This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SINGAPORE 002501 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL PARM ETTC KNNP MNUC KN IR MTCRE
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH PRESSES SINGAPORE ON 
PROLIFERATION 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Judith R. Fergin 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. Under Secretary for Arms Control and 
International Security Robert Joseph visited Singapore August 
15 and 16 to attend the opening ceremony of the 
Singapore-hosted Proliferation Security Initiative exercise, 
Deep Sabre.  The Under Secretary engaged his hosts in 
bilateral discussions regarding Iran, North Korea and the 
launch of a counterproliferation dialogue with Singapore. 
The GOS officials expressed enthusiasm for such a dialogue 
and took on board the Under Secretary's message that 
Singapore needed to continue to improve its own trade control 
regime.  Nearly 100 defense and government officials, 
academic researchers and press attended a public address by 
the Under Secretary.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) During his visit, U/S Joseph met separately with 
Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan, 
Defense Minister Teo Chee Hean, Foreign Minister George Yeo, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Peter Ho, and 
MFA Second Permanent Secretary Bilahari Kausikan; he lunched 
with Teo Eng Cheong, Director General of Singapore Customs, 
Eric Tan, Commissioner of the Immigration and Checkpoints 
Authority, and ADM Ronnie Tay, Chief of Navy, among others. 
 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The four day Singapore-hosted Deep Sabre PSI exercise, 
the first held in Southeast Asia, provided the backdrop for 
Under Secretary Joseph's visit.  With 13 countries 
participating and four countries observing, the exercise 
included a port search operation, the first ever in a PSI 
event.  The exercise showcased the important role Singapore 
can play in interdicting transshipped cargoes.  The GOS made 
a strong push to U/S Joseph for greater efforts to expand 
membership in PSI, particularly in the region. MFA Second 
Permanent Secretary Bilahari Kausikan pointed to a North 
Korean vessel's recent deliberate skirting of Singapore 
waters as evidence that "the word is out" on a tougher 
Singapore, but that it was too easy for proliferators to just 
"go around."  He stressed the need to improve proliferation 
controls throughout Southeast Asia, reflecting the GOS's 
concern that strict Singapore-specific controls will cause 
diversion of trade to other ports. 
 
¶4. (C) In a subsequent meeting, Minister for Defense Teo Chee 
Hean said that Singapore was trying to help its neighbors 
understand PSI better, and noted that he was pleased that the 
exercise drew observers from Brunei, Malaysia, Pakistan and 
Vietnam.  Foreign Minister Yeo noted that their discussions 
with Thailand on PSI had been particularly good; he believed 
the Thai would be ready to join soon, but admitted that 
Malaysia and Indonesia were more difficult.  Permsec Kausikan 
said that maritime security issues were still tied up with 
sovereignty issues for both countries, but that President 
Yudhoyono in Indonesia was reasonable and could be persuaded. 
If Indonesia and Thailand join, Kausikan said, Malaysia would 
"have to join too." 
 
¶5. (C) U/S Joseph noted that the PSI partners have always 
sought to encourage as many countries to join as possible, 
but emphasized that involvement required the commitment of 
real resources and a willingness to act when necessary.  He 
agreed that the United States and Singapore needed to work 
together to reach out to ASEAN countries on proliferation. 
He thanked the Singapore officials for their thoughts on 
encouraging greater regional participation, and urged the GOS 
to move forward to early 2006 an Operational Experts Group 
meeting Singapore is planning to host.  MinDef Teo agreed to 
look at the possibility of doing so, but noted that the 
Ministry of Defense was already hosting several events in the 
first half of the year. 
 
