This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 007547

SIPDIS

NSC STAFF FOR ABRAMS AND POUNDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2015

TAGS: PGOV PREL EG OVIP

SUBJECT: U/S HUGHES´ MEETING WITH EGYPTIAN PRIME MINISTER NAZIF

Classified by Charge Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary

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¶1. (C) Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes met with Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif on September 26. Hughes asked Nazif what could be done to improve understanding of America in the Middle East. Nazif said that Gaza presented an opportuntity to changes perceptions of the U.S. in the region. Nazifthanked Hughes for the positive USG response to Egypt´s recent presidential election, which had been relatively successful. Hughes agreed that the election was a positive initial step but urged Nazif to build on the momentum and improve the electoral process before parliamentary elections in November. Nazif explained Egypt´s agenda for continued reform and noted that announcement of an FTA would be a strong signal of support for Egypt. Hughes urged Nazif to drop Al Manar from NileSat and provide a timetable for allowing Radio Sawa to broadcast in Egypt. Both of these steps were important to Congress and the Administration. Nazif proposed a fund for graduate level study by Egyptians in the U.S. End summary.

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America´s Image in the Middle East

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¶2. (C) Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes met with Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif on September 26. Hughes remarked that Nazif had made a good impression during his visit to the U.S. in May 2005, especially in his interview on Meet the Press. The U.S. appreciated Egypt´s leadership in the Middle East, and the positive steps it was taking after Gaza disengagement. She asked how the U.S. could better communicate its goals for the region. Nazif replied that the U.S. needed to broaden its message. For example, not many Egyptians knew about U.S. assistance to Egypt and all the jobs it had created. Egyptians merely saw the U.S. as a superpower meddling in the region, particularly in Iraq. While most Egyptians liked Americans, they resented America´s policies. Hughes agreed that Iraq was a difficult subject. The perception was that the U.S. was the problem, when the real problem was the insurgents. The U.S. wanted to depart as soon as possible, but only after Iraq could defend itself.

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Gaza an Opportunity for the U.S.

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¶3. (C) Nazif said that concrete action was needed to improve America´s image. Post-disengagement Gaza offered a real opportunity for such action. Positive change in Gaza would go a long way toward improving America´s image. He noted three things the U.S. could do: 1) support Abu Mazen as he tried to consolidate power; 2) build Gaza´s infrastructure, focusing on projects with quick results; and 3) assure the Palestinians that Gaza disengagement was not the end, but the beginning. The Palestinians needed to see a path for continued progress toward a Palestinian state. Currently the message to the Palestinians was "prove yourself in Gaza first," which was not going over well. A better message would be that disengagement was a good first step and Gaza could form the nucleus of a Palestinian state.

¶4. (C) Nazif added that, after disengagement, Egypt purposely let the Palestinians cross the Gaza border. Seventy thousand Palestinians crossed, spurred by the feeling of liberation that came from finally having freedom of movement. As they crossed, Egyptians saw their misery in Gaza. Something positive was needed to counter this image. Minister of Foreign Trade Rachid added that the GOE wanted to support the U.S. message of reform in the Middle East. He understood that the U.S. was treading a fine line in Gaza, not wanting to pressure the Israelis but needing to show support for the Palestinians. One way to support the Palestinians would be to change their image in the Western media, which portrayed them all as terrorists. Hughes agreed that it was important to change this perception and explain how a Palestinian state would improve the lives of ordinary Palestinians, who just wanted jobs and family lives.

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Egypt´s Political Reform

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¶5. (C) Turning to political reform, Nazif noted that the process began in February when Mubarak announced the constitutional amendment on presidential candidates. The GOE wanted the recent presidential election to be free and fair. It was difficult to convey that perception, however, when most Egyptians knew that Mubarak would likely win. Even the opposition was pleased, however, that the GOE had remained neutral, especially the police, who had acted impartially on election day. Nazif believed the election was relatively well organized. All candidates had equal media time, and Mubarak was simply one of those candidates. Nazif noted that President Mubarak was scheduled to be inaugurated the following day. His Cabinet would tender its resignation, but would likely be asked to stay on until parliamentary elections in November. Nazif thanked Hughes for the positive USG response to the election, which was helpful.

