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Viewing cable 05GUAYAQUIL1090, PSC,S LEGACY THWARTING IT'S PRESIDENTIAL PROSPECTS?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05GUAYAQUIL1090 2005-09-01 18:16 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Guayaquil
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GUAYAQUIL 001090 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PINR EC
SUBJECT: PSC,S LEGACY THWARTING IT'S PRESIDENTIAL PROSPECTS? 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: CONSUL GENERAL KEVIN HERBERT, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B&D) 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  OPERATING FORCEFULLY FROM THE SHADOWS, 
ECUADOR,S SOCIAL CHRISTIAN PARTY (PSC) AND ITS ENTRENCHED 
LEADER, FORMER PRESIDENT LEON FEBRES CORDERO (LFC), HAVE 
PROVEN THE COAST,S MOST FORMIDABLE PARTY AND INTEREST GROUP. 
 LFC,S DOMINEERING PRESENCE MAY ALSO BE THE ROOT CAUSE OF 
THE PARTY'S LACK OF SUCCESS WINNING THE PRESIDENCY SINCE HE 
LAST PRESIDED (1984-88).  A GENERATIONAL SHIFT SHAKING LFC,S 
TIGHTFISTED REIGN IS NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE PSC'S PRESIDENTIAL 
PROSPECTS IN 2006.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
FIRST-ROUND VICTOR, SECOND-ROUND VANQUISHED 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) IN A FRAGMENTED SYSTEM WITH 17 REGISTERED PARTIES 
AND A FICKLE PUBLIC, THE PSC RANKS CLOSEST TO A POLITICAL 
DYNASTY IN THIS COUNTRY, AT LEAST IN ITS BASE ON THE COAST. 
ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT PUT FORWARD A WINNING PRESIDENTIAL 
CANDIDATE SINCE LFC (NO OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ELECTED TWICE TO 
THE PRESIDENCY SINCE THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY 25 YEARS AGO, 
EITHER), IT HAS MAINTAINED THE LARGEST BLOCK IN CONGRESS OVER 
THE PAST TWENTY YEARS, WINNING AN AVERAGE 20 PERCENT OF 
CONGRESSIONAL SEATS (IT CURRENTLY HAS 25%).  THE PSC,S 
HABITUAL FAILURE TO CAPTURE THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE HAS PROVEN 
TO BE A MIXED BLESSING. 
 
3.  (SBU) FIRST-ROUND PRESIDENTIAL RUN-OFF AND CONGRESSIONAL 
ELECTIONS TAKE PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY AND THE PSC USES THIS 
TIMING TO ITS ADVANTAGE, CAPITALIZING ON PRESIDENTIAL 
CANDIDATES WITH STRONG COASTAL APPEAL TO BOOST ITS 
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES.  AS A RESULT, THE PSC HAS 
MAINTAINED ITS INFLUENCE IN CONGRESS AND WIELDS ITS 
CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE TO WIN CONCESSIONS FROM THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH. 
 
4.  (SBU) IN THE TWO-ROUND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PROCESS, THE 
PSC CANDIDATE MADE IT TO THE SECOND ROUND IN FIVE OUT OF THE 
LAST EIGHT ELECTIONS; WINNING THE FINAL ROUND ONLY ONCE. 
OTHER PARTIES HAVE FARED EVEN WORSE, WITH TWO (DP, URP) 
VIRTUALLY DISAPPEARING AFTER ELECTING A PRESIDENT.   IN 
ECUADOR'S NOTORIOUSLY UNSTABLE DEMOCRACY, THE PSC,S FAILURE 
TO WIN THE PRESIDENCY HAS ONE ADVANTAGE FOR THE PARTY, SINCE 
IT HAS PROVEN MARKEDLY EASIER TO BRING DOWN PRESIDENTS THAN 
TO MAINTAIN THEM IN POWER. 
 
