This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 HARARE 001345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: CONTINUING RIVALRIES, SUCCESSION TENSIONS 
COMPLICATE ZANU-PF'S FUTURE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell for reasons 1.5 b/d 
 
------------------------ 
Summary and Introduction 
------------------------ 
 
¶1. (C) By many measures, the Robert Mugabe's ruling ZANU-PF 
party is as firmly in control of Zimbabwe as ever.  Its 
tainted but overwhelming parliamentary election "victory" 
in March left it in firm control of the legislature and 
executive, and simultaneously demoralized Zimbabwe's 
political opposition and civil society.  Emigration 
continues to bleed much of the best human resources for 
democratic forces; destitution or prospective destitution 
hobbles many of the rest.  "Operation Restore Order" has 
politically and economically disrupted the urban masses 
viewed by many as critical to any effective domestic 
opposition; that hundreds of thousands of victims submitted 
without resistance testifies not only to the passive nature 
of the populous, but also to the effectiveness of the GOZ's 
heavy hand. 
 
¶2. (C) Below the surface, however, ZANU-PF remains a party 
on the edge.  Deep resentment and concern over Restore 
Order is palpable outside and inside the party.  The 
magnitude of the party's economic failures complicate 
relations with the outside world and fuel discontent within 
the country and within the party.  Compounding all of this 
is Robert Mugabe's autocratic rule and refusal to 
countenance meaningful debate over serious challenges 
facing the party - especially succession.  However, party 
discipline is still strong, particularly at the top, in 
part because of a patronage system that, while under 
stress, remains the only game in town. 
 
¶3. (C) This report examines divisions within the ruling 
party, especially as they relate to prospective leadership 
succession.  The party is beset by cross-cutting rifts: 
personal, ethnic, and generational.  Nonetheless, there are 
substantial forces that hold this bunch together: 
interwoven family and business connections; a sense that 
"we hang together or hang separately" in the face of 
growing political pressures; the bonds of shared historical 
experience; and, perhaps most importantly, an undisputed 
leader and his pervasive patronage system.  How compelling 
these centripetal forces will be in Mugabe's absence is a 
pivotal issue.  For now, Mugabe  chosen standard-bearer, 
Vice President Joyce Mujuru, and the dominant Zezuru clique 
retain the inside track, but long-term succession remains 
an open question that will hinge largely on the 
circumstances and timing of Mugabe's departure from the 
scene. 
 
-------------------- 
Mujuru vs. Mnangagwa 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Purges associated with the last year's ZANU-PF Party 
Congress, the  sholotsho conspiracy", and the ruling 
party's parliamentary primaries have put to bed open 
discussion of leadership succession within the ruling 
party.  On paper, President Robert Mugabe is in charge and 
Vice President Joyce Mujuru is his standard bearer.  If 
Mugabe were suddenly to be incapacitated or step down, few 
doubt that under current circumstances Joyce Mujuru would 
be the ZANU-PF candidate in a presidential election that 
the constitution requires within 90 days. 
 
¶5. (C) Nonetheless, the rivalry between the factions of 
Solomon Mujuru and Emmerson Mnangagwa remains an important 
factor in Zimbabwean politics, albeit largely outside the 
public view.  That Mnangagwa's "Young Turk" faction 
garnered seven of the ten provincial presidium votes before 
Mugabe squelched its bid for power testifies to that 
faction's continued broad support.  The six pro-Mnangagwa 
provincial chairpersons suspended after the Tsholotsho 
meetings and other demoted Mnangagwa supporters retain 
influence among rank and file.  While accepted publicly, 
last December's establishment of Joyce Mujuru as Mugabe's 
heir apparent deeply rankled Mnangagwa's forces and many 
view her election as a temporary setback, not the end of 
the contest. 
 
--------------------------- 
Enduring Ethnic Resentments 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Historically, the Mnangagwa-Mujuru factional 
conflict is associated with a struggle for intra-Shona 
tribe dominance between Mugabe-Mujuru's Zezuru clan, which 
accounts for nearly 20 percent of Zimbabwe's population, 
and Mnangagwa's more numerous Karanga clan, which accounts 
for more than 30 percent of the population.  The Zezuru are 
centered largely around Mashonaland while the Karanga 
dominate Masvingo and much of the Midlands.  Many Karanga 
have long felt that it would be their "turn" to rule after 
Mugabe.  Mugabe's replacement of long time Karanga Vice 
President Muzenda with fellow Zezuru Mujuru deeply 
disappointed the Karanga, who viewed the position as 
"theirs" and a springboard to national leadership in the 
party's succession exercise. 
 
