶G.  Yes.  The host country is normally very responsive to 
Embassy requests for protective security. 
 
¶H.  The Embassy assesses as very good the overall security at 
major airports (Lima, Arequipa, Cusco) in the country; at 
smaller regional airports, security is poor.  This security 
rating relates to physical security, however, as procedural 
security, relating to document fraud and alien smuggling, is 
poor at all airports. 
 
¶I.  Immigration control agencies are generally considered 
ineffective due to high levels of corruption and a lack of 
resources. Illegal immigrants and potential terrorists can 
easily enter and depart the country with little worry of 
inspection by host country immigration services.  Customs has 
not been effective in screening outgoing cargo for drugs. 
 
¶J.  Border patrol forces are generally considered ineffective 
due to a lack of resources and serious corruption.  Peru's 
jungles, bordering Brazil, Colombia, and Bolivia are 
extremely difficult to control and are very porous. 
 
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INDIGENOUS TERRORISM 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS: 
 
¶A.  Yes.  There are indigenous anti-American terrorist groups 
in Peru. 
 
¶B.  Two main groups - Sendero Luminoso (SL) and the Tupac 
Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). 
 
¶C.  No.  These groups have not carried out an anti-American 
attack within the last 12 months. 
 
¶D.  No.  However, attacks in previous years were extremely 
lethal. 
 
¶E.  Yes.  These groups have attacked U.S. diplomatic targets, 
but not within the past year. 
 
¶F.  Yes, these groups have attacked U.S. business, military, 
or U.S.-related targets, but not within the past year. 
 
¶G.  Recent SL attacks against Peruvian government forces and 
facilities are mainly confined to specific regions, although 
SL retains the capability to conduct isolated attacks 
anywhere in the country. MRTA has not conducted any attacks 
in a number of years.   Although credible information on MRTA 
capabilities has been difficult to obtain in the recent past, 
their ability to carry out attacks is considered greatly 
diminished. 
 
¶H.  There are no declared diplomatic facilities in the 
regions where they are most active. However, there are U.S. 
counter-narcotics Forward Operating Locations in these areas 
(Pucallpa and Tingo Maria).  Also, NAS and DEA personnel 
carry out counter-narcotics operations on a temporary basis 
from host country police and military bases in the 
Apurimac/Ene River Valleys.  AID personnel also support 
development projects in these areas. 
 
¶5.  (U) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS: 
 
¶A.  No.  There are no other known indigenous terrorist groups 
(not anti-American) in country. 
 
¶B.  N/A 
 
¶C.  N/A 
 
¶D.  N/A 
 
¶E.  N/A 
 
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TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 
----------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS: 
 
¶A.  Yes.  The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
have a presence in Peru. Also the possibility exists that 
there are Islamic extremists who transit Peru or operate in 
the southern Department of Tacna and perhaps even in Lima. 
Also, although classified as an indigenous terrorist group, 
SL and MRTA do have supporters outside of Peru. 
 
¶B.  FARC presence in Peru is considered to be limited to 
support, finance and propaganda activities. 
 
¶C.  No.  The host country is not sympathetic to these groups. 
 
¶D.  Embassy Lima is not aware of any suspect Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGO's) in the country that have a relationship 
with any of these groups. 
 
¶E.  Yes.  There are Muslims, primarily Pakistanis, who are 
possibly sympathetic to Islamic extremists.  Most of them 
live in the Department of Tacna, along the southern border 
with Chile. 
¶F.  The EAC assesses the level, intent, and scope of hostile 
intelligence services in country relative to potential 
anti-American terrorist acts to be very low. 
 
¶G.  Weapons and explosives are readily available throughout 
the country either by purchase or theft.  Also, corrupt 
government officials and porous borders facilitate illicit 
arms transfers into and out of the country. 
POWERS