This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005346 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2030 
TAGS: PTER MARR PREL TU IZ PKK
SUBJECT: EUCOM/CENTCOM OFFER TURKS HELP WITH PKK; ASK FOR 
PATIENCE 
 
Classified By: Charge Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S/rel UK and AUS) Summary: At talks with EUCOM Commander 
Gen James Jones and CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lt.Gen. Lance 
Smith on Sept. 8-9, TGS Chief GEN Hilmi Ozkok indicated that 
Turkish cross border operations targeting the PKK in northern 
Iraq were not imminent, but that Turkish patience was 
"almost" exhausted and Turkey wanted a solution before 
reaching that point.  He asked for the US to take some small 
steps that could be touted to the Turkish public, such as 
arresting PKK leaders, stopping PKK and its front 
organizations' political activities "that incite Turkish 
public opinion," or pressuring the Iraqi Kurds to crack down 
on the PKK in their regions.  Our generals urged continued 
patience, emphasizing the overarching need to get Iraq right, 
and encouraged greater efforts by TGS to improve public 
opinion in Turkey.  They offered specific assistance to help 
the Turks fight the PKK in Turkey, while the Charge pointed 
to US initiatives to tackle PKK media and financing streams 
in Europe.  While the MFA participant in the talks believed 
the Turkish military and public were disappointed because a 
dramatic new initiative against the PKK in Iraq was not 
announced, the visit by leaders of the two combatant commands 
demonstrated the USG's commitment to Turkey and in helping it 
with the PKK terrorist threat.  Embassy Ankara appreciates 
the time and energy put into preparations for the visit by 
EUCOM and CENTCOM.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (S/rel UK and AUS) EUCOM Commander Gen James Jones and 
CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lt.Gen. Lance Smith, together with 
members of the staff of the two commands, visited Ankara 
Sept. 8-9.  Gen Jones signed an MOU on US support to the 
Turkish military's NATO Center of Excellence - Defense 
Against Terrorism on Sept. 8.  Both generals, their senior 
staff and the Charge participated in a TGS-hosted dinner 
Sept. 8 and a meeting with the TGS leadership the morning of 
Sept. 9.  Staff presented briefings afterwards.  Before the 
meeting and briefings, Generals Jones and Smith had a private 
breakfast with TGS Chief GEN Hilmi Ozkok, Deputy Chief GEN 
Isik Kosaner, and TGS/J3 LTG Bekir Kalyoncu.  Gen Jones had a 
brief press encounter following the talks. 
 
----------------------------- 
Senior Staff Meeting, Sept. 9 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S/rel UK and AUS) Ozkok began the Sept. 9 restricted 
meeting with senior staff by explaining how TGS sees the PKK 
threat it faces, noting that this terrorist organization is 
highly hierarchical, with politician and military wings that 
it uses in a coordinated fashion with the goal of creating a 
separate Kurdish state out of Turkey's southeast region and 
perhaps territory of neighboring states.  The organization's 
attacks have increased the cost of investment in Turkey's 
poor SE region, just as its recent targeting of tourist areas 
is intended to damage that important sector to the Turkish 
economy.  The PKK has increased its terrorist activities on 
the eve of Turkey's EU accession negotiations with the aim of 
derailing those talks.  "It is important to act (against the 
PKK) before our patience is exhausted; we are almost there," 
he warned. 
 
¶4. (S/rel UK and AUS) Ozkok expressed appreciation for what 
the US has done to help Turkey with this problem, but after a 
couple of years of talk, no action to stop PKK activities in 
Iraq had yet been taken, he claimed.  Turkey has contributed 
significantly in the Global War On Terrorism, such as its 
contributions to and cooperation with ISAF and OEF in 
Afghanistan, Operation Active Endeavor in the Med, etc.  To 
be successful in GWOT, we "shouldn't differentiate among 
terrorists," he said.  Even on intelligence sharing (comment: 
our most robust area of cooperation), Turkey would like 
information passed more quickly. 
 
