This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 002484 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV BM VM ASEAN WTO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES ASSISTANT MINISTER ON BURMA, 
ASEAN 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Ambassador met with Assistant Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Trung Thanh September 22 to 
discuss Vietnam's role in ASEAN and other regional 
architecture institutions and how Vietnam can help advance 
political change in Burma.  Thanh said Vietnam is heavily 
invested in ASEAN as an institution that both enhances peace 
and security for the ten member states internally, and 
allows them to "stand up as one" and interact more equally 
with other "strong powers."  Thanh affirmed the primacy of 
APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Asian regional 
architecture and advocated an ASEAN-United States summit on 
the margins of the APEC summit in Hanoi in 2006.  He 
described Burma as a wayward brother who brings shame on the 
family, but who must be dealt with carefully to avoid 
provoking a counterproductive reaction.  End Summary. 
 
ASEAN AND REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Assistant Foreign Minister Nguyen Trung Thanh, who 
has responsibility for ASEAN affairs in the Foreign 
Ministry, told the Ambassador that for Vietnam, ASEAN 
represents "the peace and independence of member states and 
the ability to stand on their feet together with a common 
position to allow constructive engagement with strong powers 
that would not be possible as individual states."  Now that 
the ASEAN member states have put their ideological 
differences behind them, ASEAN represents "an important 
element of our international politics and security."  The 
main task, he said, is "to manage economic integration, 
through and beyond the ASEAN Free Trade Area, and use that 
economic integration to address transnational threats and 
build our common capacity."  ASEAN's objective is to "reach 
2020 as a cohesive whole and achieve the targets set in the 
Bali Concord."  The date, he acknowledged, is notional, and 
probably would be moved up.  "ASEAN is quite accustomed to 
adjusting the goal markers.  We see this flexibility as a 
positive quality." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Thanh said that, in looking at the East Asian 
Summit (EAS), it is necessary to put the meeting into the 
context of what ASEAN is trying to achieve overall.  In that 
light, it is possible to see the EAS as an ASEAN+3 summit, 
which is an ASEAN goal.  The EAS, he said, deepens and 
intensifies what can be accomplished in the ASEAN+3 
framework.  More importantly, the concept has evolved to 
include 16 countries, and now has become an important 
parallel mechanism to the ASEAN+3.  The EAS will "cover 
strategic matters of the region and the world."  From 
ASEAN's point of view, the EAS is a reflection of ASEAN's 
basic paradigm of internal development and constructive 
external engagement.  The Ambassador said the news that the 
EAS would be open and inclusive is welcome to the United 
States, but the United States is still trying to understand 
fully how the EAS will fit with existing regional 
architecture and what the agenda will be.  It would not be 
beneficial to ASEAN or the United States if the EAS 
diminishes the importance of other key mechanisms such as 
APEC and the ARF, he stressed. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Thanh argued that practically speaking, Asia has no 
regional architecture comparable to what exists in Europe 
and the Americas.  The purpose of the EAS is certainly not 
to derail or diminish existing regional architecture in 
Asia, but rather to help leaders get together, add value to 
existing mechanisms and build constructive and workable 
solutions for peace, unity and solidarity in the region.  So 
far there is no full answer to those problems, despite the 
existence and importance of the ARF and APEC.  The EAS would 
create another forum to discuss these important issues. 
 
¶5. (SBU) ASEAN wants to continue to strengthen its 
partnerships with the United States, Japan, India, Korea and 
even Russia, Thanh continued.  Of these, the United States 
is particularly important, which is why Vietnam proposed a 
stronger U.S.-ASEAN partnership at the U.S.-ASEAN dialogue 
in August.  Vietnam believes ASEAN should continue 
cooperating with the United States on important issues such 
as terrorism, but also that the two sides should look at 
terrorism as something to be eliminated, and therefore ASEAN 
and the United States should consider ways to develop side- 
by-side economic and political cooperation that can be the 
basis of a long-term partnership.  The Enterprise for ASEAN 
initiative and the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 
proposal are good steps, but both sides need to think about 
what else the United States and ASEAN can do together that 
reaches beyond the traditional bilateral activities and 
relations that exist today.  The U.S.-ASEAN summit might be 
something along those lines.  Whether it occurs or not is up 
to the United States at this point; ASEAN has already 
proposed it for the margins of the APEC summit in 2006. 
 
¶6. (SBU) ASEAN-U.S. relations are already riding high based 
on good bilateral relations between many member states and 
the United States, Thanh said.  In August at the U.S.-ASEAN 
dialogue, Thanh noted, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia and 
Thailand were all either just coming off of or about to hold 
a successful leadership visit to the United States. 
 
