This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 005263 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2015 
TAGS: PREL IS KPAL SY IR PTER PARM FR
SUBJECT: PM SHARON VISIT HERALDS SYMBOLIC UPTURN IN 
FRENCH-ISRAELI RELATIONS 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and comment: Israeli PM Sharon's successful 
July 26-29 visit to France was marked by warm atmospherics 
and ostentatious emphasis on improving bilateral relations 
from both sides, with many French media outlets heralding a 
new "honeymoon" in French-Israeli relations.  The GoF, in 
welcoming Sharon to Paris, stressed its support for Gaza 
disengagement, commitment to fighting anti-Semitism, and 
longtime friendship and "shared values" with Israel, while 
reiterating support for the roadmap and an independent 
Palestinian state.  Sharon, for his part, paid effusive 
public tributes to Chirac, invited him to Israel, and 
stressed GoF-GoI agreement on issues like Syria and Iran. 
French MFA contacts described the visit as a success in 
largely symbolic terms, with both sides seeking to highlight 
the positive and not dwell on areas of disagreement, while 
not shifting from established positions.  That said, the GoF 
appears to have recalibrated its public message on Gaza 
disengagement more in line with the U.S. focus on making 
disengagement a success, while highlighting the roadmap as 
offering a political perspective to Palestinians.  The main 
topics of Sharon's discussions with Chirac and other senior 
French officials were Gaza disengagement, Syria/Lebanon, and 
Iran/EU-3 negotiations, with the MFA reporting a particular 
convergence of views on the latter two topics.  Quai contacts 
told us they were struck particularly by Chirac's toughness 
on Syria, and noted that the GoF opted to raise what happens 
post-Gaza disengagement during the PM Villepin-Sharon 
discussion only.  The sole deliverable from the visit was the 
GoF-proposed creation of a new France-Israel foundation, 
which will seek to improve Israel's public image in France, 
and vice-versa.  End summary and comment. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) At the invitation of President Chirac, Israeli 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited France July 26 through 
July 29, his first visit to France since 2001.  On July 27, 
Sharon had a working lunch with Chirac and had a separate 
meeting and working dinner with PM de Villepin; on July 28, 
he met with French FM Douste-Blazy and attended cultural 
events with French Jewish community groups.  The 
two-hour-plus Chirac-Sharon meeting, which focused on 
bilateral ties and regional issues, was marked by 
exceptionally positive atmospherics.  In public remarks, 
Sharon called Chirac "one of the world's great leaders," 
hailed French firmness on the Syria/Lebanon and Iran/EU-3 
dossiers, and invited the French president to visit his ranch 
in the Negev. (MFA contacts confirmed that Chirac accepted 
the offer, and spontaneously offered to donate a French cow 
to Sharon's ranch, with cattle being an additional 
ice-breaking topic between the two leaders.)  Chirac publicly 
offered Sharon "the warmest of welcomes" and applauded the 
Gaza disengagement plan as a "historic decision," reiterating 
that France would be side-by-side with the Israeli and 
Palestinian people in helping to relaunch the roadmap.  PM de 
Villepin went further in projecting the image of a balanced 
French Middle East policy, declaring that, "France, with its 
unrelenting support for a balanced solution, will always be 
side-by-side with Israel, and all partisans for peace... 
France and Israel have the same passion for democracy and for 
liberty...on the basis of these shared values, it is up to us 
to continue and enrich our dialogue..." French media coverage 
of the visit was generally positive, with multiple references 
to a new "honeymoon" in French-Israeli relations after 
decades of strains, notwithstanding continuing bilateral 
differences on key issues like West Bank settlements and the 
security barrier. 
 
GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, HAMAS 
---------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) We received a brief readout of the Sharon-Chirac 
meeting from Diplomatic Advisor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, 
and a more detailed briefing on the discussion topics from 
MFA Israel desk officer Etienne Chapon.  Gourdault-Montagne 
characterized Chirac's talks with Sharon as highly positive, 
especially given that the visit was a delicate one for the 
GOF.  Gourdault-Montagne added that Chirac had asked Sharon 
whether the Palestinians had an interest in sabotaging Gaza 
disengagement, to which the Israeli PM replied that he didn't 
know, but would implement the plan regardless.  Chapon noted 
that although the Israeli PM, during his bilateral 
discussions, entered into less detail than the GoF had hoped 
on his plans for Gaza disengagement, Sharon left no doubt on 
the French side of his determination to implement the plan. 
Chapon said the GoF "got the message" from the U.S. on the 
need to focus on making Gaza disengagement a success, and 
took this line with Sharon; the planned Douste-Blazy visit to 
Israel and the Occupied Territories September 4-6 would be 
made in a similar spirit.  Chapon added that the GoF chose to 
raise the issue of what happens "after Gaza withdrawal" 
during the Villepin-Sharon meeting only, as Chirac had wanted 
to avoid contention in his meeting with the Israeli PM. 
Chapon conceded that some in the GoF had worried whether 
Villepin, known for his passion on the Israeli-Palestinian 
issue, would press the point too harshly, but in the end, the 
PM handled the issue diplomatically.  Sharon's response to 
Villepin was to note that we were still in a prelude to the 
roadmap, for which implementation was contingent on a 
complete halt to terrorism, confiscation of weapons, 
dismantlement of terrorist groups, and an end to incitement 
of hatred towards Israel.  Chapon commented that the last 
condition listed by Sharon was new, and suggested a 
maximalist, hard-line approach on roadmap implementation. 
 
