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Viewing cable 05NEWDELHI6150, DELHI ON WARY TACK WITH ISLAMABAD, MULLING TALKS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05NEWDELHI6150 2005-08-08 15:06 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy New Delhi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 006150 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS ECON PTER KDEM KISL MOPS PK IN INDO PAK
SUBJECT: DELHI ON WARY TACK WITH ISLAMABAD, MULLING TALKS 
WITH KASHMIRIS 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 5925 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Despite mounting political concern about 
increased infiltration across the Line of Control (LOC), and 
BJP sniping over the UPA government's failure to hold 
Pakistan accountable for terrorism in India, the GOI's top 
leadership has remained committed to forward progress in the 
Indo-Pak peace process.  This is evident, for instance, in 
the GOI's positive spin of the modest progress in the August 
6 talks in Delhi on nuclear confidence building.  That said, 
our contacts say the GOI harbors no illusions about its 
neighbor, and the security services in India are pushing 
Manmohan Singh to consider "unconventional" methods to remind 
Pakistan that India is not "fooled."  In a recent media 
interview, NSA Narayanan went public with his warning that 
dialogue with Pakistan "would evaporate" in the event of a 
major terrorist strike, and DefMin Mukherjee told Parliament 
terrorists remained ready for infiltration from camps across 
the LOC.  A glimmer of hope has emerged, however, on the 
Delhi-Srinagar axis, with some here saying the GOI has begun 
to consider the possibility of starting talks with the 
Hurriyat and others in Kashmir.  However, local hawks 
question even that strategy, saying the Hurriyat are not 
worthy of Delhi's respect or engagement. Cooler heads are 
prevailing for now, but in India's democratic system, popular 
perceptions of Pakistani performance on terrorism will impact 
significantly the PM's room to maneuver.  END SUMMARY. 
 
TERRORIST SURGE SPIKES REDEPLOYMENT PLAN 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Conversations with a variety of Delhi-based Pakistan 
observers suggest a consensus that, while the GOI is still on 
the rapprochement track, it is finding itself under 
increasing pressure.  Ayodhya and recent terrorism in 
Srinagar have complicated its stance, as has the rising tide 
of infiltration.  Two weeks ago, after a spike in incursions 
in the Gurez sector, Army chief of staff JJ Singh poured 
water on press reports that the Pakistani government was 
responsible.  On August 5, however, the senior Army corps 
commander in the Kashmir valley, SS Dhillon, told the BBC 
that Pakistan was failing to honor its commitments to stop 
infiltrations.  Referring to the increase in infiltrations 
and terrorism, Defense Minister Mukherjee told Parliament 
August 3 that "recent reports indicate a large number of 
launching camps along the LOC have been activated where 
militants have been kept in readiness for infiltration." 
A.K. Suri, Director General of the 70,000-strong Railway 
Protection Service and former head of the J&K police, told us 
this summer's violence has caused a huge setback.  If 
Pakistan had "behaved moderately" India would have removed a 
regular Army division from Kashmir.  Instead, the GOI will 
add more Rashtriya Rifles battalions.  N.N. Vohra, the Home 
Ministry's titular point-man for talks with the Hurriyat, 
echoed Puri, saying that the rise in terror had delayed -- if 
not ended for now -- government plans to withdraw troops from 
the Valley and reduce remaining troops' daily contact with 
civilians. These sentiments reflect a shift in Indian 
thinking that is starting to solidify, and could harden. 
 
NARAYANAN: DON'T CROSS THRESHOLD; DIALOGUE COULD COLLAPSE 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
3. (C) Even NSA Narayanan is getting into the act, saying 
publicly what he has only said privately before.  In an early 
August India Today interview, Narayanan said terrorism 
against India had increased its "quality" and 
"sophistication" and that religious targets and commercial 
centers were vulnerable, including the RSS headquarters and 
Infosys offices in Bangalore.  Narayanan clarified that, "I 
am not blaming all this on Pakistan, but you cannot run an 
operation of this scale without ISI backing.  Definitely the 
attack in Ayodhya where the LeT was involved was; Lashkar is 
a creature of the ISI."  To answer critics of the 
government's approach, Narayanan added that, "a soft answer 
turneth the wrath away," but added that the PM had mentioned 
cross-border terror in his July 29 phone call with President 
Musharraf.  Narayanan concluded by saying, "We have warned 
Pakistan there are certain thresholds and if they are crossed 
the entire thing collapses.  President Musharraf has invested 
very heavily in this dialogue.  He is worried if it collapses 
as a result of something of this kind then he does not have a 
leg to stand on internationally and here.  The PM is using 
this card...if an incident like Ayodhya had turned out 
otherwise, all dialogue with Pakistan would have evaporated." 
 
 
PUTTING A BRAVE FACE ON THINGS 
------------------------------ 
 
4. (C) However, our interlocutors -- including Vohra -- told 
us that the PM and Sonia Gandhi recognize that Indo-Pak 
rapprochement is good for India, good for the economy, good 
for votes, and generally supported.  Former High Commissioner 
to Islamabad G. Parthasarathy, an informed member of FM 
Natwar Singh's kitchen cabinet, said the PM and Sonia 
recognize they have no choice but to move forward.  Yousef 
Tarigami, an influential J&K MLA who meets regularly with the 
PM and Sonia, agreed that the current UPA leadership has to 
resist pressure from security hawks at the bureaucratic 
level, and that he continued to urge them to move forward 
with dialogue on the Srinagar-Delhi axis as well as 
Delhi-Islamabad.  Recognizing that publics on both sides want 
peace more than confrontation, confidence building measures 
continue apace, missile test pre-notification talks took 
place August 5 and 6, new road openings are mulled, the 
overall atmosphere of statements at the senior level remains 
upbeat, Musharraf-Singh phone calls take place, the UNGA 
summit meeting between the two leaders is on track, and 
people-to-people efforts are expanding.  At the same time, 
the security agencies are increasingly fed-up with what they 
perceive as a growing gap between President Musharraf's 
rhetoric post-London and the reality of what they see on the 
ground.  The skeptical voices are increasingly hard for the 
government to ignore, and Parthasarathy warned us another 
terrorist strike could put real pressure on the PM to take 
"unconventional" measures to remind Pakistan of its 
commitments. Vohra and Suri echoed this frustration within 
the intelligence services.  Parthasarathy commented that, 
with India, "Musharraf has seen that he can talk peace while 
bleeding us at the same time."  Nevertheless, he insisted 
that "the tolerance threshold in India is very large, unless 
something big happens." 
 
