This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 WARSAW 003044 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/NCE, NEA/I, AND S/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2015 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR PL IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ-POLAND: JONES-SMITH CONSULTATIONS WITH GOP 
 
REF: (A) STATE 131524 (B) WARSAW 2786 (C) WARSAW 2598 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Lisa Piascik, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Ambassador Richard Jones Senior Adviser to 
the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq Policy (S/I) led an 
interagency delegation to Warsaw July 28-29 to consult with 
senior GOP officials and encourage continued substantial 
Polish participation in the Iraq Coalition and the 
Multi-National Division Center-South (MND-CS).  The current 
government, which will almost certainly relinquish power 
after September 25 parliamentary elections, refuses to take 
any affirmative decisions on Iraq while continuing to speak 
publicly of "withdrawal from Iraq."  While the GOP agreed in 
principle to allow operational planning to go forward on all 
options, so that the next government would have full latitude 
to choose its course, there is very little chance that the 
current government will make any further commitment on MND-CS 
before the September elections.  Nevertheless, Deputy CHOD Lt 
Gen Cieniuch said that the Polish General Staff is proceeding 
with planning for a robust follow-on "multi-national training 
force" that, he told Lt Gen Smith privately, would not differ 
substantially in either numbers or capabilities from the 
current MND-CS.    Therefore, if the General Staff's plans 
are to reach fruition, senior military leaders will have to 
maintain continuous contact with their Polish counterparts, 
and we will have to engage immediately with the new political 
leadership following the September elections. 
 
¶2. (C) The GOP also gave a readout of PM Belka's political 
consultations July 25-27 in Kuwait, Baghdad, Arbil and 
Istanbul (ref B).  Septel reports on the delegation's working 
dinner with leaders of the two parties expected to form a 
coalition government after the September elections.  This 
message was coordinated with USDAO Warsaw and cleared by Amb. 
Jones.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (C) Accompanied by Lt Gen Lance Smith, Deputy Commander 
USCENTCOM, Charge, and representatives of OSD and the Joint 
Staff, Amb. Jones met separately with PM Marek Belka and 
DefMin Jerzy Smajdzinski and attended a roundtable discussion 
at the MFA hosted by U/S Piotr Switalski.  (Septel reports on 
the delegation's working dinner with leaders of the key 
opposition parties.)  In all of their meetings, Amb. Jones 
and Lt Gen Smith stressed the same basic message: 
 
- The political track is going well, with reasonable hope 
that the draft constitution will be completed by the August 
15 deadline, to be followed by a constitutional referendum on 
October 15 and elections on December 15.  That said, 
constitutional drafting deadline could be extended by up to 
six months, prolonging the entire process.  Also, should the 
constitutional referendum fail, then an extension of up to 12 
months would be required to schedule a new referendum. 
 
- Iraqi Security Force (ISF) training is proceeding well, 
though not without some delays.  In some sectors, including 
hopefully MND-CS, the ISF will be able to take over all 
routine security tasks by the middle of 2006.  However, the 
8th Iraq Division that is responsible for the sector is 
untested, so the transfer of responsibility may not go 
completely according to schedule. 
 
- Given the uncertainties of both the political and military 
situation in Iraq, it is important that the GOP focus its 
public discussion of eventual Iraq drawdown and disengagement 
on the "conditions on the ground" rather than explicit 
timetables or dates certain. 
 
- The USG is making preparations for a follow-on legal 
mechanism to UNSCR 1546, but this should not be discussed 
until after the constitutional referendum, so as not to 
prejudice or undermine the political process. 
 
- Although the political process is proceeding apace, the 
U.S. expects there will be in fact an upswing in terrorist 
activity as important benchmarks such as the constitutional 
referendum and the December elections approach. 
 
