This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 006414 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV MOPS PBTS ECON IN BD PK SA
SUBJECT: MEA UNSURPRISED BUT ANXIOUS IN REACTION TO BANGLA 
BOMBINGS 
 
REF: A. DHAKA 4090 
 
     ¶B. NEW DELHI 6340 
     ¶C. CHENNAI 1976 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: The MEA told us that the few indicators so 
far available point to the Jamaat ul-Mujahidin Bangladesh as 
author of the August 17 bombing wave.  The MEA further 
theorized that the terrorists' goal was to demonstrate 
organization and sophistication.  Delhi views Bangladesh's 
terrorism problem as symptomatic of its tolerance of 
extremists and is concerned about increasing evidence of 
international linkages.  The MEA's archly-worded public 
statement on the attacks -- in a week that also saw the 
assassination of Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister -- demonstrates 
GOI concern about the way Bangladesh is going.  End Summary. 
 
MEA: Bangla Suffering Blowback from Riding Tiger 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2.  (C) In an August 18 meeting with Poloff, MEA Deputy 
Secretary (Bangladesh) Puneet Kundal stressed it was too soon 
 
SIPDIS 
to tell who was behind the August 17 wave of bombings across 
Bangladesh (Ref A), but opined that Jamaat ul-Mujahidin 
Bangladesh seemed to be the leading culprit, largely by dint 
of their leaflets left behind at bomb sites.  Separately, 
Ashutosh Misra of the Institute for Defense Studies and 
Analysis -- MoD's think-tank -- echoed Kundal's theory, 
remarking that, "as with Pakistan, and with India as regards 
Sri Lanka, Dhaka is learning that when you ride the tiger, 
eventually it turns around and bites you." 
 
An Attention-Grabber -- And It Worked 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) When asked why the bombs were dispersed so broadly, 
MEA's Kundal theorized that the attack was intended to 
demonstrate how well organized and equipped the terrorists 
were.  "They could just as easily have made ten bombs, added 
shrapnel, and caused many more injuries and deaths if they 
had wanted to," he commented.  "Their intent was to maximize 
damage and their image, not casualties, it could have been 
much worse" Kundal concluded. 
 
¶4.  (C) Kundal argued that the most notable elements of this 
attack were its geographic breadth ("every district except 
one was bombed"), the tight timing (all blasts "within a 
30-minute window"), and the very limited number of fatalities 
(only two as of late August 18, according to Indian press 
reports).  "We were surprised at the size and coordination, 
we did not think any Bangladeshi group was this 
sophisticated," he added.  "They have certainly got our 
attention as well." 
 
The New Afghanistan (or Pakistan) 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) D/Polcouns attended an August 17 MEA-hosted lunch 
when word of the blasts spread.  The initial reaction around 
the table was that Dhaka's tolerance of "India-haters" was 
coming back to haunt them, and that Bangladesh was headed in 
the direction of Taliban-era Afghanistan.  The next day, 
D/Polcouns heard from MEA Americas Deputy Secretary Santosh 
Jha that India worried about Pakistani efforts to use 
Bangladesh as a launching platform for insurgency and 
instability in eastern India.  Bangladesh's "inexplicable" 
attitude of resentment and hostility to India had resulted in 
active cooperation between the ISI and Bangladeshi jihadis, 
but the bombings made it clear that Dhaka was losing control, 
just as happened in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
 
¶6.  (C) Kundal elaborated the MEA's view that terrorism 
problems in Bangladesh are symptomatic of the country's poor 
governance.  He recalled prior USG characterization of 
Bangladesh as "a flailing state, not a failing state," and 
offered his own assessment that "Bangladesh is on the same 
trajectory as Pakistan ... first the government radicalizes 
elements of the population, this leads to repression of 
minorities -- Hindus and Ahmediyyas -- falling education 
standards, civil unrest, a deterioration of democracy, and 
eventually religious extremists and the military vie for 
power in the vacuum of failing democracy." 
 
GOI Says Evidence in Plain Sight 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) After offering that this attack would be an 
opportunity to invigorate deeper information sharing under 
the umbrella of the CT Joint Working Group, Kundal demurred. 
"You can get all the information from the Awami League's 
website, there are numerous articles about these groups, 
including their cross-border activities and (Pakistani) ISI 
support," he answered.  To Poloff's comment that the USG 
takes great interest in regional terrorist groups, especially 
those with international connections, Kundal immediately 
pointed to suspected Saudi funding behind Bangladeshi 
madrassahs.  He underlined his suspicion by noting that the 
leaflets found at many of the bomb sites "were in Bangla and 
Arabic, not Urdu, and Arabic is not even a South Asian 
language."  In closing, Kundal dismissed the notion that 
Dhaka would take any tangible steps, lamenting that, "I have 
had this job for two years, and I have not seen any major 
arrests, only very low-level people, never any planners or 
organizers." 
 
Archly-Worded MEA Statement 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Poloff also shared with Kundal the Department's press 
statement regarding the Bangladesh bombings.  The MEA's 
(August 17) public statement, by comparison, was sterile, 
merely noting that "the scale and coordination of these 
explosions raises a number of questions," offering 
condolences to the victims, and reporting on the safety of 
Indian nationals in country.  This marked a departure from 
the strong language used to denounce the assassination of Sri 
Lanka's Foreign Minister (Ref B), and reflects the MEA's 
deepening sense of impatience with Bangladesh, and the belief 
(in contrast to Sri Lanka) that Dhaka's problems are 
self-inflicted. 
 
Comment: We Warned You 
---------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) For a change, Indian railing against Pakistan-based 
terrorism is taking a back seat to other brands of regional 
political violence.  The major attacks in Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh, along with the Naxal terrorism in Andhra Pradesh 
(Ref C), have largely overshadowed the Prime Minister's 
Independence Day warning to Islamabad and Indian 
Parliamentary questions on Pakistan-based terrorist 
infiltration and infrastructure (Septel).  The MEA views of 
the August 17 bombings has a strong element of "I told you 
so," but at least so far this has not derailed the GOI's 
intention to use the PM's upcoming visit to Dhaka for the 
SAARC Summit to begin putting bilateral relations back on a 
more stable trajectory.  The US and India have a common 
interest in helping Bangladesh to extinguish this radical 
Islamist spark, and we should work together closely in 
managing the aftermath of August 17. 
MULFORD