¶5. (S/rel UK and AUS) In northern Iraq, the PKK enjoys 
freedom of movement, trains its fighters, receives support 
from "local Kurdish groups" (read: KDP and PUK), maintains it 
logistics, learns new tactics (particularly in the area of 
IEDs), conducts political activities (primarily through the 
KDSP which is a registered party in Iraq), operates TV and 
radio outlets, and acquires equipment and explosives, 
according to Ozkok.  UNSCR 1373 and 1546 require 
international cooperation to fight terrorism, but while 
Turkey is taking measures to secure its border with Iraq, the 
Iraqi side needs to be secured.  If not by the US, then the 
ITG should act.  If not, TGS might need to take the 
initiative as public pressure to act is growing.  Art. 51 of 
the UN Charter provides for the right of hot pursuit, but "we 
want a solution before reaching that point," he declared. 
"We want to reverse the situation with your help." 
Specifically, Ozkok suggested the following "steps:" 
 
-- Pressure the Kurds, especially the KDP, to cut off their 
contact, encouragement and support of the PKK and to struggle 
against the terrorists. 
 
-- Take steps to stop the PKK's political activities that 
inflame public opinion in Turkey (e.g., close front offices, 
prevent their fronts from participating in the Iraqi 
political process). 
 
-- Apprehend and hand over PKK leaders. 
 
-- Cut the PKK freedom of movement and logistics lines. 
 
-- Prevent criminal activity that funds the PKK. 
 
-- Close Makhmour refugee camp. 
 
-- Get the word out to the US media that the PKK does not 
represent Kurds, but is a terrorist organization that uses 
IEDs that kill indiscriminately ("are a crime against 
humanity"). 
 
-- Provide real-time intelligence. 
 
-- Facilitate coordination between border units on both sides 
of the border (but the Iraqi side should not be only Kurdish 
units) 
 
-- Consider training Iraqi Border Patrol personnel in Turkey 
 
"What you do is up to you," he concluded. 
 
¶6. (S/rel UK and AUS) The Charge opened for the US side by 
reviewing the US record of cooperation on the PKK and 
emphasizing the importance for both countries of success in 
Iraq.  As part of our effort to succeed in Iraq, it was 
important to engage the ITG on this and other issues so the 
Iraqi government could develop into a real counterpart for 
the long-term.  Gen Jones affirmed that EUCOM was anxious to 
continue progress on rebuilding bilateral mil-mil ties 
through honest exchanges.  He acknowledged that both sides 
needed to work at improving public opinion, citing recent 
polling data showing many people in Turkey do not see the US 
as a friend.  He encouraged TGS to put out more timely 
information on what Turkey and the US are doing together to 
help turn around public attitudes. 
 
¶7. (S/rel UK and AUS) Lt.Gen. Smith thanked Ozkok for his 
presentation.  He noted that the focus of Coalition and Iraqi 
forces was on Zarqawi and the AIF, but allowed that the 
situation in the north could not be ignored.  To that end, he 
had been in Baghdad the previous week talking to MNF-I and 
MNC-I leadership and indicated that General Abizaid had 
previously spoken with Kurdish leaders about the need to take 
control of the border.  A successful constitution process 
would be key, he stated, in keeping Iraq united.  After 
election of a government with a four-year term, many issues 
could be addressed more aggressively.  For that reason, 
Turkey-Iraq relations were important, and the US was prepared 
to facilitate contacts with the right interlocutors.  He 
counseled patience as Iraqi institutions build their capacity 
to address the relevant issues.  Controlling the borders, for 
example, was really an issue of capacity.  (The Charge 
recalled that the President had asked PM Erdogan for Turkey's 
help in getting the Syrians to do more to control its border 
with Iraq.)  The focus was currently on the Syrian border and 
creating a professional border force was a time consuming 
process, General Smith continued, but it was coming along. 
He expressed appreciation for Turkey's support for the 
process and again asked for patience. 
 
¶8. (S/rel UK and AUS) Ozkok agreed that Turkey needed to work 
with Iraq, but he expressed frustration at with the Iraqis' 
attitude and apparent ineffectiveness.  The Charge noted that 
the USG has consistently told the Iraqis that they have no 
better neighbor or partner than democratic Turkey with its 
free market economy.  Ozkok appreciated the point, observing 
that that also made Turkey a valuable partner of the US in 
the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI). 
 