Iran and North Korea 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) U/S Joseph stressed in all of his meetings that Iran 
could not be allowed to continue to snub the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  If Iran did not cease its 
conversion activities before the Director General's report is 
released on September 3, the United States would seek an 
early meeting of the Board of Governors to push to refer the 
matter to the UN Security Council for action.  GOS officials 
expressed deep concern about the situation, and explicitly 
agreed that the next step must be to take Iran to the 
Security Council.  At a lunch he hosted, Permsec Kausikan 
remarked that the NAM had been unusually helpful in 
supporting the recent IAEA Board resolution; Iran should get 
the message now that it does not have the support within the 
NAM that it thought it did.  IAEA Director General El 
Baradei's presentation to the NAM at its most recent meeting 
had been important in bringing about this shift, said 
Kausikan.  FM Yeo promised that Singapore would do everything 
it could to shore up support for referring Iran to the 
Security Council in the NAM, but stressed that all of the 
EU-3 would have to stand firm in order to succeed.  U/S 
Joseph agreed, and said the UK and France seemed solid, but 
the German government, facing elections, was less certain. 
FM Yeo called the German government's behavior 
"irresponsible." 
¶7. (C) U/S Joseph briefed the GOS on the Six-Party Talks.  He 
acknowledged recent progress, but cautioned that it would be 
impossible to overstate the challenges ahead.  MinDef Teo 
said that Singapore was concerned by the increasing range of 
North Korea's missiles, noting that some of the "range-rings" 
now reach far into the region, including to Singapore. FM Yeo 
mentioned that China seems to be more helpful with the 
six-party talks, and was cautiously optimistic.  He wondered, 
however, why South Korea was behaving as if the crisis 
"wasn't their problem."  Deputy Prime Minister Tan affirmed 
that Iran and North Korea were dangerous countries with 
dangerous leaders, and posed a threat to the world.  DPM Tan 
agreed with the Under Secretary that the international 
community must keep constant pressure on both to compel 
behavioral change. 
 
¶8. (C) The Under Secretary told his Singapore hosts that the 
Iran and North Korea crises had brought the entire NPT regime 
"to the breaking point," and that failure to address them 
would encourage other countries to follow the same path. 
Permsec Kausikan went further, saying that the regime was 
"broken," and that something had to be done to fix it.  He 
expressed concern with the "peaceful use" clause in 
particular; Kausikan said the current global environment made 
potentially dangerous any nuclear capability in the hands of 
a country unable to properly secure it, even if its 
intentions were good.  U/S Joseph stressed to Kausikan and in 
other meetings that Iran and North Korea should not be 
allowed to exploit the pretext of a "civilian" nuclear 
program -- all their nuclear programs were military in 
nature.  U/S Joseph said we hoped the reforms for the IAEA 
that the President has proposed would improve safety and 
oversight, and inquired about Singapore's progress in signing 
the Additional Protocol.  Kausikan responded that the 
Additional Protocol had received Cabinet approval; MFA 
Permanent Secretary Peter Ho was confident that Singapore was 
on track to have it fully vetted in time for it to be 
approved at the IAEA Board meeting in November. 
 
Export Controls 
--------------- 
 
¶9. (C) In all his meetings, U/S Joseph praised Singapore's 
efforts to improve its counterproliferation regime, but 
strongly urged it to do more -- specifically by adhering to 
the multilateral control lists (MTCR, Australia Group, 
Wassenaar, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group) and by collecting 
data on transshipment cargo.  Defense Minister Teo affirmed 
that Singapore and the United States were "on the same side" 
on counterproliferation, and Singapore would do whatever it 
could to assist.  It could not, however, search every 
container, and had to be mindful of the economic impact of 
its actions.  Teo stressed the need for better intelligence 
cooperation to identify suspicious containers, and U/S Joseph 
pointed to the upcoming experts dialogue as a first step in 
achieving this.  MFA Permanent Secretary Ho asserted 
Singapore would take action against any act of proliferation, 
regardless of the control lists, and argued for an integrated 
"supply chain security" system that would allow countries to 
keep track of shipments from manufacture to receipt by the 
end-user.  The Under Secretary acknowledged the idea and 
suggested discussing it further at the upcoming experts 
dialogue, but stressed the need for Singapore to adhere to 
the highest export control standards. 
 
¶10. (C) Permsec Kausikan asserted that Singapore had been 
adding to its control list in a systematic way and that there 
was now "political will" to adhere to all four multilateral 
regimes.  Singapore would, however, make changes to its 
control list deliberately.  "It is not just about having a 
list, but also about being able to enforce it," he said, 
adding that Singapore was having to build up its scientific 
and technical expertise as its control list expanded.  U/S 
Joseph acknowledged the need for technical and scientific 
knowledge, and asked how the United States could help. 
Permsec Kausikan pointed to the upcoming bilateral 
proliferation dialogue, and urged the participation by U.S. 
experts who can assist Singapore officials build their 
technical expertise.  Ambassador Lavin advised Kausikan that 
adhering to the multilateral control lists, the international 
standard for a strong counterproliferation regime, would 
benefit Singapore by identifying it as a strong supporter of 
nonproliferation and protecting it from allegations of 
complicity. 
 
