This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 002420 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH FROM AMBASSADOR LAVIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2015 
TAGS: KNNP PARM ETTC PREL OTRA SN
SUBJECT: SINGAPORE SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Franklin L. Lavin 
 for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) I look forward to welcoming you to Singapore next 
week.  My staff and I are working to ensure a very positive 
and productive visit.  Your visit comes at an ideal time to: 
 
-- thank Singapore for its strong commitment to the 
Proliferation Security Initiative and global 
counterproliferation efforts; 
 
-- encourage Singapore to take further steps to ensure that 
proliferators and terrorists do not misuse its port; 
 
-- solidify our growing cooperative relationship on combating 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their 
components; and 
 
-- highlight our close security relationship, enshrined in 
the new Strategic Framework Agreement, and the importance of 
the interoperability of our armed forces. 
 
A Strong Partner 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Our excellent security relationship with Singapore is 
at a high-water mark, though it is constrained by Singapore's 
desire to be close partners, but not an ally.  Singapore is a 
valuable logistics hub and has supported U.S. forces engaged 
in OEF, OIF and tsunami relief.  Our military training and 
exercise program is extensive, and we hope to enhance our 
interoperability if Singapore chooses the F-15 over the 
French Rafale for its Next Generation Fighter.  In July, 
President Bush and Prime Minister Lee signed the Strategic 
Framework Agreement (SFA), which lays the foundation to 
expand our strong ties and specifically notes the importance 
of enhanced cooperation on nonproliferation. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Singapore supports the United States' global 
nonproliferation agenda and trade security initiatives. It 
was the first country in East Asia to join the Container 
Security Initiative (2002) and the Megaports Initiative 
(2005), and participates enthusiastically in the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  Singapore has 
supported our efforts to raise the profile for 
nonproliferation at the United Nations, and has been helpful, 
as a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
Board of Governors, in pressing for greater accountability 
for Iran. 
 
¶4. (SBU) A high-profile terrorist target itself, Singapore 
recognizes its own interests in controlling trade in 
dangerous goods.  Though it has tended to focus more on 
terrorists' misuse of the trading system rather than 
proliferation by state actors, Singapore's mindset is 
shifting.  Enacted in January 2003, its first strategic goods 
control law imposes controls on a range of sensitive goods 
and technology.  Over the past two years, Singapore has 
concentrated on refining implementing regulations, training 
customs and border control officers, and reaching out to 
industry to raise awareness and compliance. 
 
Export Controls Still A Work in Progress 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) While these measures are welcome, Singapore's trade 
controls still fall short of international best practices. 
The GOS does not yet adhere to key multilateral instruments 
such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the 
Australia Group, though your lunch host MFA Second Permanent 
Secretary Bilahari Kausikan has told us Singapore plans to 
 
SIPDIS 
sign up to these regimes "eventually." Singapore now controls 
only a subset of the items covered by these agreements and 
relies on catch-all clauses to forbid trade in goods destined 
for weapons of mass destruction.  Singapore also collects 
little data on most transit and transshipment cargo, which 
handicaps enforcement. 
 
¶6. (C) Singapore's port, one of the busiest in the world, 
remains critical to its economy; the government carefully 
weighs the potential impact of stricter trade controls on its 
efficiency and competitiveness as a trading hub.  Over the 
last year, extensive U.S.-provided customs training has 
improved Singapore's understanding of how a comprehensive 
control system works and has eased fears that such a system 
would overwhelm their limited manpower and technical 
expertise.  You will want to make the point that the majority 
of successful trading nations have implemented 
internationally agreed export controls, at little cost to 
legitimate trade. 
 
Opportunity to Advance U.S. Interests 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) We believe Singapore is ready to take another big step 
toward bringing its strategic goods control regime in line 
with international best practices.  During his July 12 joint 
press conference with the President in Washington, the Prime 
Minister himself pointed out that the SFA commits Singapore 
to work with the United States to do more to combat the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Your visit, 
while highlighting our close partnership and Singapore's good 
work against proliferation through PSI and other programs, 
could provide the impetus the GOS needs to resolve to become 
a full participant in the global effort to prevent 
proliferation.  Good next steps would be Singapore's 
unilaterally aligning its control lists with agreed 
international ones, collecting more information on transit 
and transshipped cargoes, and beginning the legal procedures 
for joining key international control regimes. 
 
Public and Private Messages 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) We recommend that your public message emphasize our 
appreciation for our excellent security ties and Singapore's 
good work on nonproliferation, as demonstrated by the ongoing 
PSI exercise, and our desire to work together as Singapore 
continues to refine its export control regime.  Privately, 
your message to the GOS should be more frank: despite 
Singapore's impressive progress over the past few years, much 
remains to be done.  Given Singapore's prominent role in 
global trade, it must fully commit to keeping dangerous items 
out of the reach of terrorists or nations that intend us 
harm.  By not fully participating in the international 
control regimes, Singapore is open to exploitation by 
countries like North Korea and others who use it as a "cut 
out" to procure items that other major traders will not sell 
them.  Further, a strong proliferation regime and aggressive 
cooperation with us is a key component of our growing 
security relationship, as Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
pointed out in Washington.  Singapore needs to make its 
export control regime truly world class.  We look forward to 
building a strong, cooperative enforcement relationship.  We 
will launch the effort to strengthen that relationship with 
the visit this fall by a team of U.S. proliferation experts. 
LAVIN