¶7. (C) Mugabe's "siding" with the Mujuru clique represented 
a watershed of sorts after carefully balancing ethnic 
groups for a generation.  However, ethnic rivalries and 
maneuvering have been a hallmark of ruling party politics 
for years.  The Manyika, a third Shona sub-group accounting 
for just under 20 percent of the population, have 
traditionally supplied a disproportionate number of 
prominent political figures and also feel they deserve a 
shot at leadership.  Nonetheless, the 
independent-mindedness of the Manyika, who voted for the 
opposition more than any other Shona group and whose number 
include opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai and ex-Finance 
Minister  Simba Makoni, make them a group to be controlled 
in the eyes of many party leaders. 
 
¶8. (C) The minority Ndebele (roughly 15 percent of the 
population), who were ruthlessly suppressed during the 
mid-80s, are at most a swing group in the leadership and a 
box to check in cabinet-making exercises.  Indeed, the 
Ndebele leaders within the party are largely despised by 
the Ndebele people and have proven utterly incapable of 
delivering their constituency in national elections. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Conflicting Generational Perspectives 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Cutting across ethnic divides are conflicting 
generational perspectives.  The Old Guard in Mugabe's 
generation tend to frame the party's legitimacy in 
nationalist terms, equating liberation credentials with 
entitlement to leadership.  That chafes the party's younger 
generation, which attaches higher priority to economic 
progress and a more open political process - inside if not 
outside the party.  Much of Mnangagwa's appeal is in 
playing to younger generation frustrations that transcend 
ethnic allegiance. 
 
¶10. (C) Importantly, though, most recognize that there is 
little genuine ideology behind the Old Guard's frequently 
truculent, anti-western, anti-democratic fulminations. 
Mugabe himself may be the country's last true ideologue, 
and many expect that all factions will quickly reorient 
themselves - rhetorically at least - to the West and more 
conventional development strategies once he has gone.  In 
the meantime, liberation rhetoric and confrontationist 
posturing at the top will prevail, reflecting Mugabe's 
dominance and the regime's inability to explain its gross 
policy failures in any other terms. 
 
¶11. (C) For its part, the younger generation's allegiances 
are shallow and prone to shift.  While many have been 
aligned with Mnangagwa, they are represented in both 
camps.  Many privately profess commitment to 
democratization and economic reform; however, their actions 
(or more often inaction) - largely in lockstep with 
leadership dictates  elie their words.  Their posturing 
must be taken in the context of their overarching 
objectives of personal security, advancement and 
enrichment.  Most may be identified with one faction or 
another but in fact quietly hedge political allegiances 
with a view to maintaining access to dwindling perks of 
patronage in an uncertain environment.  Aside from Simba 
Makoni, the "dissident" Politburo member historically 
aligned with the Mujuru camp, and independent Jonathan 
Moyo, who still professes to carry his party membership 
card, no ruling party young turks stand out as potential 
national figures in the foreseeable future. 
 
¶12. (C) Traditional deference to authority in Zimbabwe will 
continue to be an important political factor, at least as 
long as the liberation generation survives.  The party 
exploits this in its relentless propaganda themes and 
commitment of resources to co-opt the allegiance of 
traditional chiefs and headmen.  Within the party, it 
favors the Zezuru faction, as reflected in the Tsholotsho 
outcome: the Mujuru faction, with the Old Guard arrayed 
behind it, prevailed over Mnangagwa's group, which may have 
had the numbers but not the gravitas.  It helps explain why 
"reformers" like Simba Makoni and Eddie Zvobgo, Jr., keep 
their wagons hitched to the Mujuru wagon despite affinity 
for the "moderate" posturing of the Mnangagwa camp. 
 