MFA ON IRAQ POLICY, BELKA TRIP READOUT 
-------------------------------------- 
¶4. (C) At a working luncheon July 28 at the MFA hosted by U/S 
Switalski, Amb. Jones and Lt Gen Smith briefed on the 
situation in Iraq.  Switalski was joined by MFA Director for 
Middle East/Africa Krzysztof Plominski, Director for Americas 
Henryk Szlajfer and Director for Security Policy Robert 
Kupiecki, as well as by Lt Gen Mieczyslaw Cieniuch, Deputy 
Chief of the Polish General Staff.  Switalski responded that 
the commitment to Iraq will remain a key priority to the GOP 
for both the current government and the future government 
that will take over after the September 25 parliamentary 
elections in Poland.  PM Marek Belka's July 25-27 trip to 
Iraq (ref B), accompanied by FM Rotfeld, Szmajdzinski and 
other senior officials (including Plominski and Kupiecki) had 
represented a shift in Poland's emphasis from "stabilization 
to normalization in Iraq."  Belka's delegation had observed 
"centrifugal forces at work" in the constitutional drafting 
process, as the Kurds pursued their autonomy strategy and 
some Shiite elements sought the "Islamization" (i.e. 
inclusion of some or all elements of Shari'a) of the 
constitution.  Jones said the U.S. was urging the Iraqis to 
opt for a "simple framework model" of the constitution that 
would leave as many contentious issues as possible out of the 
equation. He also opined that the Kurds and Shiites might be 
willing to set aside their respective demands as the price of 
full buy-in by Sunni leaders, which they seemed finally to 
have acknowledged as crucial to a successful political 
process.  Switalski agreed that this would relieve some of 
the tension. 
 
¶5. (C) ME/Africa Director Plominski then described the Belka 
delegation's visit.  They had achieved no "concrete results" 
but they had accomplished the main goal of establishing a 
normal bilateral relationship.  Belka had told Iraqi 
officials, including the PM and DefMin, that Poland was 
prepared to provide significant assistance but that the ITG 
had also to help itself - "Poland believes in Iraq's future, 
and now you must believe in yourselves."  Belka had agreed 
with PM Ja'afari on an Action Plan for bilateral relations 
across the board, including political, economic, cultural and 
scientific issues.  He had also initialed two bilateral 
MOU's, one on non-proliferation and export control 
cooperation and one on resolution of the dispute over the 
destruction of cultural treasures in Babylon. 
 
¶6. (C) Both Switalski and Plominski reiterated Belka's 
statement in Baghdad that the Polish stabilization mission in 
Iraq would end in January 2006.  The ISF was ready to take 
over operations in MND-CS and some other sectors, and the 
Polish contingent was already beginning to hand over some 
security and patrolling tasks to ISF units and re-focus its 
own efforts on training.  However, both PM Ja'afari and the 
Kuwaiti PM (whom Belka had seen in Kuwait on July 25) had 
stressed that MNF-I should not draw down or withdraw quickly, 
as the political process remained fragile and could not yet 
survive without their support. It was therefore necessary for 
Poland and other Coalition partners to maintain a presence in 
Iraq.  Switalski asked point blank how Amb Jones and Lt Gen 
Smith would advise the GOP to respond to media and public 
pressure for troop reductions.  Smith replied that the Poles 
should respond "just the way Gen Casey does" (i.e. referring 
to goals and conditions on the ground, but NOT to timetables 
or dates certain).  Jones added that the best approach was to 
present troop reductions as the goal, but to link such 
reductions to improved conditions on the ground, and not to 
make any mention of timetables or dates certain.  Smith added 
that Polish and U.S. plans for eventual disengagement are 
identical, but that the U.S. NEVER gives firm dates. 
 
¶7. (C) Americas Director Szlajfer commented that a political 
process in Poland was also well underway and would last 2-3 
months, through the parliamentary elections and the 
subsequent presidential elections on October 9, until a new 
government was formed in late October.  So far, the question 
of Polish engagement in Iraq beyond January 2006 had not been 
a factor in the electoral campaign, and it would be good to 
keep it that way.  Although the current government was 
deferring the final decisions to the next government, all 
options regarding Iraq were under consideration within the 
GOP, and also within opposition circles.  Szlajfer also 
thought that the U.S. delegation would not be disappointed by 
its meeting that evening with opposition leaders (to be 
reported septel). 
 
