This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 002529 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR P, R AND EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2015 
TAGS: PREL KDEM KPAO EAID PHUM KMPI GR INTERNAL
SUBJECT: COMBATING EXTREMISM IN GREECE 
 
REF: STATE 159129 
 
Classified By: Charge Tom Countryman.  Reasons 1.4(b/d). 
 
¶1.  (S) SUMMARY: In Greece, the twin threats of extremism and 
violence stem more from a decades-old, homegrown anti-U.S., 
anti-NATO, anti-globalization sentiment that is deeply 
engrained in Greek society than from extremism exported from 
the Middle East.  Domestic terrorist groups and an active 
anarchist movement have long been the source of extremism and 
violence in Greece.  Greece's Muslim community is split 
between the Turkish minority in the north (protected under 
the Treaty of Lausanne), and a relatively new Athens-based 
population of economic migrants from the Middle East and 
South Asia.  Extremist elements are rare in both.  Greek 
society's insular focus, with its high premium on "Greekness" 
and the Orthodox religion, has created a haven for fringe 
groups which target non-Greeks (especially Jews) for 
violence.  Above all, the United States is Public Enemy 
Number One in Greece -- domestic extremist groups regularly 
target the U.S. embassy to protest against both past history 
and current "American hegemony."  To counter extremist 
attitudes, the Embassy has a multifaceted outreach program, 
designed to promote mutual understanding (an MPP goal) 
between the U.S. and Greece, and within Greece's increasingly 
heteregeneous population.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------- 
FORMS OF EXTREMISM IN GREECE 
---------------------------- 

¶2.  (S) Extremism in Greece is mostly homegrown, and to a 
great extent derives from events unique to Greeks.  In 1968 a 
military junta overthrew the Greek Goverment in a move that 
is still widely (if wrongly) held here to have been at the 
behest, or with the connivance, of the U.S. Government.  The 
Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus in 1974 is also chalked 
up to American hegemonist planning.  Since then, a perceived 
bias in U.S. policy toward Turkey (and Greece's own identity 
problems vis-a-vis 400 years of Ottoman rule) has further 
skewed public opinion against the United States.  In recent 
history, the Kosovo air campaign and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
have both been used to keep public hostility toward the U.S. 
at a peak. 
 
-- DOMESTIC TERRORISM: "17 November" (17N), a radical leftist 
group, was established in 1975 and named for the student 
uprising in Greece on 17 November 1973 against the ruling 
military junta.  It is anti-Greek establishment, anti-U.S., 
anti-Turkey, and anti-NATO, and has sought the ouster of U.S. 
bases from Greece, the removal of Turkish military forces 
from Cyprus, and the severing of Greece,s ties to NATO and 
the European Union.  For 27 years, 17N murdered Greeks and 
non-Greeks alike, including five U.S. Embassy employees. 
Members of the organization also committed armed robbery, and 
carried out rocket attacks against symbolic targets.  In 2002 
a bungled attack by a 17N operative led to the arrests of 
eighteen other suspects.   In 2004, fifteen of these 17N 
defendants were found guilty and given multiple life 
sentences.  Some 17N members, including individuals believed 
to be involved in the murder of USG employees, remain at 
large; others have never been identified.  Further, other 
domestic terrorist groups continue to operate in Greece, and 
while they have not attained the murderous notoriety of 17N, 
they serve as a beacon for the extremist segment of the Greek 
population.  ELA (Revolutionary Popular Struggle) has 
described itself as revolutionary, leftist, anti-state, 
anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism and strongly anti-U.S.  ELA 
emerged in the 1970s and has assumed responsibility for over 
200 bombing that killed three people.  In the 90s, ELA 
stopped operations in Greece.  Four members of ELA were 
arrested in 2004.  All four were convicted and each received 
an imprisonment of 1,174 years.  One member, Christos 
Tsigarides has since been released from prison for health 
reasons.  In 2005 two other members were tried for ELA 
actions (both were acquitted). 
 