¶4. (C) On Hamas, Chapon reported that Chirac defused the 
issue by reiterating its status as a "terrorist organization" 
during his discussion with Sharon and making clear that the 
GoF had no intention of talking to Hamas.  Sharon, for his 
part, observed that PA President Abbas had committed a grave 
error in seeking accommodation with Hamas, which had been 
borne out by recent clashes between the two sides.  Chapon 
added that FM Douste-Blazy took a more nuanced line with 
Sharon on Hamas; rather than stressing its status as a 
terrorist group, he pointed to the need to undermine Hamas' 
popular appeal by giving full support to the PA. 
 
SYRIA/LEBANON, HIZBALLAH 
------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Chapon described Syria/Lebanon and Iran/EU-3 
negotiations as "honeymoon" topics between Chirac and Sharon, 
but noted that both sides stuck to generalities.  Chapon 
stressed that Chirac and Sharon discussed Syria from the 
Lebanon angle, and agreed on the need to keep pressure on 
Damascus, while not addressing any new initiatives.  Sharon 
commended Chirac for his cooperation with the U.S. on UNSCR 
1559, and stressed the importance of full implementation. 
According to Chapon, Sharon described Hizballah as an 
"existential menace" to Israel, but did not appeal for 
Hizballah disarmament, nor did he ask the EU to list 
Hizballah as a terrorist organization -- two omissions which 
took the GoF by surprise.  Chapon speculated that Hizballah 
was a case in which Israeli/French differences were 
well-established and perhaps not worth pressing during 
meetings intended to mend fences.  He added that Chirac 
helped defuse the issue by stressing that the GoF was sending 
very firm messages to Iran to push Hizballah to moderate its 
behavior.  Chirac also advised Sharon that it was Syria, not 
Iran, that was offering the bulk of external support to 
Hizballah; therefore external pressure should remain focused 
on Damascus.  Chapon concluded that he and other MFA contacts 
were struck by the toughness of Chirac's message on Syria, 
which he dismissed as a "bad regime" which understands no one 
and does nothing to change its behavior.   Chapon confirmed 
that Sharon raised concerns on Syria's support for 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to which Chirac assented. 
 
IRAN/EU-3 
--------- 
 
¶6. (C) Chapon reported that the Israeli PM thanked Chirac for 
the GoF's efforts to keep Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons 
and for keeping Israel informed of the progress of EU-3 
negotiations.  Sharon also reportedly described the EU-3 
effort as the best possible option to contain Iran's nuclear 
ambitions. Describing divisions between the Iranian regime 
and its young people, civil society, and female population, 
however, he argued that threats of UNSC sanctions were an 
effective form of pressure on the regime.  According to 
Chapon, Chirac stressed that the GoF would be firm and make 
no concessions to Iran on the nuclear issue, and was working 
to maintain the best possible coordination on the issue with 
Washington and Moscow.  Chirac explained that the EU-3 would 
seek to make a serious and credible offer to Iran in order to 
put the onus on the Iranian side to respond.  If the Iranians 
failed to meet their obligations, Chirac stressed that the 
GoF was ready to take the issue to the UNSC.  Chapon added 
that Sharon maintained a relatively moderate line on Iran and 
did not into enter details, for instance, on Israeli analysis 
of the progress of the Iranian nuclear program. 
 
FRANCE-ISRAEL FOUNDATION 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) Chapon and Israeli embassy contacts described the 
proposed founding of a new France-Israel foundation as the 
sole concrete result from the Sharon visit.   Chapon 
explained that the GoF-proposed foundation will be an unusual 
public-private partnership, with a 1:7 ratio between 
government and private sector financing, the latter coming 
mainly from the French Jewish community.  The purpose of the 
foundation will be to improve the public image of Israel in 
France, and vice-versa, through high-profile public diplomacy 
initiatives, in contrast to the very low-key France-Israel 
technical commission in operation since 2003.  Initial 
efforts will focus on student exchanges, expanded civil 
society contact, and organizing a France-Israel cultural week 
in 2006, which will mark the formal launch of the foundation 
and the opening of a new French cultural center in Tel Aviv. 
Chapon added that the bilateral public diplomacy efforts had 
already started before the Sharon visit, with coordinated 
interviews by Chirac and Sharon appearing in the French and 
Israeli press last week. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) The Sharon visit culminates a GoF effort launched 
nearly three years ago (under then-FM Villepin) to improve 
its long-troubled bilateral relations with Israel, and was a 
resounding success in overcoming the GoF's particular 
psychological baggage with respect to Sharon.  Though Chirac 
and Sharon are not new best friends, their convergence on 
such varied issues as anti-Semitism, Syria, Iran, and cows is 
striking, especially for two dinosaurs of international 
politics.  The visit offered the GoF the chance to offer 
Sharon a symbolic boost before Gaza disengagement begins, but 
was also timed, Quai contacts tell us, to avoid generating 
domestic controversy, with most of the French public already 
in vacation mode by late July.  We do not see the GoF using 
the Sharon visit as way to seek a more high-profile role in 
peace efforts at the expense of the U.S., as some local media 
analysts have speculated.  For now, the GoF appears to have 
recalibrated its public message on Gaza disengagement in line 
with that of the U.S.: focus on making disengagement a 
success, and highlight the roadmap as offering a political 
perspective to the Palestinians.  End comment. 
 
 
 
 
STAPLETON