This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 005825 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER MNUC TU US EU IR IZ SY IS KPAL CY
SUBJECT: APNSA HADLEY'S MEETING WITH TURKISH PM ERDOGAN: 
STRENGTHENING THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
 
Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  In a 90-minute meeting with APNSA Hadley on 
September 23, Turkish PM Erdogan spoke of the challenges in 
the Middle East and the need for concrete steps to promote 
democracy.  In that context, he stressed his theme of 
building personal relations with leaders of Turkey's 
neighbors, including Syria and Iran, but also Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority, because of the dividends those 
relations could reap in the form of encouraging reforms and 
democracy.  Erdogan was appreciative of U.S. support for 
Turkey's EU aspirations and on the fight against the PKK, but 
pushed hard for concrete steps against the PKK in northern 
Iraq.  The PM was scathing in his criticism of Iraqi 
President Talabani, whom he said presented himself as the 
"President of the Kurds, not the Iraqis" during his UNGA 
speech, and expressed concern about the Iraqi constitution, 
which had failed to deal with the special status of Kirkuk. 
He welcomed Hadley's proposal to establish a strategic 
dialogue between the U.S. and Turkey, as well as of the 
resumption of High Level Defense Group meetings and companion 
meetings between MFA and State Department as a means to 
strengthen our strategic partnership.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  PM Erdogan opened by describing the U.S.-Turkish 
relationship as a strategic partnership that goes back 50 
years, and which has expanded and improved over the years 
through cooperation in international organizations and on 
regional issues.  Erdogan focused on the BMENA Initiative as 
the way gradually to build democracy in conflict-torn 
countries in the region.  Progress has been made - the 
withdrawal of 34,000 Syrian troops from Lebanon; Israel's 
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.  Now the Palestinian 
Authority must crack down on terrorism to ensure further 
progress.  Erdogan said he had met with Wolfensohn and PM 
Sharon in New York, and Shimon Peres the week before in Italy 
and pledged that Turkey would help facilitate the process. 
Concrete steps include: 
 
--Creating a "solidarity" group among the Palestinian, 
Israeli and Turkish Chambers of Commerce; their first meeting 
took place in Turkey, their second on Palestinian territory; 
the third would be in Israel; 
 
--The Turkish Union of Stock Exchanges and Chambers of 
Commerce was prepared to rebuild the Erez industrial area; PM 
Sharon, per Erdogan, had reacted positively.  Erdogan 
estimated that infrastructure and other construction projects 
could employ as many as 5,000 Palestinians. 
 
¶3. (C)  More concrete steps are needed on BMENAI, Erdogan 
continued, to ensure it was more than just words.  The 
Quartet will continue to play an important role.  The 9 
billion envisioned for infrastructure in the West Bank and 
Gaza can be significant, but only with broad cooperation. 
Turkey, he claimed, is prepared to contribute its experience, 
knowledge and assets. 
 
¶4. (C)  NSA Hadley noted that his trip to Turkey was his 
first solo stop as NSA. Stressing the importance of the 
strategic partnership and our shared values and interest, he 
focused on: 
 
--Europe, describing the U.S. vision of a Europe whole, free 
and at peace, with Turkey as a full contributing member - a 
step important for both the EU and Turkey.  Recognizing 
Turkey's frustration with the lead-up to the October 3 start 
of accession negotiations, he urged Erdogan to keep his eye 
on the prize. 
 
--The Middle East and the region surrounding Turkey, a key 
priority for President Bush.  To achieve that, we must defeat 
terrorism and advance democracy and freedom; Turkey could 
play a critical role in both areas.  With respect to Iran, 
Syria, Iraq, Israel and Palestine, it was important that the 
U.S. and Turkey share common policies to the extent possible. 
 
¶5. (C)  Erdogan responded that the BMENAI was a long-term 
process that would require countries in the region to acquire 
democratic rights - the right to organize, to associate, to 
pursue enterprise, as well as the right of free speech. 
Progress was piecemeal; each country holds elections, but 
they are not without flaws.  The key was to create the right 
atmosphere, and that was not in the 170-member UN or other 
international meetings - a more intimate setting - bilateral 
relationship - was needed.  Turkey, Erdogan said, should not 
be considered a model - that would be presumptuous -  but 
some in the region could draw inspiration.  Democracy, 
Erdogan stated, should be a system of "modesty".  And 
Turkey's democracy remains imperfect; the 59 years since a 
multi-party system was established in Turkey have seen 59 
governments, and "interventions"  (i.e., coups) have no place 
in democracy. 
 
¶6. (C)  Bilateral contacts could achieve results, per the PM. 
 He offered Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip - 
completed despite internal opposition - as an example.  The 
Palestinians should view this not as a victory, but as a step 
along the road to democracy.  He described the preferable 
road via a Turkish proverb:  You can fight with the vineyard 
owner or you can have the grapes.  Turkey would rather 
harvest the grapes. 
 
