This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 008454 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID PTER ECON ETRD EAGR KCRM KJUS CO EI
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER BARCO AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS 
KATRINA, IRISH THREE, FREE TRADE, AND CHAVEZ 
 
REF: A. BOGOTA 8415 
     ¶B. BOGOTA 8414 
     ¶C. BOGOTA 8392 
     ¶D. BOGOTA 8410 
     ¶E. STATE 164051 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. 
Reason: 1.4 (b,d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C)  Ambassador Wood thanked Foreign Minister Carolina 
Barco September 7 for the GOC's offers of assistance in the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina.  Barco said the GOC could send its 
30 disaster relief experts and nutritional powder immediately 
and is standing by for further instructions from the U.S. 
Wood told Barco that the U.S. would communicate to Dublin the 
importance of Ireland following its international obligations 
with regard to the "Irish 3" who fled Colombia and who face a 
17 year sentence for terrorism; Barco said the GOC was open 
to the three serving a custodial sentence in Ireland.  In 
response to Wood's suggestions, Barco said the GOC would make 
available to Dublin the transcripts associated with their 
convictions (they are being translated) and consider hiring 
an Irish attorney or advisor and sending a representative to 
Dublin to make the GOC case to the Irish government and 
media.  With regard to President Alvaro Uribe's upcoming trip 
to the U.S., Barco said the Ambassador's suggestion of a 
meeting with the Washington Post editorial board was a good 
one; such a recent meeting by Vice President Francisco Santos 
had resulted in positive Post coverage of Colombia's Justice 
and Peace law.  Barco informed Wood that she had already 
accepted the Secretary's September 16 dinner offer.  She said 
Uribe had instructed GOC FTA negotiators to place "all the 
GOC's cards on the table" during upcoming Washington talks, 
with the objective of concluding a deal by the end of 
October.  Barco said she expected to receive a GOC draft of 
Plan Colombia II late September 7.  She expressed GOC concern 
for political developments in Nicaragua, and for Venezuelan 
president Hugo Chavez's efforts to use oil to cement his 
influence in the region.  Barco suggested the U.S., Colombia, 
Mexico, and other countries consider a "line of credit" 
facility for Central America to ensure that Chavez's finances 
were not the only option for Central American countries. 
Barco agreed with Wood that the UN High-Level Meeting on 
development should be constructive.  She said recent problems 
with the U.S. associated with the GOC's position on UNHCR 
reform were the result of a misunderstanding and said they 
had already been resolved.  Barco informed Wood of the GOC's 
recent efforts to solicit international political and 
financial support for paramilitary demobilization.  End 
summary. 
 
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GOC Assistance for Hurricane Katrina Recovery 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Ambassador Wood thanked Foreign Minister Barco for 
the GOC's offers of assistance in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina.  He said that he had talked in the past several days 
with President Alvaro Uribe, Justice and Interior Minister 
Sabas Pretelt, and Vice Minister of Defense Andres Penate, 
all of whom had expressed solidarity with the U.S. and 
offered specific assistance.  (As reported ref C, Penate 
increased the GOC's offer of assistance September 6 to 30 
disaster relief experts and 10 tons of nutritional 
supplement.)  Wood said the U.S. would inform the GOC as soon 
as practicable about how and where the GOC should deliver the 
aid.  The U.S. wanted to ensure that experts and relief 
supplies arrived in an orderly manner to a place that could 
take advantage of them.  Barco said the GOC was looking into 
other ways to help.  The Ambassador informed Barco that the 
Embassy was working with the Associated Press on a story 
highlighting the GOC's assistance.  (The story was published 
on September 7.) 
 
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Irish Three 
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¶3.  (C) Wood informed Barco that the U.S. would communicate 
to the Irish Republic the importance of complying with its 
international obligations with regard to the "Irish 3" who 
recently surfaced in Dublin after fleeing Colombia and who 
face a 17 year sentence for terrorism (ref E).  The Irish 
Republic should not be used as a safe haven for terrorists. 
Wood said that the solution was up to Colombia and Ireland. 
The "Irish 3" could be extradited to Colombia or serve their 
sentences in Ireland.  Wood said the U.S. would press the 
Irish Republic to give the GOC full cooperation on the 
matter.  He asked Barco to provide the Irish Republic with 
all the evidence associated with their trial, appeal, 
conviction, and sentence, and suggested that the GOC consider 
retaining an Irish attorney or advisor to assist in 
understanding the nuances of Irish legal and political 
processes.  Wood also suggested that the GOC consider sending 
a representative to Ireland to explain its case to the 
government and to the press, especially on Colombia's justice 
system and human rights record. 
 
¶4.  (C) Barco thanked the Ambassador for the information and 
said she thought the political climate was changing in favor 
of the "Irish 3" serving a custodial sentence.  She said 
initially the subject was regarded as being especially 
sensitive because of the Northern Irish peace process, but 
recently she detected movement.  The GOC was translating the 
trial documents for Dublin.  The GOC was open to the 
possibility of the "Irish 3" serving their sentences in 
Ireland.  Unfortunately, the respective schedules of 
President Uribe and Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern 
appeared to rule out an UNGA meeting, but either Barco or 
Vice President Santos would meet with Irish Foreign Minister 
Dermot Ahern in the U.S.  It was possible, she said, that 
Ambassador to the UK Alfonso Lopez could visit the Irish 
Republic to make the GOC's case. 
 
