P 271509Z SEP 05
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9857
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BEIRUT 003122 
 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANON/POUNDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2015 
TAGS: KDEM LE PGOV PREL SY UNGA
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN 
MINISTER -- U.S.-LEBANESE COOPERATION GOING WELL 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador.  Reason:  Sections 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  On September 27, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Fawzi Salloukh met with Ambassador and Poloff to 
discuss the recent Lebanese meetings in the U.S.  The 
Minister was in good spirits.  He expressed his overall 
satisfaction with the reception he received in the U.S., 
including a side visit that took the Minister to Dearborn, 
Michigan to meet with the Lebanese-American community there. 
The Minister said he was pleased with the degree of 
cooperation his government was enjoying with the USG and he 
hoped to continue that cooperation.  The Ambassador discussed 
local commentary on replacements for President Lahoud, 
Lebanese diplomatic appointments, and the arrival of the FBI 
team in Lebanon.  Pulling the Ambassador aside, the Minister 
highlighted the importance of not isolating the Shia 
community, and offered to serve as a messenger to Hizballah, 
an offer the Ambassador politely refused.  End Summary. 
 
Clearing the air on assistance 
and conditions 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C)  The Ambassador thanked Minister Salloukh for his 
help in dispelling rumors that the Core Group interest in was 
linked to compliance with UNSCR 1559, or other conditions to 
be imposed on Lebanon.  The Minister launched into 
expressions of gratitude for the meetings in New York on the 
margins of the UNGA, and in Washington with USG officials and 
members of congress.  The Minister frequently repeated that 
he was happy with the meetings, and with the outcome the 
Washington discussions.  He was particularly pleased with his 
meeting with NEA A/S Welch, whom he described as "direct and 
transparent."  He said the local criticism that the meetings 
had drawn in Lebanon was unwarranted.  "Speaker Berri was 
critical of the form, not the substance of the meetings." 
Salloukh attributed the selected negative reaction in Beirut 
to a question posed by a Lebanese journalist about the 
conditionality to be imposed on assistance to Lebanon and on 
the subsequent misquoting of the Secretary's response to the 
question.  Salloukh volunteered that he circulated the real 
transcript of the interview to interested parties to correct 
the record. 
 
¶3.  (C)  After Salloukh's description of his efforts to 
correct the atmosphere, the Ambassador thanked him for his 
work.  The unjustified verbal attacks on PM Siniora were of 
particular concern to the USG, the Ambassador explained.  The 
Ambassador noted that he had visited Walid Jumblatt, who had 
made negative comments about the New York meeting after 
reading local press reports, and presented him with the 
transcript of the interview as well.  Jumblatt disavowed his 
earlier criticisms.  Salloukh added that he found that 
Washington understood the Lebanese position.  The GOL 
understood that UNSCR 1559 was still on the table, but the 
USG had understood that Lebanon would work to "solve one 
problem after another." 
 
Dearborn and Washington both successful 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Salloukh was proud that he was the first Lebanese 
Minster for Foreign Affairs to visit the Lebanese-American 
community in Dearborn, Michigan.  The Minister said he was 
greeted in Dearborn by Christian as well as Muslim community 
leaders, including local bishops and sheikhs.  The Minister 
said he perceived the American-Lebanese community as 
Americans proud of their Lebanese heritage.  He said they 
seem satisfied with the level of bilateral cooperation. 
Salloukh explained that he had to interrupt his Michigan 
visit to rush to Washington to be at PM Siniora's side during 
his meetings there.  Outside of the Department, Salloukh met 
with Representatives Henry Hyde, Nick Rahall, Tom Lantos, and 
Darrell Issa.  These meetings were short, as the Minister had 
to attend an IMF meeting.  On his way out of the Capitol, the 
Minister and PM Siniora bumped into Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld.  Salloukh said Secretary Rumsfeld expressed support 
for a "strong and stable Lebanon." 
 
¶5.  (C) The one unpleasant issue raised by the Minister was 
the publication of a comment, made off the record by the 
Prime Minister, regarding the potential need for President 
Lahoud to step down.  According to Salloukh, Siniora was 
speaking to a reporter off-the record.  That comment was 
published and topped with the headline "Siniora says Lahoud 
should resign."  Despite the published comment, the Minister 
said that relations between Lahoud and Siniora were good. 
When asked by the Ambassador, the Minister also characterized 
the relations between Siniora and Speaker Berri as good, 
although with noticeably less conviction than had accompanied 
his earlier statement. 
 
USG has no Presidential Candidates 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  On that topic, the Ambassador explained that the USG 
had no favored candidate for President of the Republic in 
Lebanon, if the presidency were to become vacant.  The 
decision to seek President Lahoud's early departure, or to 
pick a replacement for President Lahoud, was not a matter to 
be determined by the USG or any other actor in the 
international community, the Ambassador affirmed.  Salloukh 
agreed and added that although the Ambassador was free to 
discuss issues related to the presidency, or the possible 
character of a new president, Lebanese would never accept the 
"naming" of candidates by any foreign embassy. 
 
FBI team is welcome 
------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  The Ambassador briefed the Foreign Minister on the 
arrival of the FBI technical team requested by PM Siniora. 
The team will work at the direction and under the 
responsibility of the Lebanese justice system.  They will not 
be independent actors.  The Prime Minister had requested the 
team and the Embassy had relayed that request directly to the 
FBI.  The Legatt from Jordan, with responsibilities for 
Lebanon, was already on site and working with local 
investigators.  The Minister expressed his gratitude for USG 
assistance. 
 
After Mehlis? -- We will see 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  The Minister refused to speculate on what Lebanon 
would do once the Mehlis report is issued and the UNIIIC 
mandate under UNSCR 1595 came to an end.  Salloukh said the 
Ministry of Justice has the lead on those issues and he, as 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, did not wish to intervene in 
the matter.  However, the Minister did say that Lebanese are 
awaiting the report, and hope to have "the truth".  The 
Ambassador expressed the hope that local expectations for the 
Mehlis report were not too high. 
 
Diplomatic appointments will come 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  The minister, who had been very comfortable during 
the conversation, became visibly ill at ease when the 
Ambassador asked him about possible diplomatic appointments. 
Salloukh said, "We should do it." "I am preparing."  The 
Minister added that he had discussed the issue with the 
President, Prime Minister and Speaker of the Parliament and 
all agreed that appointments should be made.  The Ambassador 
reminded him that the Mission in New York was still without a 
Chief of Mission and Salloukh added that even Riyadh had only 
a Charge.  Then, he made a subtle comment about the Lebanese 
mission in Washington indicating he knew that changes were 
needed in that Embassy.  But the Minister, for all his 
visible concern, fell well short of announcing a schedule for 
appointments. 
 
Don't isolate the Shia 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  As the meeting ended the Minister (accompanied by a 
notetaker) pulled the Ambassador aside briefly.   Salloukh 
said that his meetings in Washington made it clear to him 
that the USG did not aim to isolate the Lebanese Shia 
community and that some Lebanese Shia were misguided in 
believing that USG policy was "anti-Shia."  Salloukh said 
that he wanted to work with the Ambassador in making sure 
that the Shia had an accurate understanding of USG foreign 
policy.  Even if the Shia were suspicious of some of the USG 
"principles" and did not like UNSCR 1559, the Shia needed to 
see that the USG would not work to isolate them as a 
community.  Salloukh also offered to serve as a conduit 
between the Ambassador and Hizballah.  The Ambassador 
demurred, explaining that we do not pass messages to 
Hizballah. 
 
FELTMAN