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Viewing cable 05ANKARA5109, GOT WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY FOLLOWING THROUGH ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ANKARA5109 2005-09-01 13:11 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

011311Z Sep 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005109 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TU OSCE
SUBJECT: GOT WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY FOLLOWING THROUGH ON 
KURDISH INITIATIVE 
 
REF: ANKARA 4842 
 
Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney; reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
1. (C) Summary: Political observers widely credit PM Erdogan 
with breaking new rhetorical ground on the Kurdish issue in 
the context of his recent visit to Diyarbakir.  But contacts 
say they doubt the GOT is prepared to follow through on the 
initiative.  Members of the (PKK-related) Democratic Peoples' 
Party (DEHAP) have praised the PM's statements on the 
"Kurdish problem," which they view as an indication that the 
PM is willing to address issues on their agenda, such as a 
broad amnesty for PKK militants.  However, our contacts say 
any government perceived to be following such a path would 
quickly lose support.  Military leaders, who pressured 
Erdogan to address the issue, are concerned that the PM used 
vague language that could be interpreted as supporting the 
concept of a separate Kurdish identity; their concerns appear 
to be reflected in a National Security Council (NSC) 
statement stressing the "integrity" and "indivisibility" of 
the country.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
PM Uses New Rhetoric on Kurds... 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Politicians and pundits continue to debate the meaning 
and importance of PM Erdogan's recent visit to Diyarbakir and 
public comments on the issue of Turkey's Kurds (reftel). 
Erdogan has been widely credited with "breaking the memorized 
rhetoric" regarding the Kurdish issue.  A number of contacts 
have told us Erdogan went farther than previous PMs in 
addressing the subject by referring to a "Kurdish problem," 
indicating (though indirectly and vaguely) that the GOT has 
made mistakes regarding the issue, and assuring the public 
that the problem will be resolved through democratic means. 
However, our contacts question whether the GOT can turn the 
new rhetoric into a new reality. 
 
3. (C) DEHAP members have praised the PM's initiative. 
(Note: DEHAP is widely believed to be linked to the PKK.  Its 
members deny any direct links; they claim they share the 
PKK's long-term goals while rejecting violence as a means to 
achieve them.  DEHAP leaders recently decided to close the 
party and join a new successor party.  End Note.)  DEHAP 
President Tuncer Bakirhan acknowledged to us that DEHAP 
officials told party supporters in the southeast not to turn 
out for Erdogan's August 12 speech in Diyarbakir, to express 
the party's skepticism about the PM's sincerity.  Only about 
700-800 people attended the speech.  Nevertheless, he said 
DEHAP supporters were encouraged by the PM's message. 
4. (C) Bakirhan believes Erdogan took a step toward a new, 
more flexible approach to the Kurdish issue.  He said PKK 
leaders were caught off guard by the PM's initiative, and 
felt compelled to respond by announcing a one-month cessation 
of operations.  He averred that the public, weary of the 
conflict, is ready for a new approach, as indicated by the 
absence of public criticism of Erdogan's initiative beyond 
nationalist circles.  Bakirhan noted that even members of an 
association representing the families of security forces 
killed by the PKK gave their blessing to Erdogan's effort. 
 
--------------------------- 
...But Lacks Follow-Up Plan 
--------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Turkey's (generally leftist) Kurdish human rights 
activists also praise the PM, although they are more 
skeptical than Bakirhan that the GOT will follow through. 
Yusuf Alatas, president of the Human Rights Association, and 
Yilmaz Ensaroglu, former president of the human rights 
organization Mazlum Der, said Kurdish issues have never been 
high on the agenda of the ruling AK Party (AKP).  Since 
coming to power in 2002, the AKP government has taken small, 
grudging steps on Kurdish language and cultural rights, and 
that only at the direct urging of the EU.  As a result, they 
said, the GOT lacks a program for addressing Kurdish issues 
and is not prepared to follow up on Erdogan's promising 
remarks.  "Universities and NGOs need to start holding 
conferences to discuss Kurdish cultural rights and the 
problems of the southeast," Ensaroglu said. "We have been 
afraid to debate sensitive issues like these, and as a result 
we have no ideas about how to resolve them."  Alatas said he 
wants to believe the PM is sincere, but in any case the AKP 
government cannot resolve the Kurdish problem on its own; any 
new initiative that is not supported by the Turkish state 
will have no chance. 
 
