This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001910 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM WI MO AG
SUBJECT: POLISARIO AMBASSADOR URGES U.S. "GESTURE" 
FOLLOWING PRISONER RELEASE 
 
REF: ALGIERS 1768 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
-------------------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Polisario "Ambassador" to Algeria Beissat told DCM 
September 6 that there was considerable internal criticism of 
Polisario leader Abdelaziz following the Lugar mission due to 
the impression that the Polisario had received nothing in 
return for releasing the Moroccan prisoners.  Beissat urged 
the U.S. to "make a gesture" toward the Polisario, at least 
by expressing concern at Morocco's continued detention of 37 
Sahrawi activists.  Turning to the diplomatic impasse over 
the Western Sahara, Beissat said Morocco had made clear it 
would not accept the Baker Plan, so it was up to the 
international community to pressure Morocco.  If not, 
Polisario might use force to break the logjam.  DCM pushed 
back, stressing that Senator Lugar's mission had been 
humanitarian and Polisario had done the right thing by 
releasing the Moroccan prisoners.  DCM warned that Polisario 
would be completely isolated if it resumed the use of force 
and urging them to pursue the UN process.  Beissat said 
Polisario wanted to be a force for stability in the 
Trans-Sahel, and suggested they were interested in engaging 
EUCOM in support of the Trans-Sahel counterterrorism 
initiative. 
 
¶2.  (C) Since the Lugar mission, the Polisario leadership has 
been undertaking an active diplomatic campaign to call 
attention to their cause and clarify their views.  Abdelaziz 
has written to President Bush, the EU, Kofi Annan and Nelson 
Mandela, with his letters published in the Algerian press. 
Their goal is to generate international sympathy and support 
for implementing UNSCR 1495, present themselves as on the 
right side of international law, depict the Sahrawi detainees 
arrested over the summer by Morocco as political prisoners, 
and draw attention to the humanitarian agenda, including 
family reunification and accounting for Sahrawi missing. 
While their public messages avoid Beissat's bluster about use 
of force, they do serve to emphasize their point that they 
represent a party to the Western Sahara conflict that, absent 
a mutually acceptable settlement, will not quietly disappear. 
 End Summary and Comment. 
 
ABDELAZIZ CRITICIZED AFTER LUGAR 
MISSION, NEED FOR U.S. GESTURE 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) During a September 6 meeting at his request, 
Polisario "Ambassador" to Algeria Mohammed Beissat commented 
to DCM that Polisario leader Abdelaziz had been weakened by 
the aftermath of the Lugar Mission and release of the last 
remaining Moroccan prisoners held by Polisario.  The 
opposition to Abdelaziz within the Polisario were arguing 
that Senator Lugar and his delegation had flown into Tindouf, 
taken the Moroccan prisoners back to Morocco, and then the 
U.S. had effectively told the Polisario to "go to hell" by 
not acknowledging publicly their role in the prisoner release 
and by not mentioning Polisario humanitarian concerns, 
including the 37 Sahrawis (whom he termed political 
prisoners) arrested by Morocco after demonstrations in 
Laayoune.  Even Moroccan human rights organizations were 
demanding the release of these prisoners, Beissat said, so 
why had the U.S. not commented?  Abdelaziz was fortunate that 
the next Polisario "national conference" would not take place 
until next year, since he was certain to come under severe 
criticism due to the impasse and the sense among the rank and 
file that Polisario had received nothing in return for 
releasing the Moroccans.  He argued that some kind of U.S. 
gesture or a statement at the UN recognizing the Sahrawis' 
right to self-determination, was needed to restore hope and 
fend off pressures to take up arms in order to break the 
stalemate. 
 
¶4.  (C) DCM stressed that Lugar's mission had been 
humanitarian, and that Polisario had done the right thing by 
releasing the prisoners.  Sometimes doing the right thing 
required going out on a limb politically, but the prisoner 
release had resolved a long-standing humanitarian issue and 
may create new opportunities for diplomatic progress. 
Furthermore, the UNSYG had put together a new team to deal 
with the Western Sahara, including his naming of a new 
personal representative.  In addition, Ambassador Bolton was 
very familiar with the Western Sahara issue and interested in 
contributing to its resolution.  These were new, positive 
factors, and the Polisario leadership should be preparing to 
engage constructively rather than rattle sabers.  No one, 
including Algeria, would support Polisario's returning to 
force, and they would find themselves completely isolated if 
they took that path. 
 
MOROCCO WILL ONLY RESPOND TO PRESSURE 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Beissat said the Polisario believed the international 
community had a responsibility to insist on the 
implementation of UNSCR 1495, which unanimously endorsed the 
Baker Plan.  Morocco had made clear it would not accept the 
Baker Plan on its own, but the Polisario and the Sahrawis in 
the camps would not disappear as the Moroccans appeared to 
hope.  There would have to be pressure on Morocco if there 
was to be any progress toward a settlement.  That pressure 
could either be diplomatic pressure from the Security Council 
and the U.S., or it would come in the form of military 
pressure from the Polisario.  Beissat said Polisario 
intelligence had concluded that the Moroccan forces in the 
Western Sahara were poorly equipped and poorly led.  Their 
soldiers had no boots and their officers stole supplies to 
sell them on the black market.  King Mohammed did not trust 
his army and had not modernized their equipment.  If 
Polisario attacked across the berm, they could administer a 
powerful shock to Morocco.  Polisario merely sought the 
implementation of Security Council resolutions.  This was not 
"asking for the moon." 
 
¶6.  (C) DCM reiterated that use of force would be a terrible 
error that would completely isolate Polisario.  Rather, they 
should engage van Walsum and make their case in diplomatic 
channels.  Beissat concluded that Polisario was looking to 
the United States to take a position.  There was great 
sympathy for the Sahrawi cause in the developing world, but 
the West had put itself in the position of blocking a 
solution due to its support for Morocco.  France was 
completely aligned with Morocco, Chirac had even told 
Bouteflika in 2003 that he considered himself a "member of 
the Moroccan royal family," to which Bouteflika reportedly 
responded, "I congratulate you on your descent from the 
Prophet Muhammad."   Neither Spain nor Germany would 
challenge the French despite considerable popular support for 
the Sahrawis in both countries. 
 
POLISARIO OFFER TO WORK WITH EUCOM IN TRANS-SAHEL 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶7.  (C) Polisario, Beissat said, was not a threat to Western 
interests, but rather sought to be a stabilizing factor in an 
unstable region.  He even suggested that Polisario was 
interested in engaging with EUCOM in support of efforts to 
fight GSPC and other terrorist organizations in the 
Trans-Sahel, asserting that the only capable, indigenous 
military forces with a proven desert combat record in the 
Trans-Sahel were Polisario and the northern Chadians.  Even 
the Algerian army was not effective in the desert, he 
claimed.  DCM urged that Polisario focus on the opportunities 
offered by the UN process and exercise utmost restraint. 
ERDMAN