This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 005105 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2015 
TAGS: PREL KWBG KPAL ETRD EG IS KBTS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: EIVAL GILADY ON GAZA DISENGAGEMENT 
 
REF: TEL AVIV 4417 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer. for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Brigadier General (res) Eival Gilady, a 
special advisor to PM Sharon on disengagement, met August 16 
with Assistant Secretary (A/S) Welch and Ambassador Kurtzer 
to discuss progress in Gaza disengagement.  Gilady said that 
the Prime Minister's disengagement plan was proceeding more 
or less according to plan.  He anticipated that the 
evacuation of all settlements in Gaza would be complete in 
less than ten days.  More than 50 percent of the settler 
families in Gaza had already departed.  A/S Welch and 
Ambassador Kurtzer pressed Gilady on the need for Israel to 
make disengagement a success, including finding ways to 
assist President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority.  They 
encouraged Gilady to pursue creative solutions for overcoming 
differences on crossings and to consider a possible 
third-party role at Rafah crossing.  End Summary. 
 
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Settler Evacuation Status 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Gilady described the GOI strategy as a combination of 
sensitivity in dealing with settlers in the run-up to August 
17 and decisiveness thereafter.  Much will depend on how 
events unfold on August 16, but the GOI plan has been to tell 
the IDF soldiers to respect the law and to treat the settlers 
respectfully.  West Bank infiltrators will be evacuated 
"decisively" on August 17, Gilady predicted.  Gilady said 
that more than 50 percent of the Israeli settlers in Gaza had 
already departed.  He believed that 700-800 settler families 
would have departed Gaza by midnight August 16, but cautioned 
that figures cited are not always accurate.  Gilady 
anticipated that another 700-800 settler families would wait 
until the last moment, and would only depart once it became 
illegal for them to remain in Gaza on August 17.  The 
possibility of losing financial compensation would also 
influence their decision-making.  Gilady said the GOI had 
made arrangements with a number of settler groups and 
different leaders within these groups to facilitate the 
departure of remaining settlers.  "They will not pack, but 
they will leave," Gilady clarified, adding that this group 
might engage in some passive resistance.  Gilady estimated 
that 220 families constituted the hard-core of those settlers 
who might actively resist evacuation.  Another 200 families 
would monitor this group closely. 
 
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Coordination and Governance 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Gilady commented that the level of coordination 
between the GOI and PA has improved, but action on the ground 
remains weak.  Gilady said a strategic decision on the part 
of the PA leadership needs to be taken to enforce PA 
policies.  For example, President Abbas must make it clear 
that there are to be no more mortar attacks.  In response, 
A/S Welch recalled that President Abbas had made two 
statements outlining the importance of a single authority and 
a demand that there be no deviations.  The PA, at U.S. 
urging, had responded with force to Hamas in July.  Even so, 
Gilady responded, the challenge of helping the Palestinians 
do what they (the PA) say should be done remains difficult. 
Gilady said he is convinced that PA security forces refrained 
from doing more for fear of not being backed up by the PA's 
political leadership.  The passage of time would make it 
increasingly difficult for President Abbas to make headway on 
security matters. 
 
¶4. (C) After recognizing Israel's support for the provision 
of non-lethal equipment to the PA, A/S Welch asked Gilady 
what else Israel would do on key issues, such as crossings, 
to help President Abbas strengthen his credibility with the 
Palestinian people.  Gilady concurred that Israel has an 
interest in a disengagement process that leads to greater 
freedom of movement, trade and improvement in the quality of 
life of Palestinians.  He agreed that the GOI should do 
whatever would help the PA govern more effectively.  The PA 
has an interest, independent of U.S. or Israeli concerns, in 
demonstrating good governance, and Gilady added that if the 
provision of ammunition would serve that end he would support 
it.  However, Gilady came back to his preoccupation with good 
governance.  He cited the absence of PA control to minimize 
bottlenecks at Erez crossing as just one example of how the 
PA has failed to focus on easy steps it could take to improve 
the lot of its people. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Post-Disengagement Planning, Symbolic Importance of Rafah 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) A/S Welch focused on the importance of helping the PA 
present Gaza as "more open, more free, more prosperous and 
more secure" on the day after disengagement.  For instance, 
Israel could assist on crossings, particularly Rafah.  Gilady 
replied that Israel's agreement with Egypt on the deployment 
of Egyptian forces along the Gaza border would be concluded 
within 24 to 48 hours.  "It will be done," Gilady emphasized. 
 On the question of crossings, Gilady said he believes the 
Palestinians will ultimately come to accept that goods will 
need to pass through the Kerem Shalom crossing.  Speaking 
personally, he said that people could continue to cross at 
Rafah, but stressed that the GOI security establishment would 
not trust anyone but Israelis on security matters.  Probed on 
this point, he accepted A/S Welch's idea that there might be 
a role for a third party in control and inspections at that 
crossing -- provided there was an agreement between the 
parties on what a third party was to monitor.  Gilady 
acknowledged that the Rafah question needs more study, but 
ventured that "we could make it happen" with a combination of 
trust, technology (he mentioned UAVs), Egyptian border 
control, PA agreement and the involvement of a third party. 
¶6. (C) A/S Welch noted that the Europeans are prepared to 
play a third party role in Rafah, and stressed that for 
disengagement to be perceived as a success, Gaza has to be 
more open.  Ambassador Kurtzer added that if Israel wants to 
demonstrate that the day after disengagement is different, it 
needs to act now on issues such as Rafah rather than in six 
months.  A/S Welch encouraged the GOI to build an image of 
successful disengagement by mid-September so as to prevent 
others from seizing control of the agenda or second-guessing 
the wisdom of disengagement or the roadmap.  Gilady predicted 
that Israel would withdraw from the Philadelphi corridor 
within this timeframe, but A/S Welch again stressed the 
importance of resolving the issue of Rafah crossing. 
 
¶7.  (C) Ambassador Kurtzer asked why Gilady assumed that the 
Palestinians will accept a goods crossing at Kerem Shalom. 
Gilady said the customs union provided some leverage in 
Israel's dealings with the PA, as maintaining the union is in 
the Palestinians' economic interest, particularly in the 
short term. "They have a lot to lose," Gilady concluded, 
acknowledging that this fact does not mean that the PA will 
be open to compromise on matters that concern issues of 
national pride.  A/S Welch agreed that Israeli leverage was 
potentially useful, provided it leads to the right outcome. 
Ambassador Kurtzer noted that the GOI is demanding a 
third-party (EU) role in rubble removal from Gaza, but has 
opposed, to date, an EU role in Rafah.  A/S Welch and 
Ambassador Kurtzer urged Gilady to explore new approaches -- 
including a third-party role -- to resolving the Rafah issue, 
given the shared Israeli-Palestinian interests in opening 
Gaza and maintaining security.  Gilady reiterated his 
insistence that there could be no third party on security 
matters, but acknowledged the importance of creating an 
atmosphere to do more. 
 
¶8. (C) On Gaza crossings into Israel, Gilady said he believes 
that the situation at Karni and Erez will improve 
post-disengagement.  The goal is to facilitate trade, while 
maintaining security.  On the seaport, Gilady stressed the 
importance of agreeing on the protocol of how it will operate 
before it is built.  Israel and the PA must come to a basic 
understanding.  A/S Welch agreed. 
 
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