----------------------------- 
EUCOM, CENTCOM, TGS Briefings 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (S/rel UK and AUS) Opening remarks at the session with 
staff by Ozkok, the Charge, Gen Jones and Lt.Gen. Smith 
echoed their remarks in the more restricted senior staff 
meeting (above). 
 
¶10. (S/rel UK and AUS) Briefing for EUCOM, J5 Maj. Gen. Scott 
Gration emphasized the strong overall cooperation in security 
policy between Turkey and United States, and noted EUCOM's 
desire to assist in efforts against the PKK in the command's 
AOR.  Specifically, EUCOM is prepared to offer "surge" (more 
of it and in almost real-time) intelligence support on PKK 
activities/locations in Turkey, based on Turkish requests 
related to specific operations.  Additionally, EUCOM is 
prepared to offer its assets for aerial surveillance on the 
Turkish side of the border. 
 
¶11. (S/rel UK and AUS) CENTCOM Deputy J5 BG Mark Kimmitt 
briefed on MNF-I's fragmentary order (FRAGO) to detain PKK 
terrorists if they are captured in the course of normal 
operations, and the placement of three PKK high-value 
individuals (HVIs) on MNF-I's watch list.  CENTCOM is willing 
to expand this HVI list.  Additionally, last month F16s 
carried out two intelligence surveillance reconnaissance 
missions over PKK camps in northern Iraq; CENTCOM is prepared 
to continue these missions and hand over intelligence gleaned 
from them to Turkey.  Finally, the command offered to 
facilitate Turkey-Iraq military contacts, and to explore with 
both sides the possibility of joint Turkish-Iraqi border 
patrols.  Lt.Gen. Smith emphasized that in terms of the PKK 
the problem was not our intent, but our capacity. 
 
¶12. (S/rel UK and AUS) TGS's briefer repeated Turkey's 
analysis of the PKK's camps in Qandil Mountain and along the 
Turkish border.  The briefing emphasized--though with no 
corroboration--links between the PKK and the main Iraqi 
Kurdish political parties (KDP and PUK).  The Turks also 
claimed that the PKK cooperates with AIF, such as Al Qaeda 
Iraq (Zarqawi) and Ansar al-Sunnah. 
 
¶13. (S/rel UK and AUS) Ozkok remarked that if the U.S. were 
to press Iraqi Kurdish leaders to curtail the PKK's 
activities, "this will help us significantly."  He quickly 
added that he hoped the U.S. would do more against the PKK in 
Iraq when we are able to do so.  He asserted that there is no 
question that U.S. intentions are positive, and concluded 
that the result of the meeting was "our common understanding 
that the time is approaching to do more." 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Comment: Kicking the Can Down the Road 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (S/rel UK and AUS) Press coverage has, to date, been 
factual (thanks in large part to Gen Jones' brief meeting 
with the press following the talks) and muted (due to a 
continuing effort by the GOT to dampen public expectations 
for immediate US action).  MFA Security Affairs Director 
General Hayati Guven, who participating in the briefings, 
told polmilcouns and polmiloff afterward that he expected TGS 
(and the public) was disappointed that the US had not offered 
any specific step against the PKK in northern Iraq.  He, like 
his military colleagues, expressed appreciation for intel and 
other cooperation, but argued that something was necessary 
that could be publicly touted in order to turn around public 
opinion against the US for lack of action against the PKK in 
Iraq. 
 
¶15. (S/rel UK and AUS) Comment:  Most Turkish participants in 
the talks appreciated the visit of the CENTCOM and EUCOM 
delegations as a demonstration of the USG's commitment to 
Turkey, even if they were disappointed that no measures to 
disrupt the PKK in Iraq were agreed.  EUCOM and CENTCOM's 
offers of assistance, whether or not they are ultimately 
accepted, further demonstrate that the USG is prepared to do 
what it can within its means and capabilities.  We expect 
this view will be reflected in media commentary as the 
military backgrounds the press.  We appreciate the tremendous 
effort that went into making this visit happen at both 
CENTCOM and EUCOM. 
MCELDOWNEY