This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 005926 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015 
TAGS: PREL IZ FR
SUBJECT: GOF CAUTIOUSLY SUPPORTIVE IN PUBLIC, PRIVATELY 
PESSIMISTIC ON IRAQI CONSTITUTION 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 158420 
 
     ¶B. STATE 158149 
     ¶C. PARIS 5220 
 
Classified By: Deputy Political Minister-Counselor Bruce Turner, reason 
s 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and comment: The initial GoF public reaction 
to presentation of the Iraqi constitution has been low-key 
and stressed GoF support for the Iraqi political process 
(vice the constitution itself), and the need for Iraqi 
authorities to build support for the document from all of 
Iraq's political communities.  Working-level MFA officials 
conceded that the draft text contained important human rights 
advances, but expressed worry that Sunni dissatisfaction with 
the document spelled further trouble for Iraq's political 
process and territorial unity.  One MFA official went so far 
as to describe the draft constitution as a "demi-fiasco," 
claiming that the Sunni community, despite efforts to 
increase its input, remained alienated from the final result, 
which he described as a Shia-Kurdish compromise.  At the same 
time, MFA officials refuted press reports that the GoF is 
considering withdrawing its ambassador in Iraq due to 
security concerns, and downplayed a conference idea publicly 
floated by FM Douste-Blazy, claiming this was not yet a 
concrete GoF initiative.  End summary and comment. 
 
¶2. (C) We delivered ref a talking points urging support for 
the Iraqi constitution to MFA contacts August 29, and 
discussed the issue in more detail with MFA DAS-equivalent 
for Iraq/Arabian Gulf Affairs Antoine Sivan and Iraq desk 
officers David Cvach and Bernard Chappedelaine August 30. 
Cvach expressed appreciation for the timeliness of the 
information we provided, particularly the fact sheet on the 
constitution.  He explained that the initial GoF response to 
the constitution, issued by the MFA spokesman on August 29, 
was intended to reaffirm the GoF's full support for the 
political process, while not taking a position on the 
substance of the constitutional text itself.  (Note: The 
August 29 MFA statement took note of completion of the 
constitution and described it as a "milestone towards 
effective restoration of Iraqi sovereignty.. " Full text is 
in para 8.  End note.)  While Cvach conceded that the 
constitution contained impressive human rights advances, 
particularly in the area of individual liberties, he 
concluded that the GoF remained concerned over lack of 
support for the text among Iraq's Sunni community; this had 
the potential to deepen Iraq's sectarian divide to the 
detriment of the political process and Iraqi territorial 
unity.  Cvach added that on other contentious issues, such as 
the distribution of revenues from natural resources, the 
vagueness of the draft text language could complicate its 
eventual implementation. 
 
¶3. (C) MFA DAS-equivalent Sivan was more negative in 
assessing the draft constitution, describing it as a 
"demi-fiasco," due to the lack of buy-in from Iraq's Sunni 
Arab community.  Sivan complained that, despite the best 
efforts to widen Sunni participation in the constitutional 
drafting committee, the final text was largely a 
Shi'a-Kurdish compromise which did nothing to reduce the 
Sunni sense of alienation.  Sivan described his remarks as 
personal, but added that the reactions which he had heard 
from Iraqi contacts and the French embassy in Baghdad largely 
confirmed his view.  Poloff reiterated that the failure of 
some Sunni negotiators to support the document was not 
equivalent to rejection by the entire Sunni community, but 
Sivan remained unswayed.  Cvach asked about reported comments 
from the U.S. ambassador in Iraq suggesting that there was 
still room for edits in the draft constitutional text, noting 
that the GoF would welcome further changes to the draft text, 
if they translated into additional Sunni support. 
 
¶4. (C) Poloff stressed the urgent need for GoF assistance to 
the Iraq's independent electoral commission (IECI), given the 
GoF's support for Iraq's political process.  Chappedelaine 
said that French support for IECI was being channeled via 
pledged EU contributions towards all three phases of Iraq's 
electoral process: the January ballot, October referendum and 
December elections for a permanent government.  On other 
French assistance programs, Cvach added that the first class 
of 40 Iraqi police officers and magistrates had completed 
training in France in August, under the EU "JUSTLEX" program; 
two more tranches of a similar size would undergo training in 
France in coming months. Cvach reported no movement, however, 
in the long-stalled French bilateral offer to train Iraqi 
gendarmes outside Iraq, noting that the GoF was still waiting 
for Iraqi follow-up after the visit of an Iraqi MOI 
delegation to France in July (ref c).  Chappedelaine added 
that the French embassy in Baghdad would revisit the 
bilateral training offer with Iraqi authorities starting next 
week, but was not optimistic that there would be movement 
before permanent elections at the end of this year.  He added 
that the Iraqi preference remained for training inside Iraq, 
which crossed French red-lines against sending military 
personnel to Iraq. 
¶5. (C) Asked about press reports suggesting that France might 
temporarily withdraw its ambassador from Baghdad due to 
security threats, Cvach responded that Ambassador Bajolet, 
now in Paris for the annual ambassadors' conference, would 
return to Iraq at the end of the week.  He stressed that the 
GoF had made no decision to reduce its staff in Baghdad, 
which consisted of five diplomats (two handling cooperation 
issues) and about 30 security officers.  Cvach added that the 
GOF remained ready to assume the risks of maintaining its 
staff in Iraq, for whom vehicle movements represented the 
most dangerous security risk.  He said that the French 
embassy staff had been consolidated in two residential 
complexes, in addition to the ambassador's residence and 
chancery. 
 
¶6. (C) Cvach and Chappedelaine also downplayed August 30 
remarks made by FM Douste-Blazy to the ambassadors' 
conference (septel), in which he floated the idea of a 
conference, similar to the Sharm al-Sheikh gathering, which 
could affirm a "perspective" towards a foreign troop 
withdrawal and accompany the political process.  Cvach 
stressed that Douste-Blazy had added the conference reference 
to the speech himself, without the input of the regional 
directorate, and noted that he and his colleagues would be 
seeking clarification from the minister's office.  He claimed 
that there was no concrete GoF proposal for a conference, and 
added that language on a "perspective" for a foreign troop 
withdrawal had long been part of French rhetoric on Iraq and 
did not constitute a call for a troop withdrawal date. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment:  Though pessimism among MFA officials on the 
constitution is at once disappointing and not surprising, at 
least this negativity is not being reflected in GoF public 
statements, which for now have been limited to the August 29 
MFA statement.  We will continue to seek details on the 
possible conference proposal, and determine whether it is a 
serious initiative on the part of FM Douste-Blazy.  End 
comment. 
 
¶8. (U) Text of August 29 MFA statement on presentation of the 
Iraqi constitution: 
 
Begin text. 
 
France has taken note of the completion of the draft Iraqi 
constitution.  This is another milestone towards the 
effective restoration of Iraq's sovereignty which is part of 
the political transition process begun in accordance with 
resolution 1546.  It is now up to all Iraqis to vote on the 
text in the referendum that will be held on October 15, 2005. 
 
France also applauds the efforts of the UN 
Secretary-General's Special Representative and the United 
 
SIPDIS 
Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq. 
 
It calls on the Iraqi authorities to continue and intensify 
their efforts in the context of a real national dialogue so 
as to develop the bases of a consensus on the country's 
future around this text and in all components of Iraqi 
society.  It renews its urgent appeals to all Iraqis to turn 
away from violence and mobilize to ensure the establishment 
of their new institutions in the best possible conditions. 
 
End text. 
 
 
STAPLETON