This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HELSINKI 001013 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR R, P, AND EUR/NB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL KMPI KPAO PGOV PHUM KDEM EAID FI
SUBJECT: EXTREMISM IN FINLAND 
 
REF: STATE 159129 
 
Classified By: POLOFF DAVID ALLEN SCHLAEFER FOR REASONS 
 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Finland has a small but growing Muslim 
population of approximately 20,000.  Extremist sentiment is 
not widespread throughout the Muslim community, but areas 
of concern exist.  Embassy Helsinki's strategy to combat 
extremism consists of an active outreach to Finland's 
Muslims coupled with programs designed to counter 
xenophobia and promote tolerance in Finnish society. 
Embassy-sponsored receptions and roundtables have increased 
our understanding of Finland's Muslim community and our 
ability to monitor extremism.  PD programming has brought 
in experts to promote tolerance and sent both ethnic 
Muslims and ethnic Finns to the U.S.  The GoF has just 
launched an ambitious strategy to prevent extremism in 
Finland; it is too early to assess the effectiveness of GoF 
plans.  End Summary. 
 
 
Finland's Demographics 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U)  Finland is one of the most homogeneous countries 
in the European Union; only 2% of the country's population 
in 2004 was foreign-born.  According to the Finnish Office 
of Vital Statistics, there are 108,346 foreign-born 
residents in the country out of a total population of 
5,237,000.  By country-of-origin, Russians made up the 
largest immigrant group (24,626), followed by Estonians 
(13,978) and Swedes (8209).  However, Muslims now 
constitute the fastest growing segment of Finland's 
immigrant community.  There were approximately 20,000 
Muslim immigrants of varying nationalities in Finland at 
the end of 2004.  Finland's Muslim population is diverse, 
and includes Somalis, Bosnians, Iraqis, Iranians, peninsula 
Arabs, Pakistanis, Turks, Palestinians, Afghanis, and 
Moroccans.  Many of Finland's Muslims came to the country 
as refugees or asylum-seekers, although some, especially in 
the Turkish and Pakistani communities, are economic 
migrants.  Asylum-seekers and economic migrants are more 
likely to be "secular" Muslims that are better educated, 
professionally employed, and better integrated into Finnish 
society.  Muslim refugees to Finland are less likely to be 
integrated and tend to live in relatively closed 
communities. 
 
 
The Muslim Experience in Finland 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U)  Finland presents several unique challenges for 
Muslim immigrants.  The language barrier is a significant 
problem; acclimation to the Nordic environment and harsh 
arctic winters can be difficult; and the country's 
relatively homogeneous racial and religious composition 
exacerbates natural tensions.  The GoF attempts to 
ameliorate these difficulties through a broad range of 
social welfare programs designed to facilitate assimilation 
and integration into Finnish society.  Immigrants receive 
language training, may participate in seminars about 
Finnish culture, and are eligible for special housing and 
employment assistance, in addition to the already generous 
welfare state benefits enjoyed by all legal residents in 
Finland.  Muslim conscripts in the military are served 
culturally sensitive meals.  Finnish law prohibits racism, 
discrimination, and "hate speech," and the country has a 
long history of religious tolerance.  An Ombudsman for 
Minorities handles general complaints about racism and 
discrimination, and a special "court" housed in the 
Ministry of Justice adjudicates cases involving labor 
discrimination.  From the outside looking in, Finland's 
official policies on integrating newcomers seem a model of 
proactive, enlightened social welfare. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The reality is somewhat more complicated.  Many 
of the GoF's programs aimed at promoting integration have 
not worked well in practice.  Although the large group of 
Somali refugees that came to Finland in the mid-90's has a 
better track record on language acquisition, many of the 
more recent immigrants have poor (if any) proficiency in 
Finnish, sharply limiting their economic opportunities. 
The GoF resettled many refugees in medium and small towns 
scattered across the country in an attempt to avoid the 
concentration of immigrants in poorer inner city 
neighborhoods.  However, a significant number of refugees 
subsequently move to Helsinki on their own.  Muslims tend 
to be concentrated in distinct ethnic enclaves in the 
working class parts of the city.  There are few overt acts 
of violence against Muslims, but many express frustration 
over more subtle and deeply entrenched xenophobic attitudes 
in Finnish society.  One Finnish Muslim described to Poloff 
what he called a "culture of politeness" that was 
politically correct and largely benign, but still left most 
Muslims feeling like permanent outsiders in their new 
homeland. 
 
¶5.  (U)  On the other hand, many Muslims in Finland resist 
assimilation into the larger polity.  Leaders of Muslim 
religious communities decry what they see as the 
materialism and sexual permissiveness of secular Finnish 
society.  Finland's strong feminist movement and general 
emphasis on gender equality issues is also at odds with 
traditional Muslim gender roles.  Some Muslims fear their 
children may lose their unique cultural identity if they 
integrate.  This perspective has contributed to the 
"separate but equal" dynamic of self-segregation that is 
increasingly a part of the Muslim experience in Finland. 
 