Recently, two groups, "Revolutionary Action" and 
"Revolutionary Struggle" have appeared on the Greek domestic 
terrorism radar (it is unclear as yet whether these are, in 
fact, two separate groups).  Some of Greece's CT elite 
believe that one group ("Revolutionary Action") is a 
successor to 17N.  "Revolutionary Struggle" is considered to 
be the successor to ELA, having simply dropped the "Popular" 
from its title.  "Revolutionary Struggle" has claimed 
responsibility for a number of small bombings at various 
Greek businesses, in which improvised explosive devices are 
always the weapon of choice.  These attacks take place in the 
early morning hours and rarely cause injuries.  There have 
been a few victims inadvertently injured as a result of being 
in the right place at the right time.  This group usually 
warns the Hellenic Police prior to detonation, however faulty 
workmanship occasionally leads to premature explosions. 
"Revolutionary Action" has claimed responsibility for a 
number of more serious attacks directed solely at the 
Hellenic Police.  In the fall of 2003, two devices exploded 
at a Greek Court in Athens, the second device clearly 
designed to harm first responders.  In May 2004 three devices 
were exploded at a police precinct in Kallithea (Athens) and 
again the seond/third devices seemed to be intended to cause 
harm to first responders.  In October 2004 a roadside device 
was detonated as it was passed by a Hellenic Police bus 
convoy that was in route to Korydallos Prison, the current 
residence of incarcerated 17N members.  There were no 
injuries, likely due to poor workmanship of the device.  The 
most recent, and most disturbing, attack occurred on December 
31, 2004, when a Special Police Guard, assigned to the 
residence of the British Military Attach was assassinated 
while sitting in his guard booth.  Hellenic Police originally 
claimed that the attack was criminal in nature, but have 
subsequently attributed the attack to local terrorism.  This 
case, as well as the others is still open and it appears that 
there are no suspects. 
 
-- ANARCHISM: Anarchist organizations proliferate in Athens 
and Thessaloniki where they have carved out niches for 
themselves as extreme, leftist "irregulars."  Greek 
anarchists organize regular demonstrations in the name of 
anti-globalization, and against the U.S. specifically and the 
more ambiguous "Western influence."  For the most part, 
anarchist demonstrations are sparsely attended (although 
well-covered in the generally anti-American media). 
Gas-canister ("gazakia" in Greek) attacks have been 
orchestrated to destroy property, not people.  Embassy has no 
evidence that anarchist groups receive material support 
and/or training from international terrorist groups.  Like 
the domestic terror groups, however, anarchist gatherings 
serve to keep alive extremist views. 
 
-- ANTI-SEMITISM: During World War II, 90 percent of Greece's 
Jewish population perished in camps.  Today, only 5,000 Jews 
remain in Greece, mainly in Athens.  While of a smaller scale 
compared to other European countries, anti-Semitism is a 
recurring problem in Greece, expressed by acts of vandalism 
against Jewish monuments and buildings, insidious 
anti-Semitism in some media and through discrimination in the 
workplace.  Some Greeks subscribe to the myth that no Jews 
were in the World Trade Center on September 11, or are 
convinced that the attacks were a plot of the CIA, the 
Mossad, or both.  Greek newspapers, especially editorial 
cartoonists, are unforgiving in their use of Nazi imagery to 
describe Ariel Sharon and Israeli government policies in Gaza 
and the West Bank.  At the same time, Greece has longstanding 
ties to the Palestinian cause and Arafat personally; Greece 
was the last member of the EU to establish diplomatic 
relations with Israel (1990).  In modern colloquial Greek (as 
in the modern Arab world) there is often no distinction 
between "Jewish" and "Israeli."  The problem is compounded by 
almost universal opposition to Israeli policies in the 
Occupied Territories. 
 
¶3.  (C) As an example of Greek extremist attitudes, the 
Popular Orthodox Herald Party (LAOS) promotes radical 
nationalism, anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia.  LAOS 
party leader George Karatzaferis, who won a seat in the 
European Parliament in 2004, regularly attributes negative 
events to international Jewish conspiracies and has used 
party-owned TV to denounce Greek politicians with Jewish 
origins and to claim that Jews were behind the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks.  The Greek neo-Nazi group "Chryssi Avghi" (Golden 
Dawn), attempted to organize "Hatefest 2005" (one of the 
slogans for the event was "Turkey Out of Europe"), a 
pan-European "festival" for the Far Right in southern Greece. 
 On a positive note, the event, after vigorous local 
opposition, was moved several times and ultimately out of 
Greece. 
 