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Parliamentary Elections

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¶6. (C) Hughes replied that the election got a lot of coverage in the U.S., and was a positive step. The Egyptian people finally had a choice. Moreover, Egyptians were now debating issues, which was also a positive development. The U.S. would like to see Egypt build on the momentum of the presidential election in the run up to parliamentary elections by allowing greater access to the media for candidates and international observers, which had become the norm worldwide. Nazif agreed that the GOE needed to continue improving Egypt´s electoral process but significant change might not be possible before the parliamentary election. The GOE was expecting more trouble with that election than it had with the presidential election. Parliamentary elections tended to stir up "tribal" issues, which sometimes led to violence. The GOE wanted to be seen as neutral and not blamed for rigging the election if there was violence.

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Access to Media and Observers

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¶7. (C) On the issue of access to the media, Nazif noted that transparency had increased, and the GOE was taking an impartial stance. Neither the GOE nor the government media were explicitly supporting the NDP. The opposition, however, was still weak. Opposition parties had not developed platforms and were simply criticizing the NDP. The GOE had to live with this reality, and couldn´t just turn the criticism around on the opposition parties. It would take some time for opposition to develop, and the U.S. needed to understand that. Regarding observers, Nazif said he favored allowing them for the presidential election, but the judiciary, which had oversight, had refused. Claiming that the judiciary had "too much ego," Nazif pointed out that the judges had capitulated at the last minute and allowed observers. For the parliamentary election, local NGOs might be allowed to observe, though not "officially," i.e., in the polls, writing reports. International observers were more problematic, since they were perceived as foreign interference. Nazif also pointed out that Egypt had a 7000 year history, so "we know how to do things ourselves." Hughes again urged Nazif to allow official observers, and repeated that international monitors were now the norm worldwide.

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The GOE´s Reform Agenda

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¶8. (C) Nazif remarked that for the first time, Mubarak had made campaign promises for continued reform. He promised devolution of power to parliament, better balance between the executive and legislative branches, government accountability, better representation for opposition parties and women, and cancellation of the emergency law, which would be replaced by anti-terrorism legislation. The changes would take about two years to accomplish, but there was no turning back now. The GOE had overcome skepticism of its economic reform program. Nazif hoped this could be repeated in the political realm, but support from the U.S. would be needed. Announcement of an FTA would be a strong signal of support, as would expansion of the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ). The QIZs had already created new jobs, and the GOE could point to this as evidence of U.S. support. The GOE hoped to get approval for QIZ expansion in the next few weeks. Expansion would have a political as well as economic effect, as it would show cooperation between Egypt and Israel. Hughes said she would like to visit a QIZ on her next trip to Egypt to highlight their importance.

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Al Manar and Radio Sawa

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¶9. (C) Hughes urged Nazif to take Al Manar and its message of hate off NileSat. This was a Hezbollah-financed station and its aim was to promote terror. Ridding NileSat of Al Manar was a major concern for Congress and the Administration. Nazif did not respond on the Al Manar issue, appearing to lack background on the subject. Hughes also noted that the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), on which she served, was concerned about the terrible delay in getting a license for Radio Sawa to broadcast from Egypt. Nazif pointed out Egypt received Radio Sawa broadcasts from Cyprus (Note: although technically true, the signal is weak and only reaches Egypt´s north coast). He said the GOE could not accept licensing of Sawa as a condition for aid. Egypt had "battles" to fight and this would place the GOE in a bad position, as U.S. assistance was needed to overcome development challenges and fight terrorism. Nazif said he had made this point to many CODELS, emphasizing that Congress should not pass a bill conditioning aid on licensing. In any event, the GOE was preparing to privatize government channels after the parliamentary elections. Rachid added that the USG wouldn´t submit to pressure for licensing of foreign media in the U.S. He said allowing Sawa to broadcast was not legal under Egypt´s current radio and television regulatory regime, so the U.S. was essentially asking the GOE to break its own law. He allowed that the law needed to be reformed, but this should be done in a transparent and appropriate manner.

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Exchanges

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¶10. (C) Nazif expressed regret that it had become harder for Egyptians to get U.S. visas. Noting that he was an alumnus of the International Visitors program and that many Cabinet members had studied or interned in the U.S., Nazif pointed out that if the U.S. really wanted to help Egypt, it should invest in Egypt´s people. He suggested setting up a fund for graduate level study in the U.S. that would allow 100-200 students per year to study in the U.S., with the caveat that they return to Egypt. Hughes emphasized that the U.S. wanted more foreign students and visitors and that one of her goals in her new position was to increase the number of exchange programs.

¶11. (U) U/S Hughes has cleared this cable.

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