This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004044 
 
SIPDIS 
 
REL GBR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2015 
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE STIFFS BRITISH 
BASRAH INVESTIGATION TEAM 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 3933 
 
     ¶B. BASRAH 112 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.4 (a), (b), AN 
D (d). 
 
¶1.  (S//REL GBR)  SUMMARY: Only two of five Iraqi members of 
the Iraqi Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS) 
attended a September 29 meeting called specifically to review 
the results of a British team's investigation of the events 
in Basrah on September 19, which involved the detention by 
Iraqi police of two British soldiers and their subsequent 
rescue by British forces.  The results of an Iraqi 
investigation were supposed to be presented as well, but the 
Iraqi investigators also failed to show up.  Only Defense 
Minister Dulime and National Security Advisor Rubaie 
appeared.  Prime Minister Jaafari (who has not been seen 
publicly the past four days), Minister of Interior Jabr, and 
Minister of State for National Security Affairs al-Anzi were 
absent.  The British team presented their findings.  The 
Iraqis refused to indicate where they foresee the matter 
going from here.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (S//REL GBR) At the conclusion of the last MCNS meeting 
on September 25, all members agreed to convene the committee 
again on September 29 to be briefed on the findings of two 
teams, an Iraqi MOI team and a British team from London, 
which were conducting investigations into the events of 
September 19 in Basrah in which two British soldiers 
operating in plain clothes were involved in a shooting 
incident with police, detained by the police, and 
subsequently rescued by British troops (reftels).  The 
British Ambassador suggested to the Iraqis at the September 
25 meeting that both teams should be permitted to present 
their findings to the committee together and that a joint 
statement be issued satisfactory to both sides.  The parties 
agreed to meet again on September 29. 
 
¶3.  (S//REL GBR) At the September 29 meeting, the Iraqi MOI 
team failed to appear.  The only Iraqi members of the 
committee present were Minister of Defense Dulime and 
National Security Advisor Rubaie.  Prime Minister Jaafari was 
absent.  Jaafari has not been seen in public since the 
September 25 meeting and has canceled all appointments with 
Embassy officials, claiming fatigue.  Also absent were 
Minister of Interior Jabr (who was said to have fallen 
suddenly "ill" about an hour before the meeting), and 
Minister of State for National Security Affairs al-Anzi (who 
was holding his own meeting in a building a few hundred yards 
away with two of Jabr's deputies, one of whom was supposed to 
be sitting in for Jabr at the MCNS).  The Coalition was 
represented by Ambassador Khalilzad, British Ambassador 
Patey, and British Deputy Commanding General of MNF-I Brims. 
After waiting thirty minutes for the MOI Deputy Minister who 
never appeared, the British team made its presentation. 
 
¶4. (S//REL GBR)  The British team pointed out that they had 
met with the Iraqi team for over thirteen hours and had made 
available to the Iraqi team all the British soldiers the 
Iraqis had wanted to interview.  The Iraqis spent five hours 
interviewing British personnel.  Conversely, the British team 
was not permitted to meet with any of the Iraqis the British 
desired to interview.  In fact, due to the Iraqi failure to 
make witnesses available, the team is still unable to say 
with certainty what happened to the Iraqi police officers 
allegedly shot in the opening moments of this incident.  So 
despite an initially high degree of trust between the two 
teams, ultimately the British were left with many unanswered 
questions--chief among them "how did two British soldiers in 
the custody of Iraqi police end up in the hands of 
militiamen?"  The British presentation noted the generally 
positive relations between MNF-I troops and the people of 
Basrah, as well as the high regard with which the British 
forces there hold many of the Iraqi police and government 
officials, including the judge involved in this incident. 
However, the British have concluded that several policemen 
operating from the station in question are members of the 
Jaysh Al-Mahdi militia and that the policemen who are not are 
powerless or too afraid to challenge the others. 
 
¶5. (S//REL GBR)  At the conclusion of the British 
presentation, National Security Advisor Rubaie asked what the 
two soldiers were doing in plainclothes in the first place. 
He referred to them as "agents" and asked if they were 
"spies" sent to kill someone.  Ambassador Patey corrected him 
by noting that the two were "British soldiers" lawfully 
operating in joint GOI-MNF-I support objectives, which are 
the same as those of the government of Iraq, namely to track 
and capture persons responsible for a deadly wave of 
improvised explosive device attacks that have killed 
Coalition soldiers and civilians alike.  Minister of Defense 
Dulime sat silent except to note that he would have liked to 
see the Iraqi team's presentation, an observation in which 
Ambassador Patey readily concurred. 
 
¶6.  (S//REL GBR)  At the end of the meeting, Ambassador Patey 
asked Rubaie where the Iraqi government plans to go from here 
with the information.  He reminded Rubaie that the purpose of 
the meeting with the two teams was for the MCNS to view both 
sets of findings, arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement 
about what had taken place, and issue a joint statement to 
ease tensions and put this event behind.  Rubaie responded 
that nothing can be done until the Prime Minister is briefed 
and makes a decision.  Patey expressed disappointment, noting 
that this had been the purpose of 
the meeting in the first place. 
 
¶7.  (S//REL GBR)  COMMENT:  The British were disappointed 
with the outcome of the meeting.  They had hoped to agree 
with the Iraqis on a joint statement to ease tensions and 
move on and to share with the Prime Minister and the Minister 
of Interior, in particular, the evidence they have gathered 
that points to serious undermining of the Basrah police force 
by militia infiltrators.  Jabr and al-Anzi clearly did not 
want to hear any of this.  END COMMENT. 
Khalilzad