This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 005103 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 
TAGS: KPAL KWBG PREF PTER EG IR IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT GOI EXTERNAL MILITARY RELATIONS
SUBJECT: (S) ISRAELI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF: GOI 
REASSESSING DATE IRAN TO GO NUCLEAR; PALESTINIANS CONTINUE 
TO PLAN ATTACKS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary: Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence 
Aharon Ze'evi Farkash told A/S Welch and Ambassador Kurtzer 
August 16 that he was surprised by U.S. media reports on a 
U.S. National Intelligence Estimate that Iran could build its 
first nuclear weapon only by 2015.  He noted that recent U.S. 
interlocutors shared his assessment that 2010 is the more 
likely date.  Farkash said that he has assembled a special 
team to reassess the date and that he will share the findings 
with the USG. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary cont: On Palestinian issues, Farkash 
expressed concern that ongoing attempts by terrorists to 
launch attacks in Gaza and Israel could have "terrible 
results" on disengagement.  He characterized Hamas' 
participation in the current period of calm around Israel's 
Gaza just-started withdrawal as an illusion, since Hamas 
continues to build up its forces in the West Bank, including 
in Jenin.  Farkash highlighted Palestinian Authority (PA) 
President Mahmud Abbas's efforts to increase his power by 
seeking a closer alliance with PA Prime Minister Ahmed 
Quraya'.  Farkash forecast heightened tensions and rivalry 
between Hamas and the PA after disengagement and leading up 
to the planned January 21, 2006 Palestinian Legislative 
Council (PLC) elections.  End Summary. 
 
¶3.  (C) At the start of the meeting, an animated Farkash 
noted his satisfaction with the behavior of the thousands of 
IDF troops and Israeli police currently in Gaza making 
preparations to evacuate the remaining settlers families from 
 the Strip.  He expressed hope that after disengagement is 
completed, Israel will be stronger as a nation.  "This is a 
real test of our DNA as a nation," he said.  He noted that it 
is not important whether disengagement is right or wrong, but 
that the government's decision is followed and democracy is 
strengthened. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Assessing When Iran Goes Nuclear 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S) Farkash said that U.S. press accounts about a U.S. 
National Intelligence Estimate assessing that Iran could 
build its first nuclear weapon only by 2015 surprised him. 
He noted that Sharon had asked him about the U.S. report and 
its timing.  Farkash said that, based on Israeli 
intelligence, Iran could achieve independent research and 
development for uranium enrichment within four to six months. 
 Iran could then reach the next threshold -- the 
"success-oriented" stage -- and produce enough fissile 
material for a weapon by 2008.  He said it would then be 
necessary to assess whether Iran could cross the next 
threshold and actually build a nuclear weapon by 2010. 
Farkash stressed that all of his recent U.S. interlocutors 
had agreed that Iran could have a nuclear weapon by 2010 -- 
"no one said 2015."  Farkash said that he has now assembled a 
special team to reassess this date and that he expects the 
results in about three weeks.  He said he would share the 
findings with the USG. 
 
¶5.  (S) The Ambassador asked Farkash why he believes the U.S. 
and Israeli estimates differ, and whether this could be based 
on varying assessments of possible technical problems faced 
by the Iranians.  Farkash said that a 2008 completion date 
for the Iranians would be a dream, but that 2009 or 2010 is 
possible.  He speculated that the USG had perhaps calculated 
that other factors would disrupt Iran's plans.  He noted that 
it would be more difficult to disrupt Iran's plans now that 
it has reached the P-2 centrifuge stage. 
 
¶6.  (S) A/S Welch noted that the USG has an effective 
dialogue with the EU-3 on Iran.  Farkash questioned whether 
the EU-3 efforts are enough to prevent Iran from moving 
forward.  The process to deal with Iran's nuclear program is 
"critical for the region," Farkash underlined, since Egypt, 
Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia are waiting to see how the 
international community deals with Iran.  He added that North 
Korea would also be influenced by the international reaction. 
 He added that the South African initiative on Iran was very 
bad timing, and that it gives the Iranians the impression 
they can win. 
 
----------------------- 
Hamas' Illusion of Calm 
----------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Colonel Amit Doron, of DMI's Palestinian Division, 
noted that the relative calm now within Gaza is mainly due to 
an understanding by most Palestinian factions, including 
Hamas and, to a lesser extent, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 
that quiet is needed to facilitate the Israeli withdrawal. 
He stressed, however, that some Fatah "offshoots" continue to 
plan attacks in Gaza and suicide attacks in Israel.  Doron 
underlined that "if one attack succeeds, it could change the 
whole situation."  Farkash echoed this view, stressing that 
he is "really afraid about these (terrorist) efforts."  He 
also maintained that the relative calm now is really an 
"illusion" since Hamas is building up its forces in the West 
Bank.  According to Farkash, PA President Abbas will use the 
current calm to justify a return to the roadmap. 
 