-------------------------- 
GREECE'S MUSLIM POPULATION 
-------------------------- 

¶4.  (C) Greece has a native Muslim minority of 
Turkish-speakers, anywhere from 90,000-140,000 strong who 
live in the northeastern province of Thrace and in the 
islands of the far eastern Aegean near Turkey.  Under the 
1923 Treaty of Lausanne, this Turcophone Muslim minority has 
official status; Islam is recognized and Muslims in Thrace 
have the right to maintain social and charitable 
organizations, to be educated in the Turkish-language and to 
settle family disputes under Shari'a law (Greece is the only 
country in Europe to do so).  Officials say more than 300 
mosques operate under Lausanne Treaty privileges.  While 
Muslim clerics in Thrace have been trained in Saudi Arabia, 
and Turkish Consuls General in Thrace have a strong 
influence, bankrolling many local leaders and the "elected" 
muftis in the region, there is no indication of Muslim 
extremism among the indigenous minority in Thrace. 
 
¶5.  (C) Unlike in Thrace, the Muslim community in Athens has 
no treaty protection or guaranteed rights.  In the last 
fifteen years, migration to Greece from Muslim countries has 
mushroomed -- activists believe there could be as many as 
200,000 Muslim migrants (mainly illegals) in Athens, in 
addition to 4,000 Turcophone Greek Muslims.  There is no 
official mosque in Athens, so Muslims pray in numerous 
unofficial prayer rooms.  There are around two dozen such 
prayer rooms operating in Athens today.  They are organized 
in basement apartments and generally serve discrete 
populations:  Pakistani migrants go to a "Pakistani" mosque, 
Egyptians go to an "Egyptian" mosque, and so forth.  Leaders 
of the Bangladeshi community have told us there is a limited 
amount of crossover in their worship.  Although the Greek 
Parliament (finally) approved a bill in 2000 allowing 
construction of a mosque in Athens, the Arbchishop of Greece 
has strongly protested that the cultural center would "serve 
as a breeding ground for terrorism." 
 
--------------------------------- 
U.S. EFFORTS TO COUNTER EXTREMISM 
--------------------------------- 

¶6.  (C) Embassy has made good use of the IV program -- 
sending the only Muslim Member of Parliament on the "Young 
Muslim Leaders" International Visitor Program in FY 2005.  We 
will send a Muslim woman from Thrace to the Young Muslim 
Leaders program in FY 2006. 
 
¶7.  (C) The Embassy (POL, RSO) monitors closely hate speech 
and activities through local contacts, police contacts, and 
the media.  We monitor Islam-related incitement and hate 
speech through additional contact with muftis, imams, and 
members of Muslim minority in Thrace, as well as with the 
diverse and more transient immigrant Muslim population in 
Athens.  There are no indications or incitement or hate 
speech directed against Muslims occurring in Athens. 
 
¶8. (U) The Embassy has undertaken a series of outreach 
activities oriented at the Muslim population in Greece.  We 
opened an American Corner in Xanthi, a town in northeast 
Greece that is predominantly Muslim, and the IRC regularly 
sends material to Xanthi as part of the Embassy's 
country-wide outreach program.   Ambassador hosts a yearly 
Iftar dinner.  Ambassador and Embassy officers have spoken to 
student groups on U.S. policy in the Middle East, including 
students from Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries.  Embassy 
and ConGen officers meet regularly with Muslim religious and 
community leaders in Thrace and Athens.   Cultural program 
opportunities will be utilized in 2006. 
 
¶9.  (U) As noted, the Embassy sent Ilhan Ahmet, the one 
Muslim Member of the Greek Parliament, on an IV program this 
year.  His website, www.ilhanahmet.com, is in Turkish and 
Greek.  (NOTE: Greek usage of the world wide web is the 
lowest in the EU. END NOTE.)  Building on Ahmet's IV program, 
we have helped develop a farming seminar to meet the needs of 
Muslim farmers in northern Greece. 
 
