This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 006596 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2015 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV ASEC EAIR MOPS KSAC IN PK
SUBJECT: TOUGH NEW ANTI-HIJACKING POLICY, AT LEAST ON PAPER 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 5165 
     ¶B. 04 NEW DELHI 5611 
     ¶C. 04 NEW DELHI 5387 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: To break with earlier ad hoc practices -- 
many of which yielded disastrous results -- the GOI recently 
unveiled India's first formal anti-hijacking policy and 
streamlined bureaucratic procedures in the event of a 
successful hijacking in Indian airspace.  The Indian Air 
Force (IAF) is now allowed to counter a 9/11-like attempt to 
use aircraft as weapons of mass destruction by shooting them 
down, and negotiators are restricted in what they can offer 
terrorists in a hostage situation.  The long-awaited policy 
reflects lessons learned from the 1999 hijacking of Indian 
Airlines flight IC-814 (Ref C), which ended with the GOI 
releasing notorious terrorists from its jails, and sends a 
tough message to would-be hijackers.  The policy has so far 
attracted little criticism, except from opposition 
politicians who argued that Parliament should have been 
informed before the press.  What remains to be seen, however, 
is whether this or successor governments can live up to the 
high standards now set.  End Summary. 
 
Empowers Airport Officials to Ground Planes 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The new policy pushes some decisions down to the 
operational level.  For example, airport personnel are 
authorized to block any grounded hijacked plane from taking 
off.  Noted terrorism expert Ajai Sahni observed that 
empowering first responders in this way means local officials 
who are not in a position to offer significant concessions 
will bear a big responsibility.  He added that keeping 
aircraft grounded limits the terrorists' options, and 
recalled that two hijackings in Amritsar by Khalistani 
terrorists in the early 1990s were resolved swiftly after the 
planes were immobilized on orders from the Punjab police. 
 
¶3.  (U) The authority to order National Security Guard (NSG) 
commandos to storm a grounded plane rests with the Cabinet 
Committee on Security (CCS).  However, as a standing order, 
the commandos would be assembled within two hours of a 
determination of hijacking and would accompany the GOI 
negotiating team to the site. 
 
IAF Can Shoot Down Suspect Planes 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (U) A plane's pilot is responsible for keeping to a 
designated flight path, responding to orders from air traffic 
controllers (ATC) and IAF communications, maintaining the 
plane's transponder, and avoiding "erratic behavior" near 
high value targets such as "strategic buildings, thickly 
populated areas, and nuclear installations."  The policy sets 
forth the following plan of action: 
 
-- Doubtful aircraft: A plane that deviates from its course, 
does not respond to the ATC, and has a non-responsive 
transponder.  The ATC informs the IAF Joint Control and 
Analysis Center (JCAC) while trying to contact the pilot. 
-- Rogue aircraft: A doubtful aircraft that ignores repeated 
ATC directions, turns off its transponder, and refuses to 
answer radio calls.  (Note: Pilots are required to have 
secondary communications, such as satellite phones, as 
back-up to their on-board communications.  End Note.)  The 
JCAC alerts the IAF operations wing, which decides whether to 
scramble fighters to escort the plane.  The ATC notifies the 
Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijack (COSAH), which 
convenes under the Director General of Civil Aviation and 
acts as the crisis management group under the CCS. 
 
-- Threat aircraft: A rogue aircraft that continues to ignore 
ATC directions and those of IAF pilots, and whose flight path 
appears in line with a high value target.  IAF HQ determines 
if a plane is a threat aircraft. 
 
¶5.  (U) The fighter escorts for any hijacked plane are 
directed to force it to land at the nearest airport. 
However, a plane must be designated as a threat aircraft 
before the CCS can order the IAF to shoot it down.  If the a 
decision is required before the CCS can convene, the PM, 
Defense Minister, or Home Minister can issue the order.  For 
hijackings during take-off or landing -- when the window for 
reaction is particularly small -- senior IAF officers are 
authorized to give the shoot-down order. 
 
Different Rules for Foreign Aircraft 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (U) The new policy makes some concessions for foreign 
aircraft: 
 
-- The IAF is directed to prevent a hijacked foreign plane 
from entering Indian airspace or landing at an Indian 
airport, except in "unavoidable circumstances" such as it 
running low on fuel. 
 
-- The GOI will coordinate with the appropriate country on 
how to proceed if a hijacked foreign plane is grounded. 
Airport personnel are not automatically empowered to 
immobilize foreign planes. 
 
Limits for Negotiators 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.  (U) Negotiators now have a limit on what they are 
empowered to offer hijackers.  The new policy permits 
negotiators to talk to hijackers to prevent loss of life and 
to end the hijacking incident, but they are not empowered to 
accede to their demands, including for the release of 
terrorists.  The 1999 IC-814 hijacking ended with the release 
from Indian jails of three terrorists, including 
Jaish-e-Mohammad founder Masood Azhar and Omar Saeed Sheikh, 
who was later convicted of murdering Daniel Pearl. 
Muted Opposition by Tarnished BJP 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) The most vocal political opposition -- on procedure, 
not policy -- to the announcement was senior BJP leader 
Jaswant Singh, who grumbled that the PM should have consulted 
Parliament before the public announcement.  In recent months, 
the UPA government has used IC-814 as a cudgel whenever the 
BJP has criticized its own counter-terrorism policies for 
being too soft on Musharraf. 
 
No-Fly Zones Proposed for "Sensitive Venues" 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (U) A committee of security experts from the Home 
Ministry and the state of Uttar Pradesh, responding to the 
July 5 terrorist attack on the controversial Ayodhya shrine 
(Ref A), recommended that the MHA create no-fly zones around 
four historic/religious sites.  These sites include the Taj 
Mahal, the Ram Temple/Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, and Hindu 
shrines in Mathura and Varanasi.  The MHA has not yet 
announced a decision on this recommendation. 
 
A Year in the Making 
-------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The GOI announced last fall that it was considering 
a new policy to deal with hostage situations, in response to 
the kidnapping of three Indian truck drivers in Iraq in 
summer 2004 (Ref B).  This policy appears to be a subset of 
that effort.  Our counterparts in the British High Commission 
tell us that their CT dialogue with New Delhi last year 
included discussions on London's hostage-taking policy. 
Nevertheless, the new policy came a full six years after 
Kandahar. 
 
Some Operational Issues Unclear 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) A number of operational details have not yet been 
announced that will require coordination through the many 
parts of the Indian bureaucracy that have slices of this pie. 
 We still seek from the bureaucracy: 
 
-- More specifics on how the GOI will accommodate foreign 
aircraft, including if a foreign plane is hijacked while in 
Indian airspace. 
 
-- What additional equipment or training Indian entities will 
require, and if there are opportunities for USG and American 
firms. 
 
-- How first responders will prioritize between timeliness 
and seniority in trying to contact senior officials. 
 
Comment: Now to Live Up to the Policy 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) The Indian press covered the policy's roll-out with 
sufficient fanfare to attract the attention of terrorist 
groups who would enjoy nothing better than to test the GOI to 
see if it has the resolve to stick to its no concessions 
line.  The increase in air traffic between the US and India 
since the new Open Skies agreement, including upcoming 
non-stop flights, as well as the political closeness between 
Washington and New Delhi in the minds of many South Asian 
terrorists and the large community of Indian-Americans, 
increases the possibility that a future Indian hijacking may 
include American hostages.  If we have views on the GOI's new 
policy, the time to comment (in private) is now.  End Comment. 
 
¶13.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http//www.state.sgov/p/sa/newdelhi) 
MULFORD