5.  (SBU) THE CORE PSC SUPPORT COMES FROM THE COAST, CENTERED 
IN ECUADOR'S LARGEST CITY OF GUAYAQUIL.  THIS SUPPORT IS 
SOLID, BASED ON A DECADE OF MUNICIPAL ACHIEVEMENT AND THE 
BOOSTING OF CIVIC PRIDE UNDER LFC AND CURRENT GUAYAQUIL MAYOR 
JAIME NEBOT; THE PERSONAL CHARISMA OF THESE TWO LEADERS; AND 
THEIR ABILITY TO DELIVER BENEFITS FOR CRONIES AND 
CONSTITUENTS.  THIS BASE OF SUPPORT ENSURES THE PSC'S STAYING 
POWER IN CONGRESS, DESPITE HAVING LITTLE SUPPORT IN THE OTHER 
MAJOR POPULATION CENTER, THE HIGHLANDS "SIERRA," WHICH IS 
DOMINATED BY SECOND-LARGEST PARTY, THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT. 
 
-------------------------- 
GOVERNING FROM THE SHADOWS 
-------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) THE PSC HAS SURVIVED WITHIN ECUADOR'S HIGHLY 
FRAGMENTED POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT BY ACTING FROM THE WINGS 
INSTEAD OF CENTER-STAGE.  PSC BOSSES LFC AND NEBOT PULL 
STRINGS OR TAKE TO THE STREETS TO ORCHESTRATE CONGRESSIONAL, 
JUDICIAL AND EXECUTIVE DECISIONS.  BOTH LEADERS ARE 
NOTORIOUSLY VOCAL AND DEMANDING, WINNING SIGNIFICANT EXTRA 
BENEFITS FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT APPARATUS FOR THEIR CITY 
OR THEIR SUPPORTERS. 
 
7.  (C) THE PSC,S DEXTERITY AT BACK-ROOM GOVERNANCE WAS 
ILLUSTRATED BY THE FALL OF FORMER PRESIDENT LUCIO GUTIERREZ. 
GUTIERREZ FIRST COURTED AND WON PSC SUPPORT AFTER LOSING THE 
BACKING OF THE LEFTIST COALITION THAT BROUGHT HIM INTO 
OFFICE.  HOWEVER, CONCESSIONS TO THE PSC ULTIMATELY FAILED TO 
SECURE HIS SURVIVAL, WHEN LFC OBJECTED TO GUTIERREZ' EFFORTS 
TO BUILD HIS OWN PARTY'S SUPPORT BASE IN THE COASTAL REGION 
DURING CONFLICTIVE SECTIONAL ELECTIONS IN OCTOBER 2004. 
LFC'S DECISION TO PURSUE IMPEACHMENT CHARGES RESULTED IN A 
CONCERTED, AND INITIALLY SUCCESSFUL, ATTEMPT BY GUTIERREZ TO 
REDUCE LFC,S INFLUENCE, INCLUDING REMOVING THE HEAVILY 
LFC-INFLUENCED SUPREME COURT.  ALTHOUGH THESE MOVES WERE 
POPULAR AMONG THE GENERAL POPULATION, RESULTING IN A 
SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN GUTIERREZ,S POPULARITY, THEY 
OFFENDED UPPER-CLASS QUITENOS AND ULTIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO 
HIS OUSTER. 
 
8.  (C) AS HIS POLITICAL INFLUENCE INCREASES, LFC SEEMS TO 
RETREAT DEEPER INTO THE SHADOWS.  POLITICS ARE STILL HIS 
LIFE, AND MORE THAN EVER HE SEES HIMSELF AND HIS BRAND OF 
CONSERVATIVE POLITICS AS THE SAVIOR OF THE COUNTRY.  BUT HE 
NO LONGER HAS TO RELY ON OCCUPYING VISIBLE PUBLIC POSITIONS 
SUCH AS PRESIDENT OR MAYOR TO WIELD HIS POWER.  OVER THE 
YEARS HE HAS BUILT UP A LARGE RESERVE OF FAITHFUL FOLLOWERS 
IN KEY POSITIONS THROUGHOUT THE JUDICIARY, PARASTATAL 
ENTERPRISES SUCH AS PACIFICTEL, CONGRESS AND LOCAL OFFICIALS. 
 NAME THE ISSUE, AND HELP IS ONLY A PHONE CALL AWAY, AS 
ANYONE KNOWS WHO HAS BEEN INVITED TO THE DEN OF HIS MODEST 
HOME IN GUAYAQUIL, WHERE THE PHONES THAT LINE HIS DESK NEVER 
STOP RINGING. 
 
