This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L  GABORONE 001281 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF/S MUNCY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BC
SUBJECT: STUDY SEES BDP'S FUTURE IN VICE PRESIDENT KHAMA 
 
REF: GABORONE 1039 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Lois Aroian for Reasons 1.4 (B) a 
nd (D) 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY:  A recent needs assessment conducted for 
the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) is likely to 
reinforce Vice President Khama's perceived importance to 
the future of the Party.  The study, passed to us by a 
senior GOB official, found that the BDP's popularity had 
declined due to a general frustration with the Government's 
perceived failure to deliver on development expectations, 
particularly regarding job creation.  In addition to rising 
unemployment, other factors threatening to undermine BDP 
support include the passing of the independence generation, 
expanding access to education, and rural-urban migration. 
At the same time, popularity of the opposition parties has 
grown.  The one ray of hope the document holds out for the 
BDP is the widespread (60 percent) approval for Ian Khama's 
performance as a leader.  This combination of findings is 
likely to mute nascent dissatisfaction with the emergence 
of "autocratic tendencies" within the party, strengthening 
Khama's hand as heir apparent of the Presidency both of the 
BDP and of Botswana.  END SUMMARY. 
 
BDP BRINGS BACK SOUTH AFRICAN CONSULTANT 
 
¶2. (C)  Six months after the Botswana Democratic Party 
(BDP) won an overwhelming majority of parliamentary seats 
in Botswana's ninth general election on October 30, 2004, 
it hired South African consultant Lawrence Schlemmer to 
conduct a needs analysis for the Party.  Schlemmer's team 
administered a national survey and conducted in-depth 
interviews with a small group of opinion leaders within the 
BDP.  Their findings describe the relative popularity of 
the various political parties, the perceptions and 
priorities of the voters, and problems faced by the BDP. 
 
¶3. (C)  The BDP first contracted Schlemmer after the 1994 
election, in which the Botswana National Front expanded its 
presence in the National Assembly from three to thirteen 
seats, at that point its best showing ever.  (Note: 
Although Schlemmer wrote that report for the BDP, Public 
Relations Manager at Debswana Mr. Kabelo Binns confirmed to 
EconOff that then Chairman of Debswana Louis Nchindo paid 
for the study personally.  As reported earlier, one of the 
individuals interviewed as an opinion leader earlier this 
year was told by his interlocutors that the 2005 study was 
paid for by a mining firm with significant interests in 
Botswana -- i.e. De Beers.  End Note.)  Schlemmer 
recommended that President Masire retire early and that the 
BDP bring Ian Khama into politics to unify the Party.  The 
BDP scrupulously adhered to his recommendations. 
 
REPORT REVEALS DISTURBING TRENDS FOR BDP 
 
¶4. (C)  Although Schlemmer's recent report confirms that 
the BDP remains Botswana's strongest single party by far, 
it highlights several statistics that worry the ruling 
party.  While 46.8 percent of those polled said they would 
vote for the BDP if elections were held soon, the combined 
support for the Botswana National Front (31.0), Botswana 
Congress Party (15.0), and the Botswana Alliance Movement 
(1.4) slightly exceeded that amount.  The fact that nearly 
60 percent of those polled expected the BDP to win their 
constituencies suggested that complacency among BDP 
supporters could significantly threaten its performance in 
the next election.  Over 78 percent of BDP supporters 
listed one of the opposition parties as a second choice, 
indicating that there is scope for opposition parties to 
attract BDP voters. 
 
¶5. (C)  An analysis of support for various parties by 
population subgroup confirmed the conventional wisdom that 
the BDP is strongest among those with little education and 
low incomes, those who live in rural areas and those over 
the age of fifty.  This is a largely ominous pattern for 
the BDP.  As the independence generation passes, access to 
education expands and rural-urban migration continues, the 
population subgroups in which it is strongest will shrink 
and, with them, the BDP's margin of victory. 
 
¶6. (C)  Aside from their top priority of job creation, 
respondents cited vague reasons for their negative 
perceptions of the BDP.  Thirty percent of those polled 
described job creation as a major shortcoming of the 
Government.  When asked why they believed support for 
opposition parties had grown, respondents consistently 
pointed to a desire for a change in 
Government, a perception that the Government failed to keep 
its promises, and its failure to meet popular needs.  In a 
 
similar question, the reasons most frequently stated for 
rating the Government poorly were insufficient job 
creation, failure to improve people's lives, indifference 
to popular needs and failure to keep promises.  This 
discontent was not unique to opposition supporters -- 
thirty-nine percent of BDP voters described Government 
performance as either indifferent or bad.  This general 
dissatisfaction with the BDP will complicate the Party's 
efforts to mount a targeted response. 
 
FINDINGS FOCUS ATTENTION ON IAN KHAMA AS SAVIOR OF BDP 
 
¶7. (C)  The one bright spot this study uncovered for the 
BDP was the widespread approval of Vice President Khama. 
Sixty-seven percent of all respondents described him as a 
good leader, including 56 percent of BNF supporters and 61 
percent of the BCP faithful.  Given the difficulty of job 
creation and otherwise responding to the causes of the 
BDP's declining popularity, the Party is likely to focus on 
exploiting Khama's popularity to extend its rule.  Although 
interviews of opinion leaders within the BDP revealed 
complaints about the emergence of "autocratic tendencies" 
within the Party -- undoubtedly a reference to Khama's 
perceived authoritarian bent -- the growing vulnerability 
of the Party without Khama is likely to mute these 
concerns. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶8. (C)  The recommendations of the report encourage the 
BDP to revamp its image among its supporters and the 
general public by being more responsive to their concerns. 
Given the effort and sacrifices that this would require, 
the BDP is likely to take the short cut of hitching the 
party to Ian Khama's rising star and campaign primarily on 
his name and reputation.  This will create the ideal 
conditions to perpetuate his reputed "autocratic 
tendencies."  If dissatisfaction with his way of running 
the Party is repressed, it could magnify existing divisions 
and weaken the party further. 
AROIAN 
 
 
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