¶8. (C) Deputy CHOD Lt Gen Cieniuch then described in brief 
the General Staff's planning for the Polish 6th rotation, 
which would begin in January 2006.  He confirmed that MND-CS 
was transferring patrol and security responsibilities for 
parts of its sector to ISF, and that training activities had 
already begun.  The General Staff was indeed preparing plans 
for all contingencies, however, it was impossible for the 
military to plan properly without full political approval. 
The absence of political approval was becoming a more and 
more critical problem for the General Staff, in terms of both 
preparing its own national deployment and, particularly, 
coordinating participation by other troop contributing 
nations (TCNs).  An eventual force generation (ForceGen) 
conference in November would be too late to start discussing 
specific troop contributions, so the General Staff was hoping 
sooner to send out two mobile staff teams, each led by a 
general officer, to consult with their counterparts in MND-CS 
TCN capitals.  In this way, TCNs would at least be prepared 
for the various contingencies by the time of the ForceGen 
conference. 
 
PM BELKA ON POLITICAL PROCESS, PLANS FOR WITHDRAWAL 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
¶9. (C) The Jones delegation met later July 28 with PM Belka. 
In response to Jones' and Smith's briefing on U.S. policy, 
Belka provided his own readout of the July 25-27 visit to the 
region, including his consultations with the Turkish 
government in Ankara.  He had stressed to Iraqi PM Ja'afari 
that this was "not just a visit to Polish troops, but a real 
bilateral consultation between Heads of Government."  In 
addition to the details provided previously by Plominski at 
MFA, Belka noted the creation of a bilateral "Joint Economic 
Commission", although he did not elaborate.  He shared his 
impressions of the Iraqi leadership, expressing concern that 
Iraqi President Talabani was too preoccupied with the problem 
of Kurdistan.  He said that Parliamentary Speaker Al Kassani, 
a Sunni, had told him that the elections should go forward in 
December, even/even if the constitutional referendum failed 
(NB: such an election would be for a new transitional 
government, again charged with writing a constitution and 
submitting it to another national referendum), and had 
assured him that the Sunnis would participate fully in the 
political process. 
 
¶10. (C) Belka also described his visit to Arbil, where the 
Kurdish regional authorities had received him as if it were a 
"state visit" to a sovereign country.  There had been a large 
media presence, and the Kurdish authorities had noted 
publicly that this was "the first ever visit of a Head of 
Government to Kurdistan."  Belka had been very careful in his 
reply, making certain to refer always to "the region of 
Kurdistan."  En route back to Poland, Belka had stopped off 
for several hours to consult with the Turkish government, in 
order to make certain his visit to Arbil would not arouse 
Turkish sensitivities.  Without going into detail, Belka said 
that the Turks focused on only two issues, Polish support for 
Turkish EU accession (which Belka reaffirmed) and their 
concern over the implications of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and 
resultant Kurdish assertiveness. 
 
¶11. (C) Turning to Polish military engagement in the region, 
Belka led by noting that there was "much excitement" within 
the military over Poland's upcoming lead role in Afghanistan 
in the second half of 2007.  Lt Gen Smith noted that the U.S. 
appreciated Poland's commitment to Afghanistan, but added 
that there were still unresolved issues regarding the planned 
merger of the OEF and ISAF missions.  Belka then stated 
frankly that in Iraq it was time to transfer to ISF 
responsibility for the three provinces under MND-CS command. 
The GOP was "determined to complete the stabilization 
mission" in Iraq in January 2006.  Thereafter, there was a 
possible Polish training role based around the Iraqi military 
academy at Al Kut.  General Casey had told him during his 
visit to Baghdad that a transfer of responsibility to ISF was 
possible not only in the MND-CS sector, but also in the 
MND-SE sector commanded by the UK, as well as in certain 
parts of northern Iraq.  Amb Jones said that the GOP's basic 
goal of disengagement, transfer to ISF and continued training 
fit perfectly with U.S. goals.  However, Jones stressed, it 
was crucial that any such planning be contingent on the 
"conditions on the ground" and not/not linked to timetables 
or dates certain.  (Both Belka and his Chief of Staff, 
Slawomir Cytrycki, were visibly uncomfortable as Jones 
delivered this message, although neither chose to respond 
directly.)  In the end, Belka did not commit to any change in 
the current policy of "out by January", deferring the issue 
entirely to the next government that would take over after 
the Polish elections. 
 