9.  (SBU) EVEN AT AGE 74, THE SALTY POLITICAL WARRIOR SHOWS 
NO SIGNS OF SLOWING DOWN.  THOUGH A SITTING DEPUTY IN 
CONGRESS, FEBRES CORDERO AVOIDS SPENDING TIME IN QUITO FOR 
UNSPECIFIED  HEALTH REASONS, ) AND IN FACT HAS NOT BEEN TO 
THE CAPITAL FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS.  HOWEVER, NEITHER CANCER 
NOR THE REMOVAL OF ONE EYE HAS SEEMED TO AFFECT HIS POLITICAL 
FACULTIES.  UNTIL THE AGING LEADER PASSES FROM THE SCENE, THE 
PSC IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE. 
 
10.  (C) MORE AND MORE WE HEAR THAT LFC,S TRUSTY SIDEKICK 
AND SON-IN-LAW MIGUEL ORELLANA NOT ONLY ACTS AS THE PARTY 
BOSS,  ENFORCER,, BUT THAT HE HAS USED HIS RELATIONSHIP 
WITH LFC AND THE ACCESS THAT AFFORDS HIM TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS 
CORRUPTION.  THOUGH NO ONE HAS BEEN ABLE TO PROVE CORRUPTION 
CHARGES, RUMORS OF HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONSTANT SACKING OF 
THE STATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, PACIFICTEL, AND DIRTY 
OIL DEALS ARE WIDESPREAD.  REGARDLESS OF THE LACK OF PROOF, 
THE PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION EXISTS, AND SEEMS TO BE SERVING 
TO ALIENATE MANY IN THE PSC. 
 
11.  (C) LFC IS NOT PERSONALLY ABOVE USING HIS INFLUENCE TO 
HIS OWN ECONOMIC BENEFIT.  MOST NOTABLE AMONG MANY RUMORED 
ECONOMIC INTERESTS IS HIS ECUASAL SALT MONOPOLY, MAINTAINED 
VIA THE MANIPULATION OF GOE REGULATORS. 
 
----------------------------- 
WINDS OF GENERATIONAL CHANGE? 
----------------------------- 
 
12.  (SBU) WHILE THE PSC THRIVES ON THE COAST, THE 
OVERBEARING MANNER OF LFC HAS BECOME A LIABILITY ELSEWHERE. 
EX-PRESIDENT GUTIERREZ CAPITALIZED ON ANTI-LFC SENTIMENT FOR 
MANY MONTHS AFTER BEATING BACK LFC'S IMPEACHMENT ATTEMPT. 
 
13.  (SBU) LFC'S DOMINATION OF THE PSC HAS ALSO LED TO A 
MARKED DETERIORATION OF HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH NEBOT, 
DESCRIBED BY PARTY MEMBERS AS VIRTUAL ESTRANGEMENT OF THE TWO 
FORMERLY CLOSE LEADERS.  THE BREACH WAS EXACERBATED BY LFC'S 
PRECIPITOUS DECISION TO CHALLENGE GUTIERREZ WITHOUT THE VOTES 
TO GUARANTEE IMPEACHMENT.  LFC PUBLICLY CRITICIZED HIS FORMER 
PROTEGE'S TACTICS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.  DURING THE SHOWDOWN 
WITH GUTIERREZ, WE HEARD FROM NEBOT'S SUPPORTERS THAT A SPLIT 
WAS POSSIBLE, BUT UNLIKELY, GIVEN NEBOT'S RELUCTANCE TO BREAK 
WITH HIS FORMER MENTOR WHILE LFC IS ALIVE.  WHILE ON THE DAY 
OF GUTIERREZ, DOWNFALL NEBOT TURNED DOWN A REQUEST FROM LFC 
TO PUT PEOPLE INTO THE GUAYAQUIL STREETS TO PROTEST THE 
FLAGGING PRESIDENT, HE DID AGREE TO JOIN THE DETERMINED LFC 
IN MAKING CALLS TO MILITARY LEADERS URGING THEIR PUBLIC 
SUPPORT OF PALACIO. 
 