Less Extremism, but Limited Monitoring Ability 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6.  (C)  Support for violent extremism and jihadism is less 
evident in Finland's Muslim communities than in some other 
Nordic countries.  There is no Finnish equivalent to Mullah 
Krekar in Norway or to the more radical imams in Sweden and 
Denmark.  There are three main religious communities in 
Helsinki and smaller communities in Turku, Tampere, and 
Oulu.  Finnish authorities believe that these communities 
are less politicized than many of their counterparts 
elsewhere in the EU, although there are several persons of 
interest (particularly in Turku) that are closely 
monitored.  Recent immigrants are more likely to express 
support for terrorism and extremism than members of 
established communities. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Finnish authorities admit that given the lack of 
assimilation and integration of many Muslims into 
mainstream society, they have limited ability to monitor 
extremist sentiment in religious communities.  In the words 
of one senior officer in the Frontier Guard:  "We really 
have little idea about what is going on inside these 
groups." However, others argue that monitoring efforts are 
limited because some senior Finnish security officials 
simply do not believe that Finland could ever be a 
terrorist target.  Events such as the London and Madrid 
bombings notwithstanding, their thesis centers around the 
argument that the Muslim population is simply too small and 
too diverse to pose any real or potential threat.  As a 
senior British diplomat has commented to us, "I have every 
confidence that the Finnish security police would handle 
any terrorist threat with the greatest efficiency.  I just 
fear that they are not looking for those threats as 
efficiently as they should." 
 
 
Embassy Helsinki's Muslim Outreach and Other Efforts to 
Combat Extremism 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  The Embassy has a dual approach to combat 
extremism in Finland:  reaching out to the Muslim community 
as a means of heading off nascent extremism while helping 
to address unhelpful xenophobic and reactionary tendencies 
in larger Finnish society.  We work closely with Finnish 
authorities and partners whenever possible and appropriate. 
The centerpiece of our outreach effort has been a series of 
four receptions and roundtables during the past two years 
for secular and religious leaders of Finland's Muslim 
community.  The events gave us an opportunity to expand our 
knowledge of and contacts in the community;  Muslim 
participants used the fora to sound off on issues such as 
discrimination, obstacles to and concerns about 
integration, gender equality issues, U.S. policy in Iraq 
and the Broader Middle-east, terrorism, and special 
concerns such as the Abu Ghraib scandal.  Some commented 
that it was ironic that it "took the U.S. Embassy" to 
convene such meetings in Helsinki.  Our outreach program is 
ongoing and aims at long-term results.  The Embassy will 
host another roundtable (or possibly an iftar meal) this 
fall. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  We use PD programming to combat extremism.  In 
2004, we sent a Muslim woman (Aysu Shakir) to the U.S. on 
an international visitor program for young European 
leaders.  Shakir is an ethnic Turk/Tartar, and was a Social 
Democrat Party candidate for Parliament in 2003.  Although 
she was not elected at that time, she was the first Muslim 
candidate for national office in Finnish history, and was 
subsequently elected to the Helsinki City Council.  By 
cultivating moderate Muslim leaders (especially younger 
leaders) like Shakir, we hope to encourage a more positive 
image and better understanding of the United States.  This 
year, we selected a Member of Parliament from the Green 
Party (an ethnic Finn) to participate in an IV program 
aimed at promoting multicultural diversity.  Anne Siinemaki 
is an up and coming young politician who narrowly lost a 
bid to become her Party's chairperson, and who enjoys 
strong support cross party support among Finland's youth. 
We hope Siinemaki will gain valuable experience during the 
IV visit with a view toward fighting racism and 
discrimination and encouraging tolerance for religious and 
racial diversity Finland. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  The Embassy also programs expert American 
speakers inside Finland.  The Embassy co-sponsored a 
seminar on resurgent anti-Semitism in Europe with a Finnish 
NGO and Finland's Parliament.  The one-day seminar (at 
Parliament House in Helsinki) featured Finland's Justice 
Minister as keynote speaker, as well as panel discussions 
about the roots of current anti-Semitism in Europe and the 
role of education in combating anti-Semitism.  Our Public 
Affairs Section facilitated the participation of Deidre 
Berger, the Associate Managing Director of the American- 
Jewish Committee in Berlin, in the seminar, and arranged 
additional meetings for her with Finnish social and 
education authorities. 
 
¶11.  (C)  In December of 2004, we arranged a visit to 
Finland by Dr. Paul Jabber, a leading USG consultant on 
Salafi fundamentalism and the cultural and ideological 
underpinnings of jihadi theology.  Jabber spoke to a group 
of approximately 40 senior and mid-level officials from the 
Foreign Affairs, Justice, Interior, and Social Affairs 
ministries, as well as police and security officials.  The 
audience was carefully selected by the MFA's Counter- 
terrorism Coordinator, Ambassador Ilvo Salmi, with a view 
toward enhancing the GoF's ability to understand and 
recognize extremism at home and abroad, and encouraging 
discussion within the GoF about ways to prevent it.  As we 
hoped, Dr. Jabber's visit sparked GoF dialogue about the 
problem of extremism, and we received several subsequent 
requests for additional material from his presentation that 
Finnish authorities used in creating their own response. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  All of the Embassy's programs are designed for 
long-term impact.  The target audiences range from leaders 
in the Muslim community (20-30 persons) to individual IV 
programs.  Our early assessment is that the programs are 
very effective.  Increased availability of IV and VOLVIS 
opportunities, as well as an enhanced ability to bring 
American speakers to Finland, would greatly improve our 
ability to affect and prevent extremism in Finland. 
 