6. (C) Observers widely credit the State, in the form of the 
military, for pressuring Erdogan to address the Kurdish 
issue.  In a series of public statements, including a July 19 
speech by General Basbug, then deputy chief of the Turkish 
General Staff, military leaders have emphasized the need for 
a multi-pronged approach to PKK terrorism, including economic 
and social initiatives in addition to military force.  With 
these statements, the military has subtly called attention to 
the absence of a GOT program for the southeast, where rampant 
unemployment, poor education, and backward social traditions 
create a breeding ground for the PKK. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Military Uneasy with Ill-Defined Statements 
------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) But the military and other state elements appear 
uneasy with what they consider the careless nature of 
Erdogan's remarks.  The PM's comments, while groundbreaking, 
were vague -- for example, he did not define what he meant by 
"Kurdish problem," nor did he say what "mistakes" the State 
had made.  Amidst the praise, there has been criticism from 
some who argue that Erdogan's words could be interpreted in a 
manner harmful to Turkey's interests.  Former President 
Demirel, for example, is among those who have argued that by 
referring to the "Kurdish problem," Erdogan reinforced the 
divisions in Turkish society, possibly strengthening the 
hands of separatists.  Others have argued that the PM's 
pledge to resolve the issue through democratic means could 
imply setting aside the use of military force against the 
PKK, or even negotiating with the terrorist organization. 
Indeed, when the PKK responded to Erdogan's Diyarbakir speech 
by declaring a one-month cessation of operations, some of 
Erdogan's critics charged that he had already unwittingly 
raised the PKK's status to the level of interlocutor. 
 
8. (C) Following its August 23 meeting, the NSC, comprising 
civilian and military leaders, issued a statement emphasizing 
the "integrity" and "indivisibility" of the country, while 
also calling for a multi-faceted campaign against terrorism. 
Sema Kilicer, political officer at the European Commission 
Representation to Turkey, told us she views the statement as 
a reflection of the military's desire to define the limits of 
any approach to the Kurdish issue.  The message, she 
believes, is that the military wants the government to take 
on the social/economic aspects of the campaign against 
terror, but without referring to a separate, Kurdish identity 
or completely removing the restrictions on Kurdish language 
and cultural expression.  Military leaders have also 
repeatedly emphasized that the government must operate within 
the Constitution, which emphasizes the "indivisibility of the 
Republic" (a mantra here) and the status of Turkish as the 
official language. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Next Steps Could Prove Risky for GOT 
------------------------------------ 
 
9. (C) Faruk Demir, a Turkish political analyst, and Suavi 
Aydin, Hacettepe University anthropology professor and expert 
on Anatolian minorities, told us they believe Erdogan set a 
trap for himself with his ill-prepared comments, into which 
he may fall if his next steps are not more careful.  Demir 
and Aydin said DEHAP members are encouraged by Erdogan's 
statements because they are hopeful the PM is indicating a 
willingness to pursue some of the items on the DEHAP agenda, 
such as negotiations with the PKK, a general amnesty for PKK 
militants, the release of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan from 
prison, and a constitutional amendment citing Turks and Kurds 
as co-founders of the Republic.  Bakirhan acknowledged as 
much to us, listing each of these examples as long-term goals 
of the party. 
 
10. (C) The problem for Erdogan, Demir and Aydin agreed, is 
that any government perceived to be considering negotiating 
with the PKK or elevating the status of Kurds in the 
Constitution would quickly lose both public support and its 
grip on power.  How, then, can Erdogan follow through on his 
initiative without appearing to cross these red lines?  "No 
one, including Erdogan, knows what the government will do 
next," Aydin said. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Comment: GOT Not Prepared to Follow-Through 
------------------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Though Erdogan struck many of the right chords during 
his initiative, we agree with our contacts' assessment that 
the GOT is not prepared to follow through.  Erdogan made no 
specific proposals, other than directing the High Board of 
Radio and Television to remove obstacles to Kurdish-language 
broadcasting on local media outlets.  Though welcome, this 
would have little impact in the southeast.  A longstanding 
Embassy contact, an attorney from the southeastern province 
of Hakkari, noted that Kurds in the southeast already receive 
several Kurdish-language TV channels broadcasting from 
abroad.  What Kurds in the region really want, she said, is 
an amnesty for their sons and daughters with the PKK in the 
mountains.  That appears no more likely today than before 
Erdogan's trip to Diyarbakir. 
 
12. (C) The obstacles facing Erdogan are heightened by the 
recent increase in PKK activity.  As long as Turks are 
feeling frustrated and powerless in the face of a perceived 
PKK resurgence, the GOT will remain hyper-sensitive to 
allegations that it lacks resolve in the fight against 
terrorism. 
MCELDOWNEY