------------------------ 
The Primacy of Patronage 
------------------------ 
 
¶13. (C) Central to the contest for party leadership is the 
once pervasive national patronage system.  At the top end, 
party favor means potentially lucrative sweetheart deals, 
access to scarce resources - and impunity.  At the 
grassroots, it means community access to food, modest 
infrastructure development, and some agricultural inputs. 
It is essentially a mafia arrangement, in which potentially 
everything is at risk no matter where one is 
socioeconomically.  Control of patronage is the key stake 
in the game, and its effective manipulation will be a key 
to winning, or at least surviving. 
 
¶14. (C) Years of precipitous economic decline have eroded 
the party and government  resource base and cut into the 
party's ability to buy loyalty.  At the same time, however, 
the declining size of the economic pie has only sharpened 
the stakes in the succession struggle, making it even more 
of a winner-take-all scenario in which the loser will not 
only be frozen out of political power but will likely lose 
economically as well. 
 
¶15. (C) The withering of patronage will likely push the 
regime to rely further on repression as its key tool for 
retaining its grip on power, fueling unpopularity at home 
and opprobrium abroad, but enabling the party to retain its 
hold on the country.  A full collapse of the patronage 
system would likely spell the end of the party.  For now, 
however, economic desperation appears to have contributed 
to party discipline as there remains no alternative to 
party patronage for most.  Moreover, the circle that the 
leadership really has to satisfy to retain power in this 
historically submissive, hierarchical society may be quite 
small, possibly assuring the primacy of patronage for some 
time. 
 
------------------------ 
Security Forces a Factor 
------------------------ 
 
¶16. (C) ZANU-PF's deep-seated public unpopularity magnifies 
the critical importance of security forces' loyalties in 
intra-party conflict.  As the patronage system continues to 
erode, repression becomes a more important tool for 
maintaining control.  Both Mnangagwa, a former head of the 
intelligence apparatus, and Solomon Mujuru, former head of 
the defense forces, retain strong personal ties within the 
"securotocracy".  However, appointments in the military and 
the CIO since last December, particularly at the 
mid-levels, appear to have advanced Zezuru influence at the 
expense of Mnangagwa  supporters. 
¶17. (C) The military and CIO continue to execute GOZ 
directives faithfully and as institutions seem likely to 
remain loyal to whoever wins the succession struggle (as 
long as that is a ZANU-PF figure).  In that regard, the 
chances of a military coup in support of one or the other 
contender seems remote.  The military and the CIO have 
traditionally avoided overt involvement in factional 
politics. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Mujuru Faction Consolidating Control 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶18. (C) The Mujuru faction's moves to fortify its position 
in the security apparatus have been mirrored in other areas 
as well.  Confident in the President's backing, it has 
successfully supplanted most of Mnangagwa's people at the 
top of the party's provincial structures, a key to assuring 
control of the presidium under the party constitution. 
Moreover, GOZ anti-corruption efforts have been directed 
principally against key Mnangagwa partners, and regulatory 
authorities have frequently thwarted the expansion of his 
partners' business interests. 
 
¶19. (C) At the same time, Vice President Mujuru is being 
aggressively groomed for potential higher office.  Rarely a 
day passes without her face or words being featured 
prominently in the state media - usually pounding populist 
themes such as corruption and economic efficiency.  Her war 
record and nickname Teurai Ropa (Comrade Spill-blood) 
afford her liberation credentials that still play well in 
the countryside and are a prerequisite to leadership under 
the current regime.  Visibly active in church and Salvation 
Army activities throughout her career, she has grassroots 
appeal as a self-made woman who projects compassion. 
Indeed, she had a much higher profile than Mugabe in the 
last national parliamentary campaign, reflecting her 
faction's recognition that it must re-orient itself to 
retain loyalties and market itself more effectively. 
 
¶20. (C) In this vein, the Mujuru faction is also grooming 
its own stable of young turks, who quietly stand on a more 
reformist platform.  They do not hold sway today but may be 
more influential with the passage of time, especially after 
Mugabe's departure from the scene.  Indeed, figures like 
Simba Makoni, Eddie Zvobgo, Jr., and Walter Mzembi will 
likely be given higher profile as fixing the party's 
fractured domestic and international image becomes a higher 
priority. 
 
