This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005222 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2025 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS PINR TU IZ PKK
SUBJECT: NEW DCHOD WANTS US TO TAKE ONE STEP TO DEMONSTRATE 
RESOLVE AGAINST PKK IN IRAQ 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Turkish General Staff (TGS) Deputy Chief GEN 
Isik Kosaner told the Charge on Sept. 7 that he wanted to 
further improve US-Turkey mil-mil relations during his 
tenure.  He pointed to the expected Sept. 8-9 visit of EUCOM 
CDR and CENTCOM D/CDR as a positive contribution to a 
relationship that is marked by frank talk that produces 
solutions to any problems.  He called on the US to take a 
"small" step against the PKK in northern Iraq that the 
Turkish people could see.  The Charge noted that expectations 
for the EUCOM/CENTCOM visit were unrealistically high 
(Kosaner agreed), and asked that TGS help lower them. 
Kosaner thought the new constitution would serve to fracture 
Iraqi unity rather than bolster it, leading to three states 
in about eight years, he predicted.  He also offered 
condolences for the victims of Hurricane Katrina and evinced 
enthusiasm for holding an early High Level Defense Group 
(HLDG) meeting.  End Summary. 
 
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Generals' Visit and the PKK 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) During an initial office call by the Charge on Sept. 
7, newly promoted and appointed TGS Deputy Chief GEN Isik 
Kosaner reminisced about his time at Ft Bragg and expressed 
condolences for the victims of Hurricane Katrina which he 
likened to the disaster Turkey experienced in the 1999 
earthquake near Izmit.  Stating that he understood the 
importance of the US in the world, he committed himself to 
work for "even better" US-Turkey mil-mil relations. 
 
¶3. (C) The Charge suggested that past problems be put behind 
and that Kosaner focus on the future.  The general averred 
that there were no problems between our two countries' 
militaries, although "I can't speak for the politicians," he 
said.  The military-to-military relationship was marked by 
frank and open dialogue that could solve any problem.  He 
pointed to the expected Sept. 8-9 visit of EUCOM Commander 
Gen Jones and CENTCOM Deputy Command Lt. Gen. Smith as a sign 
of the health of the relationship. 
 
¶4. (C) For that visit, the main subject will be PKK 
terrorism, Kosaner continued.  He believed he well understood 
the US position, with the need to carefully maintain balance 
between the various groups in Iraq.  "If I were General 
Abizaid, I would think the same way," he said.  Nonetheless, 
the Turkish people expected something to come out of the 
EUCOM/CENTCOM meeting, and TGS wanted to satisfy that 
expectation to restore friendly relations between the Turkish 
and American peoples.  He understood that the US could not 
solve the PKK problem, but was looking for some step, such as 
arresting a leader or stronger public statements condemning 
the PKK, that the Turkish people could see and appreciate. 
Two months earlier, TGS had heard the US intended to track 
and capture PKK leaders; this would have been a good step, 
but so far the Turks have not seen any results. 
 
¶5. (C) The Charge agreed with Kosaner that open communication 
was crucial to the health of the relationship.  She also 
underscored that public expectations for the EUCOM/CENTCOM 
visit were unrealistically high.  (Kosaner agreed.) There was 
no button our generals could push that would make the PKK 
problem go away, she said.  (Kosaner again agreed.)  The 
Charge expressed appreciation for the statements Turkish 
military leaders had made recently to lower expectations and 
urged these continue.  She previewed that she would be doing 
the same later that day with reporters following her 
afternoon meeting with MFA Undersecretary Tuygan (septel). 
 
¶6. (C) The Charge noted that it was possible to act against 
the PKK outside of Iraq, pointing to both the recent anti-PKK 
operation carried out by authorities in Germany and the 
measures that Turkey and the US might undertake in Europe 
that we have been discussing with MFA officials.  She asked 
whether more might be done to secure Turkey's border with 
Iraq.  Kosaner lamented its difficult mountainous terrain, 
comparing it to the difficulty the US has in stopping illegal 
immigrants along the Mexican border or from Cuba.  He said 
efforts were needed on both sides.  When asked who should do 
it on the Iraqi side given our lack of troops in the area, 
Kosaner asserted that there was a power vacuum there.  The 
Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga were friendly with the PKK. 
Nonetheless, the Turks talk to the Iraqi Kurds, but the area 
occupied by the PKK is outside their authority.  The Charge 
suggested that this issue be further explored at the 
EUCOM/CENTCOM talks. 
 
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Iraq's Future Uncertain 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Charge reminded Kosaner of Turkey and the US's 
common goals of a democratic, stable and unified Iraq.  As we 
deal with the PKK issue, these goals should be kept in mind, 
she suggested.  That is why talk about "hot pursuit" and 
similar operations raise concerns.  Kosaner agreed that our 
two countries share these goals, but he was pessimistic that 
they could be achieved.  He faulted the new Iraqi 
constitution's establishment of a "weak central government," 
stronger federal entities, and local control over new oil 
fields as evidence that "ethnic and religious divergence" 
will increase and "federalism will lead to separatism." 
Three new states which he expected to emerge in about eight 
years, would be three new problems, undermining regional 
stability. 
 
¶8. (C) The Charge argued that the constitution would 
strengthen Iraq's nascent democracy and encourage people to 
see their future in a united country.  Kosaner responded that 
democracy cannot be imposed, but could only be understood by 
"the man in the street" when the society was ready for it. 
"We know (the Iraqis') thinking, expectations and character" 
from centries of interaction with them." The Charge countered 
with examples from the former Soviet Union, emphasizing that 
Iraqis deserved a similar chance at democracy.  Success will 
only come with international cooperation.  Kosaner agreed 
that Turkey's interest was making Iraq a success, and he said 
Turkey would continue to work for that "as long as we have a 
unified Iraq to talk with."  The Charge ended this discussion 
by noting that the more Turkey and others engage the Iraqi 
government, the more it legitimizes the government, the 
better the government will become, and the more its prospects 
of success will improve. 
 
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HLDG 
---- 
 
¶9. (C) The Charge raised the USG's interest in reviving the 
HLDG process.  Kosaner said he was familiar with the HLDG 
from a previous tour at TGS headquarters.  He recalled that 
it produced few results in those days, saying that the agenda 
needed to be well prepared to ensure productive talks.  It 
can be a good channel for discussion, he said, and he wanted 
to see it revitalized.  (Comment: We will be seeing TGS/J5 
Strategy Chief MG Savas Sept. 8 to discuss possible dates.) 
 
¶10. (U) The Charge was accompanied by ODC-T Chief Maj.Gen. 
Sutton, DATT COL Hrycaj and polmilcouns.  Kosaner took the 
meeting alone. 
 
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Bio Note 
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¶11. (C) Despite Kosaner's stint at Ft Bragg and other 
international assignments, he is not comfortable in English, 
at least, not yet.  He had little or no difficulty in English 
comprehension, but frequently switched to Turkish to express 
complex thoughts.  Our impression was his English is good 
(not great), but rusty. 
MCELDOWNEY