This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 008367 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PTER CO FARC ELN
SUBJECT: GOC AND FARC FROZEN ON HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE; 
CATHOLIC CHURCH FRUSTRATED BUT ENCOURAGED BY PARA PROCESS 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (U) FARC "spokesperson" Luis Edgar Devia AKA Raul Reyes 
communicated on August 22 their demand that the GOC 
demilitarize certain municipalities as a precondition for 
talks on a humanitarian exchange.  Reyes' statement 
effectively ended the Catholic Church's offer to mediate a 
"pre-dialogue" outside Colombia, an offer that President 
Uribe accepted on August 22.  Episcopal Conference President 
Archbishop Luis Castro admitted he had run out of ideas on 
how to establish an exchange.  He noted that the Justice and 
Peace Law will ensure accountability to victims in the 
paramilitary peace process.  End summary. 
 
FARC Demand Demilitarized Zone/GOC Offers Anything Else 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶2. (U) On August 22, the latest message from Reyes to a local 
news station, made public on August 29, reiterated the FARC's 
minimum requirement for any prisoner swap: a thirty-day 
demilitarized zone in the municipalities of Florida and 
Pradera, Valle de Cauca Department.  The demilitarized zone 
has been a constant FARC demand for an exchange for more than 
a year, although the August 14 communique (below) did offer 
to limit the demobilization to thirty days.  The GOC 
repeatedly has stressed its unwillingness to create such a 
zone, but offered measures such as "strategic corridors" to 
allow the FARC to enter/exit the trade area safely.  On 
August 16, President Uribe noted in a communique from Casa de 
Narino that High Commissioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo 
remained authorized to meet with the FARC, to establish a 
meeting point without demilitarization, and to grant whatever 
other security guarantees the guerrillas choose. Based on 
these communiques, neither side seems willing to budge on the 
demobilization issue at this time. 
 
¶3. (U) Begin informal translation: 
 
FARC Communique 
 
We value the (victims') families' efforts to achieve an 
encounter between the national government and the FARC, to 
begin a humanitarian exchange process. 
 
We suggest that the families propose to the government that 
it clear the municipalities of Florida and Pradera of all 
public forces for just 30 days to hold this meeting. 
 
Military considerations prohibit our developing such an 
encounter in Aures, municipality of Caicedonia, although the 
nation recognizes and appreciates Aures residents' efforts. 
 
Always, and without exception, including occasional 
international talks, the encounters between the FARC and 
different governments have been the focus of military 
hostilities which, today more than ever, we should avoid 
since it could indefinitely postpone any hope (of an 
exchange). 
 
We are the most interested party in fixing the terms and 
realizing an exchange, but with clear guarantees.  All other 
suggestions proposed, such as the fantastical strategic 
corridor, are false, vile speculations and allow childishness 
to bar the way to a possible agreement. 
 
Compatriots, 
 
Secretariat of the Estado Mayor Central 
 
SIPDIS 
Mountains of Colombia, August 14, 2005 
 
End text. 
 
Church "Pre-dialogue" Refused 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) On August 22, the same day that Reyes issued his 
message insisting on the demilitarized zone, President Uribe 
approved the Catholic Church's offer to broker a negotiation 
"pre-dialogue" (reftel).  The FARC's refusal seems to have 
been timed to quash the pre-dialogue before it became 
established.  Episcopal Council President Archbishop Castro 
told the Ambassador on August 31, "the process is dead," and 
confessed he was out of ideas on how to create an exchange 
agreement with the FARC.  Castro plans to urge High 
Commissioner for Peace Restrepo to continue seeking options 
for an exchange, but acknowledged the GOC had offered talks 
with different interlocutors and locations, freed 23 FARC 
prisoners, and proposed denying the U.S. extradition request 
of "Simon Trinidad" without reciprocity from the FARC. 
Castro commented that the FARC had become rigid and 
speculated the guerrillas feared for their safety in an 
negotiation.  Castro raised the issue of the hostage 
families' pressure on the GOC and the Catholic Church to find 
a solution, but noted that the French Ambassador to Colombia 
had reduced the "Ingridization" of French policy, referring 
to French pressure to recover dual French-Colombian national 
Ingrid Betancourt.  Castro promised to continue looking for a 
way forward. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Castro was optimistic about the paramilitary peace 
process.  He dismissed critics of the Justice and Peace Law, 
many of whom he said had not read the law.  He added that the 
Justice and Peace Law  implemented a new concept to make 
justice and victim restitution a part of Colombia's peace 
process.  He stressed that Colombians needed to make it work. 
 Castro agreed that a truth commission would be a welcome 
addition to advance the national reconciliation process. 
WOOD