 
Finnish Plans to Combat Extremism 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C)  Until very recently, the GoF had no real strategy 
to combat extremism within Finland.  Apart from the 
previously described programs to facilitate integration of 
immigrants and refugees into Finnish society, there was 
little "official" contact between authorities and the 
Muslim community.  Few Finns have experience in the Middle- 
East, and even fewer speak Arabic or Farsi.  That said, we 
have detected some tentative shifts in the "it can't happen 
here" attitude over the past year.  The Van Gogh murder in 
the Netherlands and subsequent discussions between Dutch 
and Finnish officials opened some eyes to the possibility 
of future problems in Finland.  One report drafted by a 
Finnish liaison officer at Eurojust about extremism among 
Dutch Muslims was widely circulated among government 
agencies.  The London bombings may have added some sense of 
urgency to GoF deliberations about how to prevent extremist 
sentiment in Finland. 
 
¶14.  (C)  A clear positive sign is the June 2005 creation 
of an "Office for Muslim Outreach" within the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs.  Ostensibly the new office is designed to 
educate Finnish officials from all ministries and agencies 
about Islam.  The office (which currently consists of only 
one person--  Director Kirsti Westphalen) organized its 
first event last month, a seminar (largely drawn from the 
Jabber presentation) for Finnish ambassadors who were 
gathered in Helsinki for an annual conference.  Additional 
seminars are planned in the coming months for senior 
officials from other agencies.  Westphalen told Poloff that 
eventually the GoF hopes the office will expand its 
operations and chair an intra-agency committee to serve as 
a policy coordination clearinghouse for both domestic and 
foreign policy involving Islam.  For example, Finnish 
development assistance for a large Sudanese irrigation 
project would be first considered in the context of local 
conditions and Koranic teachings about agriculture and 
water rights. 
 
¶15.  (C)  Westphalen's most ambitious plans involve the 
domestic issue of integrating Finland's Muslims.  The GoF 
proposes forming a type of "Finnish-Muslim Council" to 
create a space for dialogue between Muslims and the 
government.  Westphalen believes Finland can prevent the 
formation of extremist sentiment by aggressively reaching 
out to Muslim communities and bringing any radical elements 
into the political process.  Rather than investigating or 
deporting radicals, they would be made political 
stakeholders.  Using the analogy of postwar French and 
Italian communists having been "tamed" by their inclusion 
in coalition governments, Westphalen says that it is 
possible in Finland and elsewhere to reach out to 
unpalatable elements in this way and influence better 
outcomes than through a "policy of confrontation." 
Proactive long-term strategic planning--  such as 
identifying areas of conflict between Finnish and Shari'a 
law and incorporating the latter in some way into the 
Finnish legal code-- would be an essential part of such a 
strategy. 
 
¶16.  (C)  The GoF is also working with NGO and think-tanks 
to address the problem.  Next month, the prime minister's 
chief of staff will give the keynote address at a 
conference on the "Roots and Routes of Democracy and 
Extremism" sponsored by the U.S. National Academies, 
Finland's Aleksanteri Institute, and the Russian Academy of 
Sciences.  The conference will look at factors affecting 
the development of extremism within democratic societies, 
the detection of early warning signs of conflicts within 
ethnic groups, and challenges to national education systems 
in avoiding and coping with extremist sentiment.  Thomas 
Pickering will participate in one of the panel discussions. 
 
¶17.  (C)  Comment: It is too early to assess the effect of 
the GoF's efforts to prevent and counter extremism in 
Finland, but the GoF is clearly waking up to the need to 
better understand the country's small but growing Muslim 
population.  Westphalen's office may be small, but it 
represents a solid start, and she reports that her access 
to senior officials -- including President Halonen -- is 
good.  However, her personal views about the inevitability 
or desirability of mass immigration from Muslim countries 
to Finland and the need for Finnish culture and society to 
adapt accordingly are probably not shared by a majority of 
Finns, in or out of government. Finland's immigration 
policy is among the EU's more restrictive, and it is by no 
means certain that even with a looming demographic 
shortfall, the country will look to increased immigration 
from the Muslim world to ameliorate the situation. 
 
¶18.  (C)  Comment, continued:  Still, more workers will 
leave Finland's workforce this year than enter it, and 
demographers predict a serious labor shortage by 2010.  A 
recent, slight increase in Finland's birthrate is 
insufficient to ameliorate the problem in the short-term. 
Politicians are reluctant to suggest Finns should have more 
babies for fear of being labelled racist or, as in the case 
of Prime Minister Vanhanen in 2003, sexist.  It seems just 
as unlikely that Finnish retirees, workers, and students 
will accept a reduction of the generous welfare state 
benefits that they currently enjoy.  Given that, increased 
immigration, whether from Muslim countries or elsewhere, 
will remain an option and issue of sharp debate for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
MACK