This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004034 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2015 
TAGS: PREL KDEM IZ XL
SUBJECT: FALLUJAH:  GEN CASEY MEETS LOCAL LEADERS, URGES 
CONTINUED COOPERATION IN STRATEGIC CIT 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT FORD, REASONS 1.4 
(B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  General Casey, MNF-I Commanding General, 
met September 22, 2005, with Fallujah leaders at the 
downtown Civil-Military Operations Center.  He stressed his 
continued personal commitment to Fallujah's reconstruction 
and improved security; progress had been made since his 
last visit but more remained to be done.  General Casey 
urged Fallujah leaders to cooperate with CF and vote in the 
upcoming referendum and election.  Fallujah leaders 
conveyed concerns about the pace of rebuilding, stalled ITG 
compensation (none for damaged businesses so far), 
inadequate resources for police, integration of ex-military 
officers into the new army, among other issues.  Fallujah 
City Council Chairman Sheikh Kamal (a principal imam) 
predicted all Fallujans would vote in the referendum and 
December election.  He also criticized ongoing military 
operations elsewhere in the province that he claimed would 
be disruptive to Sunni political engagement.  Notably, one 
Fallujah resident later told Poloff that the MNF-I 
withdrawal from Najaf was clear evidence that the American 
forces would, ultimately, withdraw from Iraq.  Fallujah's 
mufti, Sheikh Hamza, formally requested the release of 
detained imam Sheikh Ahmed Qassem -- MNF-W's number two 
high-value target.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------- 
GEN CASEY:  PROGRESS, 
MORE TO DO TOGETHER 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Key Fallujah leaders met for 75 minutes with MNF-I 
Commanding General, General George Casey, and II MEF (Fwd) 
Commanding General, Major General Stephen Johnson, 
September 22, 2005, at the Fallujah Civil-Military 
Operations Center in central Fallujah.  The group included 
the city's mufti, Sheikh Hamza, city council chairman, 
Sheikh Kamal, and various other tribal and religious 
leaders.  GEN Casey noted that progress had been achieved 
in the city since his last visit; still, more work 
remained.  He stressed that CF remained committed to the 
city, and urged city leaders to cooperate to achieve long- 
term success.  The coalition had invested significant 
resources into the city's rebuilding, totaling 
approximately USD 300 million; this figure likely 
represented more U.S. reconstruction investment than in any 
other Iraqi city except Baghdad. 
 
----------------------- 
MUST BEAT BACK AL-QAIDA 
AND THEIR SUPPORTERS 
----------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) GEN Casey called upon the group to help beat back 
Al-Qaida and their supporters' influence in the country, 
which he said represented Iraq's biggest threat to 
stability.  He also urged them to vote and "take charge" of 
their future. 
 
¶4. (C) MNF-I's CG also defended CF actions in Tel Afar as a 
necessary step to ensure residents there the opportunity to 
vote in the referendum and election.  Other cities had been 
taken over by Al-Qaida; CF and ISF would work together to 
guarantee that these communities could vote, he added. 
 
--------------------------- 
CITY LEADERS CITE CONCERNS; 
SEEK COALITION FOLLOW-UP 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Fallujah leaders requested GEN Casey's assistance on 
several issues, including: 
 
-COMPENSATION:  Mufti Hamza stressed that ITG funds had not 
yet been secured to help rebuild businesses, particularly 
in the city's industrial sector (previously home to 70 
percent of city jobs). 
 
-SCHOOLS:  Complaints were registered about some schools 
that continue to be occupied by ISF and are in need of 
repair. 
 
-EX-MILITARY OFFICERS:  Fallujah's large population of 
former military officers want to be reintegrated into the 
national army.  Since being fired in 2003, many have been 
without income.  (NOTE:  locals state that approximately 
2,500 ex-officers and 20,000 ex-soldiers still call the 
Fallujah-area home.  The city served as a key recruiting 
location under Saddam. END NOTE) 
 
-POLICE BUDGET:  Only recently had salaries for Fallujah 
police been resolved by MOI (after many months); city 
police chief, Brigadier General Salah, urged CF support to 
secure a budget for equipment and other incidental police 
costs.  One resident complained to GEN Casey:  "The ITG 
doesn't even provide gas for the police chief, how are they 
going to help on compensation issues?" 
 
-CHECKPOINTS:  Leaders complained that strict entry control 
prohibited relatives and others from visiting the city for 
important events.  (NOTE:  Badges remains a hot civic 
topic, even while most residents concede that the 
checkpoints help serve to protect the city.  END NOTE) 
 
--------------------------------- 
REFERENDUM/ELECTION: BIG TURNOUT? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Sheikh Kamal stated that "everyone" in Fallujah 
would participate in the upcoming referendum and election. 
However, he criticized ongoing military operations in Sunni 
areas, claiming they would prevent Sunnis from voting. 
Kamal questioned how residents in these areas could vote 
"when their cities are under siege?" 
 
¶7. (C) Fallujah's mufti, Sheikh Hamza, urged the coalition 
to focus on reconstruction efforts in the city's industrial 
section and compensation for damaged businesses. He stated 
that most shops and merchants were "in dire need of 
assistance."  Hamza also criticized ongoing U.S. operations 
to detain Fallujans.  As mufti, he said he had called upon 
all residents to return to the city after the November 2004 
battle, including those who might have been engaged in the 
"resistance" prior to Al-Fajr.  He said the coalition had 
agreed to focus on Fallujah's new chapter, not its past; 
this agreement had been violated, the mufti argued, by 
punishing residents for past -- not present -- insurgent 
ties.  He also requested that GEN Casey release a detained 
Fallujah imam, Sheikh Ahmed Qassem (MNF-W's number two 
high-value target). (NOTE: This is the second formal 
request by Sheikh Hamza regarding the detained imam. 
Marines continue to question the detainee.  END NOTE) 
 
------------------------------ 
LOCAL CONTROL: NAJAF PRECEDENT 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) In a follow-on discussion with Fallujah Poloff and 
Marine FAO, Fallujah resident Engineer Farouk said GEN 
Casey's visit sent an important signal to residents. 
Farouk added that "everything has changed from last year. 
When you came into our country, we thought you occupiers 
were not going to leave.  Maybe it has taken two years to 
figure out the truth, but we know you intend to ultimately 
leave."  When asked to explain the shift in the Sunni-Arab 
mindset, Farouk stated flatly:  "Najaf.  That's how.  You 
left Najaf and the place stayed under Iraqi control." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) Predictably, most of the meeting with GEN Casey 
reflected the usual gripes we often hear in city meetings. 
Fallujah leaders did not engage in much big-picture 
dialogue.  They clearly welcomed the chance to meet with a 
top coalition leader.  Local friction with ISF represents a 
growing problem; as police are stood up, consideration 
should be given to the departure of the Public Order 
Brigade.  More ITG compensation for damaged businesses will 
be key in coming months to help the city regain lost jobs. 
PM Jaafari's government has yet to provide any funds for 
Fallujah's rebuilding.  Referendum and election 
participation in the city looks promising; Fallujah leaders 
echo the same prediction:  everyone will turnout.  Arab and 
other media in Fallujah on referendum and election days 
will probably have a very different set of pictures from 
December; there is an opportunity we could exploit there. 
Sunni Arab attention on the successful return of "local 
control" in Najaf might reflect a maturing appreciation for 
underlying coalition aims in Iraq. 
Khalilzad