DEFMIN ON END OF MISSION 
------------------------ 
¶12. (C) On the morning of July 29, the Jones delegation met 
with DefMin Szmajdzinski, who was joined by Lt Gen Cieniuch 
as well as members of his staff.  Following the U.S. 
briefing, Szmajdzinski expressed his gratitude for the 
continuing high level of bilateral cooperation.  The common 
U.S.-Polish problem was how to make sure that MNF-I reached a 
successful conclusion, rather than simply staying too long 
and dissolving into nothing.  MND-CS had begun with 25 TCNs 
and some 8500 troops.  It had gone through four successful 
rotations over two years and acquitted itself well.  Now, 
however, this effort was at risk of fading away.  The 
Norwegians, Dutch and Portuguese had made clear from the 
beginning that their participation in Iraq would last only 
6-9 months.  Others such as Spain had since abandoned the 
mission for political reasons.  Now there were only 14 TCNs 
remaining in MND-CS, with some 4000 troops on the ground. 
Ukraine had declared its intention to withdraw at the end of 
2005, and in two weeks Bulgaria might well make the same 
decision.  Poland had made its own public declaration that 
the 5th rotation, ending in January 2006, was the last of the 
stabilization mission (i.e. Polish troops participating 
directly in security operations).  The goal now was to 
"train, train, train", so that the ISF would be prepared to 
take over the MND-CS sector at the end of 2005.  Then MND-CS 
could be closed down and declared successful. 
 
¶13. (C) Szmajdzinski acknowledged the call for continued help 
in 2006, and stated "If there is indeed still a political 
need, then we have a limited military capability to meet it." 
 Poland could take the lead in a much smaller multinational 
successor to MND-CS, whose mission would be entirely focused 
on training.  Some 200-300 Polish troops could provide 
command/control and logistics and form the core of this 
training task force.  With troops from some of the remaining 
TCNs, this task force would establish a training base at Al 
Kut.  Szmajdzinski claimed that he had discussed this plan 
with SecDef Rumsfeld and Deputy NSA Crouch in Washington, and 
with senior officials at CentCom in Tampa, as well as with 
the Iraqi DefMin in Baghdad. 
 
¶14. (C) Szmajdzinski acknowledged that the current government 
would, of course, not be taking any decisions on Iraq, as 
that would be the prerogative of the next government.  To 
allow the issue of Iraq deployment into the public discussion 
during the electoral campaign would be a great mistake, and 
could lead to a repeat in Poland of "the Spanish Model." 
However, the 2006 GOP budget did provide enough funds for the 
limited Polish mission he had described, and the excellent 
operational cooperation between MND-CS and the Coalition 
leadership would facilitate the transition.  Sufficient 
logistical infrastructure and equipment was available to 
support the training mission, as well. 
 
¶15. (C) Amb. Jones told Szmajdzinski that it was dangerous to 
set arbitrary deadlines for withdrawal without taking into 
account the actual conditions on the ground in Iraq.  The 
U.S. expected an upturn in violence as the calendar for the 
political process advanced.  He stressed that it was crucial 
to leave all options open to the incoming Polish government, 
so that they had maximum flexibility to react to events in 
Iraq.  Smith echoed this theme, reiterating that Polish and 
U.S. goals were the same, but urging the GOP to remain 
flexible.  In particular, the 8th Iraqi Division had not yet 
been tested in action, and there was no way to tell how they 
would fare on their first operational missions without a 
Coalition lead.  Lt Gen Smith added that the U.S. in fact 
planned to deploy an additional brigade to Iraq 45 days 
before the election process began there, and keep it there 45 
days after.  Then, if/if the situation allowed, U.S. forces 
would begin a staged drawdown.  Smith also pointed out that 
Poland was playing a very important leadership role in 
MND-CS, at a level matched only by the U.S. and the UK. 
Without the Polish presence, either the U.S. or the UK would 
have to fill the gap.  (COMMENT: Szmajdzinski appeared very 
uncomfortable during Jones and Smith's remarks.  END COMMENT.) 
 
DCHOD VISION MORE FORWARD LEANING 
--------------------------------- 
¶16. (C) Lt Gen Cieniuch then offered a more detailed picture 
(though without any troop numbers) of how a multinational 
training force might look: 
 
- A robust Coalition Training Center would be set up in Al 
Kut, to supplement CentCom's current training plan. 
 
