This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005448 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TREASURY FOR OTI 
NSC FOR MCKIBBEN AND BROOKS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2009 
TAGS: KTFN EFIN PREL TU PKK
SUBJECT: US OFFICIALS COOPERATION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGAINST PKK IN EUROPE 
 
REF: ANKARA 5037 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4(b) an 
d (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In an important gesture of our preparedness 
to work together with Turkey to shut down the PKK's European 
support network, Washington analysts presented a list of PKK 
financiers to an interagency group of Turkish officials.  In 
subsequent meetings, the Charge urged Finance Minister 
Unakitan and senior MFA officials to react quickly to this 
list and move forward on a plan to work with the Europeans. 
Building on the high level enthusiasm expressed by Unakitan 
and others, post will continue to press to get the Turks past 
their skepticism about financial measures against terrorism 
and bureaucratic stovepiping and inefficiency. End Summary. 
 
USG Analysts Pass PKK Financiers List 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) At an interagency bilateral meeting September 15, 
visiting Washington analysts discussed how the U.S. and 
Turkey could cooperate to encourage European governments to 
disrupt the PKK's support network in Europe by, inter alia, 
blocking accounts and freezing financial assets of PKK 
financiers operating from their territories.  The analysts 
presented a preliminary list of PKK financiers and explained 
we now expected Turkish ideas for the target list. 
 
¶3. (C) The analysts suggested that Turkish counterparts 
refine the list into a feasible number of targeted names that 
could be used by law enforcement agencies.  The analysts 
pointed out that in many cases European law enforcement was 
more likely to be able to go after PKK supporters on the 
basis of criminal activity rather than as terrorist 
financiers. 
 
4.(C) The analysts also discussed the issue in separate 
meetings with the Turkish General Staff (TGS) and the Turkish 
National Intelligence Organization (TNIO). 
 
Charge Reiterates at High Level 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Immediately following the interagency meeting, Charge 
and EconCouns met with Minister of Finance Unakitan and MASAK 
President Yarasli.  The Charge reiterated U.S. readiness to 
work with Turkey on a strategy against PKK financial support 
in Europe.  She urged a very quick response to the list 
presented by the analysts.  Unakitan recognized the 
importance of the U.S. offer and was very appreciative. 
Picking up the phone, he called Deputy Prime Minister Ali 
Sahin and arranged to meet him that evening.  Later the same 
evening, Unakitan told the Charge at a social event that he 
and Sahin had agreed to get back to us quickly. 
 
¶6. (C) The following day, the Charge similarly pressed MFA 
Deputy Under Secretary (and proposed Ambassador to 
Washington) Nabi Sensoy for a quick response to the list. 
Foreign Ministry officials have told us the MFA has working 
on a reply to the broader (not just finance) non-paper EUR 
DAS Bryza had provided at the beginning of September. 
 
Comment: Devil Will be in the Details 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C)  This offer to work together represents an important 
gesture of U.S. seriousness to cooperate with Turkey against 
the PKK and is a significant boost to our efforts to get away 
from the sterile conversation over PKK in northern Iraq. 
Though Turkish senior officials' reactions were positive, 
they did not give much of a substantive reaction, needing 
first to evaluate the U.S. approach and the list and 
collaborate on an official GOT response. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Going forward, there will be multiple challenges. 
First, the tendency of the Turkish government to stovepipe 
will continue to be a problem, both specifically with regard 
to developing strong PKK case files and in the broader fight 
against the financing of terrorism.  Yarasli told us he did 
not yet have legal authority to take an active role on terror 
finance issues until the new MASAK law was passed, yet the 
Minister has repeatedly directed us to MASAK on these issues 
and MASAK is the Turkish FIU.  In the September 15 meeting 
Yarasli told us that the Turkish National Intelligence Office 
had called him that morning to give its clearance to Yarasli 
receving the analysts' list.  Nor did TNIO attend the meeting 
despite our specific suggestion through the MFA.  The good 
news is that our efforts are creating pressure for agencies 
to cooperate more: the presence of MOJ, MFA and several 
branches of the police at a MASAK-led meeting was 
unprecedented, for example. 
 
¶9. (C) A second challenge will be to overcome an attitude -- 
perhaps reflective of the Turks' technical weakness on 
financial crime -- of skepticism about the utility of going 
after PKK money flows from Europe.  One official in the 
meeting from the Turkish National Police's Intel Department, 
for example, questioned the Washington analysts about the 
practicality of targeting PKK finances given that the 
decision-makers are in Iraq and the diffuse nature of the 
financial collection network.  Last, but not least, Turkish 
law enforcement has a weak track record in putting together 
evidence Europeans can actually use under their legal 
systems. If the GOT swallows its pride enough to allow U.S. 
legal experts to help the GOT prepare case files, the U.S. 
experts will have their work cut out for them. 
 
MCELDOWNEY