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Uribe and Barco's Schedules in the U.S. 
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¶5.  (C) Wood said President Uribe's schedule in the U.S. 
looked very positive (copy faxed to WHA/AND - French.)  He 
suggested, however, that the GOC consider a meeting with the 
Washington Post editorial board. Barco said this was a good 
idea; VP Santos had met with them in recent months and the 
Post's relatively favorable editorial was the result.  Barco 
said the Uribe would meet with Algerian President Bouteflika 
to explore Algeria's experience in peace-building and to 
solicit his support for Colombia's campaign for Cartagena to 
serve as the headquarters of the World Tourism Organization. 
Barco said Cartagena was competing against cities such as 
Prague, which already have many other prestigious 
responsibilities.  For Colombia, Cartegana's selection would 
increase tourism and help change perceptions about the 
country.  Uribe would also meet with South Africa's President 
Thabo Mbeki; she said she understood there would be a second 
"restorative justice" meeting in South Africa to follow up on 
the initial event in Cali. 
 
¶6.  (C) Barco told Wood she had accepted Secretary Rice's 
September 16 dinner invitation.  Wood said he understood the 
dinner would be informal, without notetakers, and would be an 
opportunity to exchange ideas, a conversation rather than a 
meeting. 
 
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Free Trade Talks 
---------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Barco said that, following his September 5 meeting 
with Peruvian president Alejandro Toledo, Uribe instructed 
the GOC FTA delegation to "put all its cards on the table" in 
their upcoming talks in Washington, D.C.  She said the GOC 
would meet U.S. representatives "in total sincerity" with the 
goal of concluding a deal by the end of October.  The GOC 
would present its bottom lines in Washington.  According to 
Barco, Uribe's rationale was that high-level interest would 
drop off as 2006 elections approached in all four negotiating 
partners and the Doha round resumed (refs A and B). 
 
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Plan Colombia II 
---------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Barco said she expected to receive the latest draft 
of Plan Colombia II late on September 7, for review prior to 
her departure for Washington with Uribe September 14. 
 
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Concern about Nicaragua, Chavez Role in Central America 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Barco said the GOC expects Nicaragua's President 
Bolanos to visit Colombia on Tuesday, September 13, prior to 
Uribe's September 14 departure for the U.S.  The GOC is 
concerned about political developments in Nicaragua.  Bolanos 
has maintained a low profile and the Nicaraguan Congress has 
made some arbitrary decisions in recent months.  Barco said 
Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega "has a good chance" in 
upcoming elections if trends continue.  In the GOC's view, 
the OAS should make a statement defending democracy in 
Nicaragua.  Barco said OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel 
Insulza told Uribe last week that he needed a report before 
making a decision, but she expects Insulza to call a meeting 
of the OAS Permament Council to discuss the matter.  Such 
hemispheric action was critical, Barco said.  In her August 
meetings with the presidents of El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Guatemala, all said they were worried about political 
developments in Nicaragua. 
 
¶10.  (C) In Barco's view, Central America has made great 
strides since the 1980s and risks being undermined by 
Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez.  This is a critical moment 
for Central America.  Barco said Central American countries 
are struggling to pay increasingly high oil bills ("they are 
drowning"); Chavez senses an opportunity and is dangling the 
possibility of providing financial assistance to cope with 
the "energy crisis" (as he is doing with educational expenses 
that are more properly the responsibility of the 
Inter-American Bank for Development, she said, and as he is 
apparently doing with Ecuador).  Barco asked if the U.S. 
would be willing to consult with Colombia, Mexico, and other 
like-minded countries to construct something like "lines of 
credit" for Central American countries.  In her view, such a 
facility would ensure that Chavez's money would not be the 
only assistance available for Central American countries. 
GOC Ambassador Luis Alberto Moreno (newly elected president 
of the IDB who will assume that role on October 1, 2005) 
would raise this issue with the State Department.  Wood said 
the U.S. was aware of Chavez's polarizing policies and desire 
to lead a "bloc" of countries in opposition to the U.S.  The 
U.S. was facing a number of calls on its funds from Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Colombia, Africa, and now Hurricane Katrina and 
its room for maneuver was less than usual.  He suggested that 
Barco could raise this topic at the September 16 dinner with 
the Secretary because it had hemispheric, and perhaps broader 
international repercussions. 
 
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United Nations 
-------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) The Ambassador said the U.S. wants constructive 
outcomes on development issues from the UN High-Level 
Meeting.  He noted that we were often unpleasantly surprised 
by Colombian positions at the UN.  Barco responded to Wood's 
concern about the GOC's role in recent discussions at the UN 
on reform by saying there had been a misunderstanding that 
had now been cleared up.  Barco said the GOC had no intent to 
cause problems for the U.S. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
International Financing for Paramilitary Demobilization 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶12.  (C) In response to the Ambassador's question, Barco said 
Uribe had raised international support for the paramilitary 
demobilization process in recent meetings with Peruvian 
president Toledo and Chilean president Ricardo Lagos.  Barco 
said she had also talked to EU Foreign Affairs High 
Commissioner Javier Solano and was pleased to hear of the 
constructive COLAT discussion September 6, at which France 
had been "not so aggressive."  Barco said the OAS mission 
needs additional support. 
WOOD