This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001721 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND PRM; GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2009 
TAGS: MO PBTS PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA CBMS:  MORE BACK AND FORTH 
 
REF: A. RABAT 1645 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶B. 7/27 CASSIDY-LENDERKING EMAIL 
 
Classified By: Pol/C Tim Lenderking for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  MFA Director of Multilateral Affairs 
Mohamed Loulichki (tapped to be Morocco's next Ambassador in 
Geneva) briefed Polcouns August 15 on the substance of the 
GOM's proposed reply to UNHCR concerning the 
confidence-building measures (in particular the family visit 
program) for the Western Sahara.  Loulichki said Morocco saw 
three remaining areas where procedures still needed to be 
ironed out:  ensuring that passengers registered to take the 
family-visit flight were the actual ones to travel (ie, 
minimizing manipulation of the participants by the Polisario, 
a recurring GOM gripe); extending duration of stays in the 
event of medical or humanitarian emergency; and calling on 
the GOA to take responsibility for travel and security for 
those participants going to the Tindouf side.  When Polcouns 
remonstrated that the UNHCR had already addressed at least 
two of these issues in its July letter (Ref B), Loulichki 
asked the US to understand that Morocco had reduced its 
earlier concerns to just three, these remaining concerns 
needed to addressed for the resumption of the program, and 
protested in turn that UNHCR was treating Morocco's concerns 
inappropriately by not consulting with the parties; this, he 
felt, was UNHCR's role.  He saw no reason why UNHCR could not 
address these issues and respond to Morocco "in a week's 
time."  The ball hereby bounces back to Geneva.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2.  (C) MFA Director of Multilateral Affairs Mohamed 
Loulichki briefed Polcouns August 15, at the former's 
initiative, on the content of the GOM's draft letter to the 
UNHCR on confidence-building measures (primarily the family 
exchange visits) for the Western Sahara.  Loulichki explained 
that, following the Ambassador's meeting with Deputy FM Fassi 
Fihri and his own conversation with the DCM on August 4 (Ref 
A), he was getting back to us as promised on how the GOM 
planned to respond to UNHCR about the resumption of the CBM 
program. 
 
¶3.  (C) Loulichki said UNHCR's July letter (Ref B) to the GOM 
had commented on most of the GOM concerns raised in earlier 
discussions.  Nevertheless, three issues still needed to be 
dealt with before Morocco would agree to resume the program: 
 
-- individuals that either side presents to UNHCR as 
passengers for the cross-berm flights should in fact be the 
ones who make the flight.  There should be no more 
"last-minute" changes by the Polisario (with the excuses that 
"so and so couldn't make the flight, so and so lives too far 
away and could not be located, and so on," Loulichki 
explained). 
 
-- individuals who wish to remain on either side of the berm 
for a few extra days (not permanently, he stressed) for 
compelling humanitarian reasons, such as the imminent death 
of a relative or medical reasons of their own, should be 
allowed to do so.  The individual should provide a medical 
certificate verifying the illness, and UNHCR or MINURSO can 
corroborate it. 
 
-- the Algerians should oversee security for the family-visit 
participants when they arrive from the Moroccan side. 
Tindouf is part of Algeria, not an autonomous region, and the 
Algerians should take the lead in ensuring that the visitors 
can travel in safety and security, similar to what the 
Moroccans provide, Loulichki said. 
 
¶4.  (C) Loulichki emphasized that the GOM remained committed 
to the program and hoped that the US did not view Morocco as 
simply throwing out roadblocks to stall.  In fact, Loulichki 
asked Polcouns to recall, Morocco had other concerns as well, 
but was either putting them aside or had found that UNHCR had 
adequately addressed them already. 
 
UNHCR Must Consult with the Parties 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Loulichki stressed that UNHCR must take these issues 
directly to "the parties."  Morocco was perplexed that UNHCR 
had not done this previously.  It was not UNHCR's role to 
make decisions like this on its own.  It should be done in 
consultation with the other players.  Morocco expected a 
good-faith effort to discuss these issues with the parties 
and reply to Morocco in a timely fashion. 
¶6.  (C) Polcouns said the US was concerned as a donor to this 
program that Morocco and the UN were still going around and 
around on the modalities when in our view what had been 
implemented before had actually worked pretty well as a 
measure to promote confidence between the parties.  Moreover, 
UNHCR's July letter already addressed two of the three 
concerns Loulichki had highlighted, ie, extending stays on an 
exceptional basis and providing security on the Algerian 
side.  UNHCR had already said that the current wording in the 
Action Plan sufficed to deal with these situations.  Could 
Morocco perhaps work these issues informally while agreeing 
to the formal resumption of the program?  Polcouns said going 
back to UNHCR again would obviously delay the program 
further.  It was now the middle of August, and the CBM 
program had been grounded for almost a year. 
 
¶7.  (C) Loulichki insisted these three remaining issues were 
important to Morocco, and essential to restarting the 
program.  There was no reason for UNHCR to delay in sharing 
these issues with "the parties" and getting back to Morocco 
"within a week."  Polcouns said Loulichki knew that was 
unlikely. 
 
¶8.  (C) In contrast to what Fassi Fihri told the Ambassador 
in Ref A, Loulichki said the letter would go out under his 
signature, not that of FM Benaissa, as the incoming letter 
from UNHCR had not been signed at the level of minister. 
 
Loulichki to Geneva 
------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Loulichki added that he had been tapped to be 
Morocco's new Ambassador to Geneva.  He would be dispatched 
"as soon as the King calls me." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The GOM is determined to have things its way on the 
CBMs, and at some point we will have to decide whether we 
want to stay in the game as a donor.  For the time being, we 
should, since the family exchanges have been useful, and 
while the negotiations over the resumption of the program 
have been tedious, we have made some progress in narrowing 
the gap.  Let us urge UNHCR to move expeditiously with its 
response to the GOM and not pull the funding at this time. 
 
 
RILEY