¶7. (C)  Turning to Syria, for decades Turkey and Syria were 
nearly enemies.  Syria harbored PKK leader Ocalan; the two 
countries came to the brink of war.  Then they began to talk. 
 Now the Syrians hand over terrorists to Turkey.  The 
dialogue began with the Syrians sending their PM to Ankara; 
then President Asad came; finally, Erdogan traveled to 
Damascus.  Prior to his Syrian trip, Erdogan stated, a number 
of Europeans asked him to raise issues.  They were, he 
assured them, already in his talking points.  Erdogan claimed 
to have told Asad that Syria needed to withdraw from Lebanon 
- it was bleeding his treasury dry and creating a bad 
international image.  The response had come when Turkish 
President Sezer traveled to Syria several months later and 
Asad told him he would hear of the withdrawal of troops 
within one week "as a result of Turkey's request". 
 
¶8. (C)  With respect to terrorists who cross Syria's border 
into Iraq, Erdogan said he raised the issue and Syrian 
government ministers told him Syria had a long border that 
they could not control - much like Turkey's own porous border 
with northern Iraq, Erdogan added.  In his own electoral 
district of Siirt, landmines and IEDs had exploded in recent 
weeks, killing and injuring soldiers.  Iran, too, was 
fighting the PKK. 
 
¶9. (C)  Hadley expressed appreciation for Turkey's role.  He 
stressed the importance of leadership, especially in the 
Palestinian Authority.  President Abbas needs to provide 
leadership, bring in young people, take control of the 
security services.  Erdogan agreed fully that Abbas needed to 
be strengthened and show leaderhip.  On Syria, Hadley 
referred to the UN report on PM Hariri's assassination that 
Detlef Mehlis was expected to submit in three weeks.  Seeking 
Erdogan's counsel, Hadley said that many believe the report 
will implicate some of the most senior officials in the 
Syrian government.  Some in the region thought it might bring 
down Asad's government.  Erdogan demurred, noting he had not 
met with Asad in some time.  When he had visited Damascus, 
however, he had been struck by the apparently relatively high 
level of popular support for Asad.  On the Hariri 
assassination, it was necessary to determine who the killers 
were; it could not be left a mystery.  Hariri, Erdogan said, 
had been a good friend; he tried to maintain relations with 
his widow and had met with his son Sa'ad at UNGA. 
 
¶10. (C)  Erdogan's concern was that if Bashar al Asad goes, 
it would likely not/not pull Syria toward democracy; just the 
opposite.  It could push Syria, he stated, into a chaos worse 
than that in Iraq and make Turkey's life - and that of all in 
the Middle East - more difficult.  Asad wanted to make good 
use of his relationship with Turkey, Erdogan continued, but 
Syria needed a change in mentality.  The establishment was 
stuck in old-think.  Asad was trying to move past his 
father's legacy, be more inclusive in parliament, improve 
relations with a variety of groups.  Over time, hearing 
different views could lead to greater understanding. 
 
¶11. (C)  The U.S., Hadley responded, had been frustrated by 
Asad.  We had gone to him repeatedly over the past two years 
urging him to turn his back on terrorism and open the door to 
reform.  We know that extremists cross into Iraq from Syria. 
Asad has done nothing.  Now we are going to let the UN 
investigation into Hariri's assassination run its course. 
The results would come out and we would all have to live with 
the consequences, which could be "very consequential." 
Erdogan did not respond. 
 
¶12. (C)  Turning to the PKK, Hadley stressed that the U.S. 
has no illusions - they are terrorists who kill Turks.  We 
know part of the problem comes from northern Iraq and we 
clearly have not done enough, he stated.  Our opportunity 
will come as the Iraqi government strengthens, which we hope 
will occur after the December elections, and as their 
security forces gain strength.  President Bush carried the 
message to Iraqi President Talabani last week that the U.S. 
and Iraq, working with Turkey, need to do more.  We can 
disrupt the flow of money to the PKK and work to reduce their 
support base in Europe.  He pledged to tell President Bush 
that the one thing we could do to improve relations with 
Turkey would be to do more against the PKK. 
 
¶13. (C)  Erdogan thanked Hadley, but responded that Talabani 
had no power, no troops and was not the PM.  Every day the 
PKK disperses itself more widely and becomes more difficult 
to track down.  The border with Turkey is long and porous. 
Pressing, the PM stated that a joint U.S.-Turkish decision to 
take action would be "very important."  Until we did so, the 
PKK would continue its attacks.  Yes, it was important to cut 
off financing, but the PKK had many sources of income, 
including narcotics trafficking.  They enjoyed support in 
Europe, too, both overt (from a political party in Norway, 
for example) and through tolerance for PKK broadcasting. 
Erdogan referred to Roj TV's Kurdish broadcasts from Denmark. 
 "The mothers (in the southeast) know only that language; 
they listen and teach their children," said the PM.  The 
broadcasts help create a structure that threatens Turkey's 
unity.  Mothers of Turkish soldiers who die at the hands of 
the PKK have, he said, lost patience.  At funerals, they 
shout, "Down with the PKK" in the same breath as "down with 
the U.S."  (Note:  There was discussion in Turkish as to 
whether he should tell Hadley this; Hadley responded that he 
was already aware of it.  End note.) 
 
