This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001877 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2015 
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV AG SOFA
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER CONFIRMS GOA READINESS 
TO ACCORD SOFA PROTECTIONS, BUT THROUGH MORE INFORMAL MEANS 
 
REF: A. ALGIERS 1853 
 
     ¶B. ALGIERS 1804 
     ¶C. STATE 158268 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, 
for reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶1. (S) FM Bedjaoui told Ambassador August 31 that political 
sensitivities over the fact or appearance of a permanent U.S. 
troop presence or basing arrangements precluded Algeria from 
agreeing to a public, formal SOFA agreement.  That said, 
Algeria understood the importance and mutual benefit of our 
growing military cooperation, including joint exercises, and 
was prepared to find a way to grant us the protections we 
needed on an exercise by exercise basis.  Specifically, he 
said Algeria was prepared to give oral assurances and, when 
pressed by the Ambassador, said it might even be possible to 
give general, written assurances that participating troops 
would be treated as administrative/technical personnel under 
the Vienna Convention.  Ambassador underscored U.S. 
disappointment over having received the MFA's August 23 note 
ruling out a SOFA agreement and over having been told the 
SOFA team should not come.  This posture was not consistent 
with either the Minister's earlier discussion with the 
Ambassador welcoming such a visit or with Algeria's usual 
posture of welcoming dialogue when there were issues of 
mutual concern. 
 
¶2. (S) Ambassador said he would convey Bedjaoui's idea for 
more informal assurances to Washington and asked if he would 
be prepared to receive a smaller delegation, for example, 
Ambassador Loftis plus one, to discuss it further.  Bedjaoui 
thought this might/might be possible, provided a visit were 
handled in a low-key way, and Ambassador said we would be 
back in touch if there was Washington interest in that kind 
of visit.  As we have reported elsewhere, the political 
sensitivities here are real and part of Algeria's liberation 
war legacy.  Former FM Belkhadem, a conservative nationalist 
who serves as Minister of State and Personal Representative 
of the President and who heads the largest party in the 
presidential coalition and in the National Assembly, is 
strongly opposed to a SOFA and, we suspect, had a direct 
personal role in the MFA note rejecting a SOFA.  Bedjaoui 
clearly has to navigate within these political constraints. 
 
¶3. (S) In this context, the Foreign Minister's emphatic 
embrace of expanded military cooperation, including joint 
exercises, and his assurances that SOFA-like protections 
would be granted on a case by case by case basis are a 
measure of how far this country has come in just the last 2-3 
years.  In our judgment, we should view the GOA's inability 
to move ahead with a formal SOFA as a tactical setback only, 
while keeping our eye on the longer term strategic prize of 
expanding cooperation where possible with a country of 
increasing importance to the United States.  While we 
initially felt a low-key visit by a smaller SOFA delegation 
might be useful at this juncture, on reflection we believe 
the timing is not good.  Bedjaoui is abroad now and will be 
going on to the UNGA, with his return dates not entirely 
clear. More substantively, since he appears to be an ally in 
wanting to expand military cooperation and find a way to 
provide SOFA-like protections, we need to avoid undercutting 
him by getting into the political crosshairs of those with 
less helpful political agendas.  In our judgment, our best 
bet for now will be to:  1) continue to discreetly press our 
SOFA concerns here and in Washington; 2) build a track record 
of joint exercises that will help the Algerian public view 
this kind of cooperation as normal, non-threatening, and 
mutually beneficial; and 3) use the Joint Military Dialogue 
session in Algiers this coming spring -- and the leadup to it 
-- to have the fuller SOFA discussions we had hoped to have 
during the SOFA team visit this month.  (End summary/comment). 
 