---------------------------------- 
GREEK EFFORTS TO COUNTER EXTREMISM 
---------------------------------- 

¶10.  (S) The Greek Government's track record in countering 
extremism is uneven.  17N operated with impunity for 27 
years, counting Greek police and government officials among 
its victims.  The Olympic Games provided a much-needed 
incentive to bring Greek methods and operations into the 21st 
century.  As a result, Greece now has more tools and know-how 
to keep track of extremist groups in Greek society.  These 
skills, however, are perishable and require routine follow-up 
training.  We do not believe such training has continued 
since the Olympics.  Furthermore, we are skeptical as to 
whether or not the Hellenic Police are pursuing Islamic 
extremists in Greece with that same "pre-Olympic" vigor. 
Greek society also views enhanced police capabilities with a 
jaundiced eye.  Greeks are hypersensitive to any perceived 
limits on personal freedoms; as an example, security cameras 
around town have been vandalized.  Members of Parliament have 
also inveighed against their use; attempts to pass off the 
cameras as trafficams have been only partly successful. 
 
¶11.  (C) Recently, the GoG appears to have taken a greater 
interest in moving against self-styled "anti-imperialist" 
anarchists who operate mainly in central Athens.  In an 
August meeting, Public Order Minister Voulgarakis, 
responsible for police, promised to crack down on violent 
anarchist activity, telling the Ambassador that the July 
arrest of three anarchists had produced evidence that would 
result in convictions and more arrests in the future. 
Thessaloniki police have estimated there are 50-70 local 
anarchists who regularly incite violence.  Recently, the 
Ministry of Public Order has called the Greek judiciary to 
task for a lack of prosecutions of the hundreds of anarchists 
arrested during the many destructive and violent 
demonstrations held in both Athens and Thessaloniki. 
¶12.  (C) The Government attempted to ignore "Hatefest 2005" 
until the outcry from Greek citizens became too loud.  At 
that point, Greek Government Spokesman Roussopoulos stated 
that the GoG would take all measures to prevent the 
"Hatefest" gathering.  Public Order Minister Voulgarakis 
seconded Roussopoulos' comments, saying the event was not 
welcome. 
 
¶13.  (C) The Government has taken steps to combat 
anti-Semitism, and has begun to press for membership on the 
International Task Force on Holocaust Education.  However, it 
was in part the result of heavy Embassy pressure that Greece 
established January 27 as Holocaust Remembrance Day in 2004. 
The Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece constantly 
lobbies for moderation, tolerance, and freedom.  The Greek 
Jewish community says the greatest problem faced by local 
Jews is the widespread perception that they are not truly 
"Greek."  The Greek constitution enshrines Greek Orthodoxy as 
the official religion and the country's non-Orthodox 
minorities - Jews, Turcophone Muslims, Catholics, and other 
Christians - report difficulty advancing in careers in the 
military, education, and the public sector.  It's not 
accurate to paint the Orthodox Church as anti-Semitic, but it 
is so virulently pro-Orthodox that the distinction is often 
lost. 
 
¶14.  (C) As is the norm in the EU, Greece has a modern 
education system that accepts pluralism and open intellectual 
exchange.  Universities do, however, serve as recruiting 
centers (and worse) for anarchists.  As a result of the 1973 
student uprising against the military junta ruling Greece, 
Greece passed a law prohibiting police on university 
campuses.  As recently as May 2005, anarchists took hostages 
at the Athens Polytechnic University and held them for more 
than eight hours as a protest against the presence on campus 
of armed bodyguards who had accompanied two Members of 
Parliament to the university for a book presentation (the 2 
MPs, both former Cabinet Ministers, were among the hostages). 
 Prior to the actual standoff, anarchists detected that 
police assigned to protect 2 MPs attending the event) were on 
campus in violation of government regulations.  The 
anarchists proceeded to attack the police and one policeman 
shot an attacker in the leg, in an effort to protect himself. 
The standoff ended peacefully, but the university academic 
board published a condemnation of the "police action" and 
called on Greeks to protest against the government.  There 
was very little negative press that condemned the violence of 
the anarchists. 
 
¶15.  (U) As part of Greece's effort to join the International 
Task Force on Holocaust Education, the Greek Ministry of 
Education and Religious Affairs has requested Post's 
assistance in re-designing its curricula to update teaching 
of the Holocaust. 
 
¶16.  (U) Public (State) education is readily accessible, 
particularly for women and girls.  Minority education is 
fully funded by the State, which funds madrassas where there 
are significant Muslim communities.  In recent years, these 
madrassas have been opened to girls (who are required to wear 
headscarves). 
COUNTRYMAN