¶14. (C)  Hadley proposed that the GoT provide the USG with an 
inventory by European country of various forms of support 
given to the PKK, which we could raise in capitals.  Erdogan 
reacted positively. 
 
¶15. (C)  Returning to Talabani, Erdogan described him as "not 
the President of Iraq but the President of Kurdistan." 
Hitting his stride, the PM related that he had confronted 
Talabani at the UN and told him that personally.  In five 
paragraphs, Erdogan said, Talabani had presented greetings 
from the Iraq people once, but spoken about Kurdistan and the 
Kurds, conveyed greetings from the Kurds and delivered a 
portion of his speech in Kurdish.  "Are there no Arabs in 
Iraq?  No Turcomans?"  Erdogan asked rhetorically.  Talabani 
needs to be inclusive, reach out to all Iraqis so that the 
entire nation views him as their President.  He did not do 
it, Erdogan stated. 
 
¶16. (C)  The Iraqi constitution, in Erdogan's view, is deeply 
flawed.  It could cause major incidents and fail to guarantee 
Iraq's territorial integrity.  Kirkuk, he stated, must have 
special status.  Each day more Kurds move into Kirkuk, 
creating a new reality and new claims on Iraqi oil resources. 
 Historically, Kirkuk was not a Kurdish city, but Kurds are 
creating a demographic reality on the ground that, under the 
constitution, would entitle them to a disproportionate share 
of Iraq's oil riches.  Moreover, the constitution is creating 
rifts among religious groups; it has caused major incidents 
in which many lives have been lost - the incident on the 
bridge; the recent death of 150; the clashes in Tal Afar. 
Steps should have been taken within the constitution to 
prevent this; Sunni Arabs should have been involved.  The 
biggest difficulty was that some articles of the constitution 
are not amendable and were, in Erdogan's words, only designed 
to benefit Kurds - not a condition that should prevail in a 
democracy.  Iraq is 65% Shia; that,too will provoke problems. 
 Elections will likely resolve little. 
 
¶17. (C)  Erdogan was right to be concerned, Hadley responded, 
but the U.S. did not think it written in stone that it would 
go badly.  Not everything was resolved within the framework 
of the constitution.  At this point, with a weak government, 
it was not possible to solve these difficult issues.  In our 
view, the Iraqis made the right decision to leave some issues 
for the government that would be formed after the December 
elections.  But, he agreed, delay had a cost as the situation 
on the ground was changing. 
 
¶18. (C)  Hadley asked Erdogan for a readout of the PM's New 
York meeting with Iranian President Ahmedinejad.  Erdogan 
responded that he had never before met Ahmedinejad, but they 
had in common their experience as big city mayors (Erdogan - 
Istanbul, and Ahmedinejad - Tehran).  He implied that 
Ahmedinejad was not as modernizing as one of his Tehran 
mayoral predecessors, with whom Erdogan had enjoyed a warm 
relationship and inaugurated Istanbul and Tehran as sister 
cities.  Erdogan spoke with Ahmedinejad about terrorism and 
WMD.  The Iranian President told him that he was determined 
to continue the process with the IAEA, but that Iran needed 
cheap, safe, peaceful energy; Iran, he told Erdogan, was 
making no efforts to build WMD.  Were that the case, Erdogan 
noted, it would certainly be of concern to Turkey.  Turkey, 
too, he added, is looking into nuclear power to lower the KWH 
cost of energy for its industry which, at 7 cents, renders 
Turkish industry uncompetitive.  Erdogan again stressed the 
importance of "talking". 
 
¶19. (C)  Hadley responded that we, indeed, hoped Iran would 
want to reopen discussions with the EU-3.  Erdogan agreed, 
saying they had to, or they risked further isolation.  The 
U.S., Erdogan said, offering Turkey's good offices, "should 
have confidence in us; we can assume major responsibility. 
We know their language, we can understand their culture, we 
can sit down and discuss, together with the IAEA."  Hadley 
emphasized the difference between the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy, and enriching or reprocessing uranium.  He pointed 
out that even if the Iranians undertook enrichment or 
reprocessing under IAEA supervision, they could at some point 
kick the IAEA out and start producing weapons. 
 
¶20. (C)  In closing, Hadley proposed that we re-start the 
High Level Defense Group (HLDG) process with Turkey, which 
has lain dormant for two years, and inaugurate a similar 
structured dialogue between their Foreign Ministry and the 
State Department.  Erdogan responded enthusiastically, 
proposing that the Interior Ministry be included as well 
because of its responsibilities in the fight against 
terrorism.  Hadley concurred. 
 
¶21. (C)  As the meeting broke up, Erdogan pulled Hadley aside 
to ask U.S. help on the EU, and to press the Austrians to 
leave Turkey's EU negotiating framework as is.  It was in any 
event not an ideal document, Erdogan said, but Turkey was 
prepared to accept it as is.  What Turkey could not accept 
was any attempt to move the Cyprus negotiations out of the UN 
context. 
 
MCELDOWNEY