NEED FOR SOFA DIALOGUE 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (s) Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, called on 
FM Bedjaoui August 31 to discuss the issue of SOFA 
protections and to urge the GOA to receive a SOFA team which 
had hoped to visit Algiers later in September. Bedjaoui was 
unaccompanied.  Ambassador said that we had been disappointed 
by the MFA's diplomatic note of August 23 rejecting the 
possibility of a SOFA agreement and by the MFA's subsequent 
indication that the SOFA team should not come.  Ambassador 
said we had been surprised by these developments because the 
purpose of the team visit had been to discuss, not negotiate, 
a SOFA agreement.  In addition, the idea of a visit had been 
discussed positively at the Joint Military Dialogue talks in 
May in Washington and had been welcomed by the Minister 
himself in an earlier conversation with the Ambassador.  It 
was unfortunate that Algeria, which usually urged dialogue 
when there were mutual concerns and differences, was reaching 
decisions and rejecting an agreement without any discussion. 
U.S. PERSONNEL CANNOT OPERATE WITHOUT SOFA PROTECTIONS 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶5. (S) Ambassador stressed that U.S. military personnel 
engaged in mutually agreed exercises on Algerian soil need 
SOFA protections.  Without them, we would not be able to 
engage in joint exercises, which were of increasing 
importance to Algeria, as recent developments and threats 
from the south had shown.   The Flintlock Exercises this 
spring, in which 8-9 countries in the region had 
participated, had underscored the benefits of this kind of 
enhanced cooperation.   The United States was not seeking 
permanent bases or a permanent troop presence, Ambassador 
emphasized.  We were simply seeking for our personnel the 
kind of protections accorded administrative and technical 
personnel under the Vienna Convention.   In the absence of 
such protections, our mutually beneficial military 
cooperation with Algeria could not progress very far. 
 
BEDJAOUI: WE WANT MORE EXERCISES AND ARE 
READY TO EXTEND INFORMAL SOFA PROTECTIONS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (S) Bedjaoui was categorical in saying that Algeria wanted 
these exercises, understood our need to assure protection for 
U.S. forces participating in such exercises, and was prepared 
to grant the Vienna Convention-like protections we required. 
"We will never refuse such protection," he asserted. "Algeria 
was very happy about this military cooperation, which was in 
Algeria's interest and benefit."  He added that "before 
troops arrive, we'll find a solution to give them sufficient 
protections."  It would not be difficult, for example, to 
treat exercise participants as technical personnel 
(temporarily) attached to the Embassy for the duration of the 
exercise.  A more general SOFA agreement, however, raised 
both legal and political issues. 
 
GOA NEEDS TO NAVIGATE POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES TO 
APPEARANCE OF PERMANENT BASING OR TROOP PRESENCE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶7. (S) The legal concerns, Bedjaoui explained, involved only 
a few relatively simple language changes in existing Algerian 
law.  The real difficulty, however, was not legal but 
political.  There were considerable political sensitivities 
surrounding the idea of permanent bases or a permanent troop 
presence.  The government thus had to proceed carefully, in a 
way that allowed our cooperation to develop while avoiding 
criticism that it was "selling Algeria to the United States." 
  It was essential to avoid steps that could give this false 
impression to the public.  The Flintlock Exercises had gone 
well, without any serious criticism, Bedjaoui continued. We 
should continue in that spirit, getting the public used to 
this kind of cooperation and avoiding giving the false image 
of a permanent U.S. military presence.  In this regard, 
Bedjaoui cited the greatly exaggerated influence attributed 
by the public and in the press to the U.S. following 
Algeria's adoption of hydrocarbon reform legislation, 
implying that a formal SOFA would generate considerably 
greater speculation about "U.S. pressures." 
 
MINISTER WILLING TO CONSIDER 
CASE BY CASE WRITTEN ASSURANCES 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (S) Noting that he liked transparency, Bedjaoui again 
emphasized that Algeria would provide protections for 
participating U.S. forces before their arrival in Algeria, 
though not in a formal SOFA document.  Ambassador asked if 
such assurances would be in writing.  Bedjaoui thought this 
might be possible on a case-by-case basis, provided it was 
outside the public view.  "Trust me," he said. There was no 
other motive behind Algeria's negative reaction to the idea 
of concluding a formal SOFA.  Concluding, Bedjaoui urged 
Ambassador to frame the MFA's diplomatic note (declining a 
SOFA) in the context he had just presented.  Ambassador noted 
that the SOFA team would be visiting Tunis later in the month 
and that it might build confidence for Ambassador Loftis to 
come with a smaller team to hear directly the Foreign 
Minister's assurances.  Bedjaoui thought that might be 
possible, provided it was very low-key and could be presented 
as "just another discussion" with a visiting U.S. official. 
Ambassador and the Minister agreed to be in touch on this 
issue. 
 
ERDMAN