14.  (SBU) WITH THE PARTY DIVIDED, AND NEBOT APPARENTLY NOT 
PRESENTLY INTERESTED IN A THIRD ATTEMPT AT THE PRESIDENCY, 
THE PSC HAS NOT YET NAMED A CANDIDATE FOR THE 2006 ELECTIONS. 
 LFC-ALLY AND PSC CONGRESS MEMBER CYNTHIA VITERI HAS BEEN 
INFORMALLY FLOATED AS A POSSIBILITY, AS HAS GUAYAS PREFECT 
(U.S. GOVERNOR-EQUIVALENT), NICOLAS LAPENTTI.  THE PUBLIC 
VIVIDLY RECALLS THE STILL-FRESH AND ICONIC IMAGE OF VITERI 
SWEARING IN ALFREDO PALACIO IMMEDIATELY AFTER REMOVING 
GUTIERREZ FROM OFFICE.  THOUGH NOT CONSIDERED A POLITICAL 
HEAVYWEIGHT, LAPENTTI'S BACKGROUND AND NAME RECOGNITION ADD 
TO HIS CREDIBILITY.  HE HAS BEEN REELECTED PREFECT THREE 
TIMES, IS TALL AND HANDSOME, HAS A FORMER ECUADORIAN BEAUTY 
QUEEN WIFE, AND IS THE FATHER OF TWO SONS PLAYING ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROFESSIONAL TENNIS CIRCUIT. 
 
15.  (SBU) REGARDLESS, BOTH WOULD FACE A CHALLENGE OUTSIDE 
THEIR PARTY'S TRADITIONAL STRONGHOLDS AS PARTY LEADERS 
CONTINUE TO EVINCE LITTLE INTEREST IN BROADENING THEIR BASE 
BY APPEALING TO MORE NATIONAL SENTIMENTS.  AFTER LFC AND 
NEBOT, NO PSC LEADER HAS STRONG COUNTRYWIDE RECOGNITION. 
 
16.  (SBU) COMMENT:  WITH OTHER PARTIES LOOKING TO THE 
YOUNGER GENERATION FOR NEW LEADERS WITH NATIONAL VISION, LFC 
HAS PROVEN UNWILLING TO CEDE REAL POWER TO ANY PARTY 
"UPSTARTS."  INSTEAD, HE SEEMS CONTENT TO RULE FROM THE 
SHADOWS, USING HIS FOOTHOLD IN GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 
(CONGRESS, JUDICIARY, PARASTATALS) TO INFLUENCE POLICY. 
THOSE ACTIONS BRING BENEFITS TO HIS COASTAL BASE, WHICH VOTES 
PSC FOR CONGRESS AND LOCAL POSITIONS, BUT NOT TO THE REST OF 
THE COUNTRY, WHICH RESENTS HIS CONTROL. 
 
17.  (C) AT THE SAME TIME, LFC HAS SO TIGHTLY MOLDED THE 
PSC'S WORKINGS AND SPOILS TO HIS OWN WILL THAT HIS DEMISE 
WOULD CREATE A POWER VACUUM, WHICH ONLY NEBOT IS IN A 
POSITION TO FILL.  NEVERTHELESS, NEBOT, THE PSC'S MOST VIABLE 
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL NOT RUN FOR 
THAT OFFICE UNTIL LFC'S INFLUENCE IN THE PSC IS DIMINISHED. 
END COMMENT. 
HERBERT