WTO. . . 
-------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The best thing the United States could do now for 
Vietnam's interests and its own interests in ASEAN would be 
to conclude WTO talks with Vietnam, Thanh continued.  He 
asked the Ambassador to consider how Vietnam operates in 
ASEAN now, and to recognize that a successful, economically 
healthy and strong Vietnam in ASEAN is in the United States' 
national interest because a "weak and muddled" Vietnam is 
vulnerable to pressure and influence from "other states," 
while a strong Vietnam contributes to a strong ASEAN that is 
a good partner for the United States.  The Ambassador 
replied that at this point it is difficult to imagine 
Vietnam as "weak and muddled," even in the absence of an 
early conclusion to WTO negotiations. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Thanh put in another plug for the United States to 
support Vietnam's entry into the WTO both in the bilateral 
negotiations and the multilateral talks.  He made a parallel 
to Vietnam's entry into ASEAN in 1995, saying that at that 
time some countries said that Vietnam had so much economic 
reform to complete before AFTA requirements would be 
realistic that it would be at least 2005 or 2010 before 
Vietnam would be ready to join ASEAN.  Vietnam made the case 
that it should be allowed to join ASEAN while making the 
necessary economic adjustments over time, a formula that had 
been very successful.  "Vietnam's entry into ASEAN had 
positive effects that would not have been possible until 
much later if Vietnam had been held to an impossible 
economic standard," Thanh said.  The Ambassador responded 
that it is up to Vietnam to accept the difficult aspects of 
international economic integration, which in this case 
include such thorny questions as telecommunications issues 
and economic liberalization. 
 
BURMA 
----- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Speaking of thorny issues, the Ambassador noted to 
Thanh that Burma's political problems and failure to change 
are a drag on ASEAN and an obstacle to many of Vietnam's and 
ASEAN's objectives.  Thanh chuckled and said that as the 
official in charge of the 2004 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
Summit in Hanoi, "Burma was on my mind 36 hours per day." 
Beginning a very labored metaphor, Thanh said ASEAN is a 
family with many brothers.  One of those brothers is not 
doing well, but the answer to those problems is to keep him 
close and encourage him, not throw him out on the street. 
"If we throw our brother into the street, he becomes a 
victim of drug gangs, criminals and hostile neighbors," 
Thanh warned.  The entire family is unhappy with the one 
brother's problems, he continued; they affect everyone.  But 
your brother is like the finger on your hand, he said, and 
you would not cut off the finger because it had problems. 
The Ambassador said he understood Thanh's point, but that it 
is clear that Burma needs more encouragement to change. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Thanh said that is clear to the GVN and that it is 
a mistake to consider Vietnam "aloof" from Burma's problems. 
He said Vietnam has sent several high-level delegations to 
talk to the Burmese leadership, including Presidential 
envoys and former Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet.  The thrust of 
Vietnam's intervention with Burma is that Vietnam is aware 
of the difficulty of engaging in economic and political 
reform, getting on its feet after many years of fighting 
multiple enemies, "stabilizing internal problems from 
within" and ultimately regaining its political position in 
the region and in the world.  "Doi moi (Vietnam's economic 
reform policy initiated in 1986) is the tool we used to do 
that, and we shared that with Burma," Thanh said.  Vietnam 
is torn, he continued, between irritation at being seen as 
"dirt" in the international community as a result of 
association with "the brother's" behavior on one hand, and 
the "risk of our brother's exploitation by a mischievous 
neighbor" on the other.  At the same time, Vietnam knows 
from its own experience that externally imposed solutions do 
not work, no matter how elegant.  They must be "home grown" 
to have any chance of success.  Adding more similes to his 
metaphors, Thanh said "imposing an external political 
solution on our brother is like giving a large piece of 
Godiva chocolate to a starving man who is used to plain 
porridge.  It may be rich and delicious, but it will only 
make him sick." 
 
¶11. (SBU) Externally supplied political solutions have a bad 
track record in Southeast Asia, he declared.  "Would you 
like to see one party become one hundred with violence and 
chaos?" he asked rhetorically, alluding to Cambodian 
politics.  "You can call that democracy if you want, but it 
is not good for the country and it is not really democracy." 
Providing an ultimatum or a single choice to a country will 
make the situation even worse, he said.  The Ambassador 
challenged Thanh's family model, saying that failure to 
confront problems in a family member was tantamount to 
enabling the bad behavior to continue, and said that Vietnam 
and ASEAN have an obligation to help Burma get its house in 
order.  And while the ultimate solution would have to be 
Burmese, there are international norms of governance and 
human rights that have to be respected, regardless of 
whether they are considered indigenous.  The situation in 
Burma is bad, the Ambassador reiterated, and it reflects 
badly on ASEAN.  More can, and should, be done. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Still, Thanh continued, the international 
community should be careful what it wishes for when it comes 
to Burma.  International pressure convinced Burma to pass on 
the 2006 ASEAN Chairmanship, but that act enabled the 
generals to return to Burma and "do what they like with less 
international attention."  The solution in Burma will have 
to be based both on principles and practicality, or else 
actions will have a counterproductive outcome. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Comment:  Thanh's discussion of Burma, despite the 
tortured metaphors, was as blunt as we have ever heard from 
high-level GVN officials.  This was also the first 
acknowledgement we have had that former PM Vo Van Kiet's 
trip to Rangoon in 2004 addressed the issue of political 
change in Burma.  The Vietnamese have as much influence as 
anyone with Rangoon, which is to say very little.  But it is 
heartening to learn that they are focused on the problem and 
genuinely interested in a solution.  End Comment. 
 
14 (SBU) Bio Note: Nguyen Trung Thanh, Assistant Minister of 
Foreign Affairs since 2003, speaks fluent British-accented 
English.  He served in London as Deputy Chief of Mission in 
1999 and earlier in his career in Canberra.  He is married 
to the daughter of Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien. 
 
MARINE