¶11. (C) In the Kausikan-hosted lunch and in the Ambassador's 
lunch the next day with the Chief of the Navy and the heads 
of Singapore's customs and border checkpoint agencies, the 
Under Secretary said the United States wanted to work with 
Singapore to collect more information on transshipment 
cargoes passing through the port.  Ambassador Lavin pointed 
out that major shipping lines, comprising the bulk of global 
shipping, were already required to collect detailed manifest 
data for the United States, and that providing such 
information to Singapore as well should be relatively easy 
for them.  Permsec Kausikan said he thought Singapore had 
some legal issues to resolve in order to collect that type of 
data, and suggested that this could also be discussed at the 
experts' dialogue.  Eric Tan, commissioner of the Immigration 
and Checkpoints Authority and Teo Eng Cheong, director 
general of Customs, both raised the practical difficulties in 
implementing further regulations and information 
requirements.  Trade is Singapore's lifeblood and changes to 
the trade regime had to be done carefully, they asserted. 
Recognizing that point, Ambassador Lavin reminded the lunch 
guests that the vast majority of major trading nations 
already were members of all four key proliferation regimes, 
with no noticeable deleterious effects on trade or 
competitiveness. 
 
Proliferation Financing 
----------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Under Secretary Joseph cited the Executive Order on 
Blocking Property of WMD Proliferators and Their Supporters 
as a useful new tool against proliferation, and urged the GOS 
not to do business with the designated entities, and to 
consider adopting similar tools itself.  All the Singaporean 
officials expressed interest in discussing the matter further 
to understand how the executive order would work, and how the 
government of Singapore might become involved in this effort. 
 FM Yeo asserted that Singapore's objectives in this matched 
the United States', and DPM Tony Tan said that Singapore must 
take whatever steps are necessary to stop proliferation, 
whether it meant physical interdiction or financial controls. 
 U/S Joseph suggested this could be discussed further in the 
experts dialogue, as well. 
 
Public Address 
-------------- 
 
¶13. (U)  On August 15, U/S Joseph gave a public address, 
hosted by Singapore's Institute for Defense and Strategic 
Studies, to approximately 100 military and government 
officials, diplomats, academic researchers and press.  The 
Under Secretary stressed the threat posed by proliferation by 
states such as Iran and North Korea, as well as non-state 
actors, and outlined the new tools that the United States and 
its partners are creating to combat this threat -- including 
PSI.  He praised Singapore's Singapore's commitment to 
counterproliferation, as reflected in its being the first 
Southeast Asian country to host a PSI exercise, but stressed 
that more work remains.  The Under Secretary highlighted 
Asia's importance to global counterproliferation efforts, and 
urged Singapore and its neighbors to continue to improve 
their nonproliferation regimes.  (U/S Joseph's speech and Q's 
and A's are available on the Embassy website 
http://singapore.usembassy.gov.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14. (C) U/S Joseph's visit pushed forward our 
non-proliferation agenda in Singapore.  The visit let us give 
full credit to Singapore in the proliferation areas where it 
is leading (PSI, CSI, the Department of Energy's Megaports 
radiation detection project) and press them to improve 
performance in the areas where it is lagging, specifically, 
in building a world-class export control regime.  Singapore 
already appreciates the threat WMDs pose to itself, and now 
understands clearly that improved cooperation with us on 
proliferation will be fundamental to the continued, positive 
growth in our security relationship. 
 
¶15. (C) The next few months represent an important 
opportunity to press Singapore to bring its control regime in 
line with key international agreements.  We should continue 
to help it develop the technical ability to identify, control 
and handle additional controlled items.  The last year has 
seen a number of USG- and other government-sponsored 
proliferation training sessions for customs, military and 
other first responders; there are three more coming in the 
next several months.  The up-coming experts dialogue will be 
an important next step.  A USG delegation comprised of 
experts who can talk about global proliferation patterns, 
specific entities and items of concern, intelligence sharing, 
and the technical reasons why comprehensive control lists are 
crucial to an effective regime will be a concrete 
demonstration of our commitment to improved 
counterproliferation performance. 
 
¶16. (U) U/S Joseph has cleared this cable. 
FERGIN