¶8.  (C) Security "anarchy" is also a problem within Gaza, 
Doron said, noting the recent kidnapping of a French 
journalist by armed militants in Gaza City.  He said he 
believes that the kidnapping was conducted by the Issa 
family, which is connected to Hamas and which has family 
members in PA prisons.  Doron said that the PA is not trying 
to address this problem and that it will therefore continue. 
In response to a query from A/S Welch, Doron said that the 
recent kidnapping of UNRWA workers was not carried out by 
this family, but rather by Fatah. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Eyeing Elections, Abbas Seeks Legitimacy 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Farkash discussed President Abbas' efforts to 
solidify his power base after disengagement and in the run-up 
to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections now 
scheduled for January 21.  Farkash stressed that Abbas was 
actively trying to enlist PA PM Quraya's support since Abbas 
understands that Quraya' has street power.  Farkash predicted 
that in the next two-to-three months, Abbas will increase 
efforts to pull Quraya' closer.  Farkash emphasized that to 
strengthen his position, Abbas wants to demonstrate positive 
post-disengagement results related to the following issues: 
 
-- crossings and access, including airport and seaport "to 
show Gaza is not a jail;" 
 
-- Palestinian view of the 1949 border, which, Farkash noted, 
is different by about 200 meters from where portions of the 
current 60-kilometer fence around Gaza are located.  Farkash 
claimed that the PA does not have any maps to prove their 
position; (Note: The Ambassador requested that Farkash brief 
him on this border issue, to which Farkash responded that he 
would seek MOD approval.) 
 
-- access to 12 miles of territorial waters, rather than 
three miles; 
 
-- GOI release of more Gaza prisoners; 
 
-- strengthening of the link between Gaza and the West Bank; 
and 
 
-- Israel's departure from the Philadelphi Corridor. 
 
¶10.  (C) Farkash noted that Egypt's role in Gaza is important 
to Abbas.  "Egypt is crucial," Farkash underlined, "and their 
behavior (in the disengagement process) has been positive," 
he noted.  Farkash added that Egypt "hates" Gaza and it is a 
problem for them.  Egypt has played a positive role on 
disengagement thus far, Farkash said, because it views Gaza 
as a problem, and one that could affect Egyptian Rafah if it 
is not resolved. 
 
¶11.  (C) Farkash claimed that the Rafah Crossing issue had 
been decided at Camp David and that if Sharon decides to 
"give up" the Philadelphi Corridor, it would be a question of 
forfeiting Israeli land.  (Note: We have not identified any 
reference to the Rafah Crossing in the Israel-Egypt Peace 
Treaty of 1979, including its military protocol.  End Note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
PA-Hamas Rivalry to Heat up After Disengagement 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶12.  (C) Doron stressed that the PA and Hamas have different 
post-disengagement agendas and that at some point, the two 
could clash.  He said that for the time being, however, the 
PA and Hamas understand the need to maintain calm to secure 
Israel's withdrawal.  The PA has been actively trying to 
contain Hamas, Doron said, and has tried to co-opt the 
movement by meeting Hamas' demands on coordinating Gaza 
disengagement.  Doron said that the PA created a Gaza 
disengagement coordinating committee with Hamas.  He said 
that while it appears that the PA has conceded to Hamas 
demands on the committee, in reality, the results have 
benefited the PA. 
 
¶13.  (C) In response to query from A/S Welch, Doron said that 
Egypt has been playing a positive role in resolving problems 
between the PA and Hamas.  Doron emphasized, however, that 
Egypt wants to achieve "quiet at any price" between Hamas and 
the PA and that sometimes it sides with Hamas.  Farkash 
underlined that Egypt's philosophy in this regard is 
dangerous, as it could weaken the PA. 
 
¶14.  (C) Doron and Farkash stressed that President Abbas is 
aware that he must seek greater legitimacy with the public 
and is actively trying to "gain control of the streets."  In 
this respect, Doron added, Abbas is trying to convince the 
public not to disrupt settlements after evacuation and not to 
fire rockets.  Doron noted that Abbas is working to 
coordinate aspects of disengagement with Israel to achieve 
positive results that he can show the public.  Doron said 
that Hamas is also vying to become the main political power 
after disengagement and is trying to depict itself as a 
"responsible force."  Doron pointed to the street competition 
between the PA and Hamas, with both sides organizing 
demonstrations and marches.  Hamas leaders also warned Abbas 
repeatedly not to ask Hamas to give up its weapons and said 
that whoever asks Hamas to do so, will be labeled as a 
criminal by the movement, Doron noted. 
 
¶15.  (C) In response to A/S Welch's question as to how long 
the period of relative calm will last after disengagement, 
Farkash said that he expects that the calm will last until 
the PLC elections.  The elections, Farkash stressed, will be 
a "critical junction" for Abbas.  He said that if Hamas gets 
20-25 percent of the vote, Abbas will have succeeded in 
gaining support from the street, but if Hamas obtains 30-35 
percent of the vote, it will bode very poorly for Abbas. 
Farkash said that Abbas is making a "huge effort" to win over 
the public and to convince them to oppose continuing the 
Intifada.  Hamas believes in the Intifada, Farkash said, and 
it will argue for continuing the Intifada to achieve Israeli 
withdrawal from the West Bank. 
 
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