------------------- 
Mnangagwa Lying Low 
------------------- 
 
¶21. (C) Against this backdrop, Mnangagwa has maintained a 
low profile.  His ministry - Rural Housing and Social 
Amenities - is a new one that essentially is without 
funding or responsibility.  He is relatively absent in 
media coverage although he does attend public events.  He 
reportedly has spoken up in cabinet meetings but has 
elicited little open backing from colleagues - underscoring 
the cautious nature of players in this environment. 
Mnangagwa historically has preferred to operate largely 
behind the scenes, and the extent and nature of his efforts 
to protect or advance his interests at this juncture remain 
unclear.  His health - he reputedly is HIV-positive - 
remains a wild card and it is unclear who would assume his 
factional leadership mantle were he absent. 
 
¶22. (C) In any event, the abject failure of ZANU-PF's 
policies and the party's associated growing unpopularity 
under the Mujuru/Zezuru leadership may provide Mnangagwa 
tools with which to chip away at their continued 
dominance.  We are already seeing pushback by ZANU-PF's 
backbenchers against GOZ (read: Zezuru Old Guard) 
policy-making - notably on energy policy, the education 
bill, and certain features of the constitutional amendments 
so far.  Like many discarded in the past year's purges, new 
MPs and provincial officials are closer than the leadership 
to their constituencies.  On personal and political levels, 
they identify with the real world plight of constituents 
much more than the insulated leadership.  Many MPs won 
their seats in part by subtly distancing themselves from 
party policy, and Restore Order has only deepened their 
discomfort with party leadership. 
 
¶23. (C) The resignation of Mnangagwa ally and relative 
Pearson Mbalekwa appeared to be an effort to provoke a 
reaction by party faithful against the leadership - a 
preview perhaps of additional efforts to exploit emotional 
policy differences to isolate the Zezuru clique.  Mbalekwa 
is also a prime mover behind the idea of a  hird force, 
which has waxed and waned over the past six months.  Most 
of its advocates are associated with Mnangagwa and it is 
therefore widely viewed as a stalking horse for his 
faction's aspirations, especially if they fail to secure 
the succession.  To that end, Mnangagwa has personally kept 
his distance from the "third force," despite its ties to 
his faction. 
 
------------------- 
Third Force Factor? 
------------------- 
 
¶24. (C) The third force may also take on a life of its 
own.  Some of its adherents appear impatient with 
Mnangagwa's cautious, non-confrontational approach and 
could be open to alternative leadership, such as the 
mercurial, amoral, but talented Jonathan Moyo.  Moyo was 
also closely linked to the Mnangagwa faction, but could 
very well have ambitions of his own for the presidency. 
The third force so far has failed to emerge as promised by 
some of its principal exponents, though.  Indeed, it has 
little ideological territory to stake out for itself and 
seems likely to be used as a foil by others with designs on 
power.  In any event, its rise would likely draw more from 
the MDC than from ZANU-PF, thus ultimately benefiting 
whichever faction controls the ruling party. 
 
---------- 
Conclusion 
---------- 
 
¶25. (C) With the MDC's decline since the March elections, 
the Mujuru-Mnangagwa contest is the central one in 
Zimbabwean politics today.  Will it remain so and, if so, 
how will it play out?  The key variables for now remain 
Mugabe's own timetable and intentions and the quickening 
collapse of the Zimbabwean economy.  Although his energy 
and attention span appear to be flagging, his word still 
goes, and he is allowing the Mujuru/Zezuru clique to 
continue to consolidate control of the party.  If Mugabe 
goes out on top, his word will likely control the immediate 
succession, bequeathing factional and ethnic tensions to 
the next generation.  However, if he were to die or 
suddenly become enfeebled all bets are off.  The continued 
failure and growing unpopularity of the leadership's 
policies (assuming they stay the course) will fuel support 
within the party for change.  This will induce both 
factions, indeed all aspiring ruling party politicians, to 
project themselves as the most credible agent of change, 
even as they try to exploit a crumbling patronage system 
that remains a key to success.  Ironically, the party 
unpopularity may 
even force its leadership and their 
respective supporters to rally around whoever emerges on 
top since their hold on power would be more tenuous should 
cracks appear in the fagade of unity.  At the same time the 
countervailing pressures - a shrinking economy and 
patronage pie, ethnic and personal rivalries, and the 
generational gulf opening up - all suggest that ZANU-PF is 
a party under stress and the cracks are beginning to show. 
In the long term this as much as anything else may shape 
Zimbabwe's politics. 
DELL