- In addition to the existing training program for platoon 
leaders, this center would train entire platoons ("the basic 
operational unit in Iraq") together with a two-week 
specialized course, with a goal of running every platoon in 
the Iraqi Army through this course. 
 
- Poland would provide the requisite command/control element, 
based at Al Kut, as well as its own training element. 
 
- Poland would also provide transport and logistics for all 
TCN contributions to the training force. 
 
- Polish forces would provide two mobile combat teams of 
60-80 troops for rapid response. 
 
- The currently deployed Polish Mi24 helicopters would remain 
to provide transport for the combat teams. 
 
- Force protection would be required for the training base, 
for logistics and supply convoys and for the helicopter base. 
 
- This would involve a total multinational force of some 2000 
(though Cieniuch declined to specify a number for Polish 
troops), which would be responsible for not only the training 
base, but also overall security in the MND-CS sector. 
 
(COMMENT: Szmajdzinski again looked very uncomfortable during 
Cieniuch's presentation, suggesting a divergence of views 
between the General Staff and MOD leadership with regard to 
the Iraq mission.  END COMMENT.) 
 
¶17. (C) In a one-on-one pull-aside with Lt Gen Smith after 
the meeting, Cieniuch stated that the General Staff was in 
fact prepared to field a multinational training force nearly 
as large as the current 4000-strong MND-CS, and with 
virtually the same capabilities.  He affirmed that the Polish 
,06 military budget could support at least 1,000 Polish 
troops in Iraq, compared to the current Polish force of about 
¶1400. (N.B. Cieniuch has in the past suggested to us that a 
Polish contingent in 2006 might number some 600 troops. 
During his discussions with Jones and Smith, however, he 
spoke only of total Coalition forces in the MND-CS sector, 
not of specific numbers of Polish troops.) 
 
 
NEED TO KEEP UP U.S. PRESSURE 
----------------------------- 
¶18. (S) COMMENT.  The current political leadership is clearly 
not willing to stray from the public line of "out by January" 
that Szmajdzinski, and more recently Belka and President 
Kwasniewski, have been stating regularly.  Szmajdzinski seems 
to have convinced himself that the Iraq deployment is so 
unpopular that the future of his party (SLD, the Democratic 
Left Alliance) is at risk if he does not completely 
neutralize the issue.  In his mind, he has done this by more 
and more strictly proscribing the possibilities for continued 
Polish deployments in Iraq.  The irony is that the public at 
large, and even the media, were not protesting in the streets 
or speaking out against Iraq engagement prior to 
Szmajdzinski's "neutralization" campaign.  Certainly, opinion 
polls have consistently shown public support for the Polish 
deployment as low as 20 percent, but these opinions come out 
only if asked.  No one is campaigning against Iraq, including 
the opposition parties expected to form the next government 
coalition.  (See septel.)  Not only Gen Cieniuch, but also 
senior MOD officials, are frustrated with Szmajdzinski's 
obsession with public opinion on Iraq.  A week before the 
Jones' visit, Acting MOD U/S Karkoszka (ref C) told Charge 
that he and Cieniuch had spent weeks convincing Szmajdzinski 
to even allow planning for the minimal training deployment 
that Szmajdzinski described to Jones and Smith (and 
reportedly during his visits to Tampa and Washington the 
previous week).  Szmajdzinski and other MOD officials claimed 
that the Jones visit was the first time, since they began 
hinting at a drawdown or withdrawal in the fall of 2004, that 
any senior U.S. official has balked at the GOP's plan. 
 
¶19. (S)  In any event, it is clear both from their words and 
their apparent discomfort during the Jones visit that the 
current government leaders will not take any affirmative 
decision about future Iraq deployments.  Not only have they 
deferred the matter to the next government, but Szmajdzinski 
has, either intentionally or merely as a side effect, 
severely complicated the task of the incoming government in 
meeting the operational challenges dictated by the situation 
in Iraq.  We will therefore have to maintain an ongoing 
dialogue with Polish military leaders regarding their 
operational plans, while preparing to engage immediately and 
at a very high level with the incoming government after the 
September elections here.  END COMMENT. 
Piascik