CHOPPY POLITICAL WATERS 
----------------------- 
 
5. (C) The BJP is also questioning the PM's attitude toward 
Pakistan. Former BJP FM Yashwant Sinha published an article 
in the Hindustan Times in which he asked why the government 
was continuing to engage with Pakistan despite mounting 
evidence that terrorism continued.  Parthasarathy argued 
Vajpayee had to have been behind the article.  Surprisingly, 
he also said the PM's statement that terrorism would not 
impact the peace process were unhelpful because "they give 
Pakistan more leeway.  US support for Pakistan has given the 
military there the sense that they do not need to compromise 
on strategic issues," Parthasarthy explained.  The BJP took 
this up in an July 23 statement in which they attacked the 
government's "confused" response and "ambivalent approach "to 
cross-border terrorism, and even cited Defense Minister 
Mukherjee's own statements about the continued existence of 
terrorist training camps across the border.  The BJP 
complained that the "complete lack of coordination, total 
confusion, and lack of direction" on terrorism was 
"destructive of national will (sic)," and urged the UPA at 
"the very minimum" to insist Pakistan act against the 
infrastructure of terrorism.  The BJP also harped on the 
government's response to the Ayodhya attack.  N.N. Vohra 
explained that the up-tick in terrorism had indeed slowed the 
government's desired pace of implementation of 
confidence-building measures largely because India was a 
democracy and the political opposition had expressed its 
outrage at the continued assault against India.  Vohra added 
the PM and Sonia had no choice but to recognize the political 
climate domestically in determining how fast to move ahead 
with Pakistan. 
 
GENERAL DESIRE FOR PEACE (WITHOUT DAILY DIET OF TERROR) 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
6. (C) Saeed Naqvi, a senior Muslim journalist, maintains 
that the "mainstream thinks that bilateral moves should be 
given momentum" and that India "must carry on regardless." 
The CBMs and increased interaction of the last year has 
created constituencies in Pakistan and India, he insisted, 
that support peace.  The LOC ceasefire between the militaries 
is holding, he said, but Naqvi was unsure whether Musharraf 
could control the terrorism in Kashmir.  He added that if the 
peace progress is terminated, there will be no route for 
Pakistani moderates.  Instead, extremists will have more room 
to function, which would lead to a "dangerous militant 
state."  Naqvi claimed that Manmohan Singh more or less 
trusts Musharraf, and both he and Sonia sincerely want peace. 
 The BJP, seeking ammunition, charges the PM with being soft 
on terrorism, but "peace with Pakistan has a wider 
endorsement in society." If the Congress could make progress 
with Pakistan, Naqvi argued that would overcome the recent 
hub-bub about relations with the US.  Sonia and the PM have 
their heart in the right place, but also know that Congress 
needs a deal with Pakistan to help them electorally in 2009. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF A SHIFT TOWARD DIALOGUE WITH KASHMIRIS? 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
7. (C) Interestingly, Saifuddin Soz, a Congress MP tapped by 
the PM to talk to the Hurriyat, said Delhi has decided to 
send feelers to the Hurriyat and others in Kashmir to see if 
talks could start.  He stressed that Delhi has set no 
political parameters and had not developed internal 
strategies.  All the PM wants is to see if the Hurriyat would 
come to Delhi so he can test their seriousness.  We confirmed 
with a Hurriyat member in Srinagar that Soz had indeed made 
an initial approach, and that the Hurriyat was considering 
how to respond.  A Kashmiri lawyer close to the Hurriyat, 
Ashok Bhan, also confirmed that there is some initial signs 
of movement in the Delhi-Srinagar dynamic. N.N. Vohra, who 
has been idle lately as talks between Delhi and the Hurriyat 
flagged, met the PM on August 5, although we hear from some 
that the PM did not convoke him; rather, he asked the PM for 
a meeting to find out if he was to be relevant again.  He 
told us August 8 that there were some signs that Delhi might 
again talk to the political tendencies in Kashmir, especially 
once the Monsoon session of Parliament ends on August 25, but 
the security climate was bad and the PM faced political 
pressure from the BJP and his own security hawks.  Vohra also 
made the point that India, as a democracy, had a hard time 
engaging with Hurriyat leaders who had never been elected to 
anything.  Nonetheless, he said, the will was there to talk 
to them. 
 
8. (C) In the midst of this interesting hubbub, police 
officer AK Suri (protect) told us that many in the RAW, IB, 
and police are pressuring the PM and his advisors not to 
engage the Hurriyat since, in their view, they are 
increasingly marginalized and politically unnecessary to 
Delhi's interests.  Our contacts lamented what one called the 
PM's "structural flaw" in that he doesn't have a "Kashmir 
guy."  NSA Narayanan, said one, is "a suspicious cop" and 
"has no vision."  TK Nair is a "low-key Principal Secretary" 
and media adviser Sanjay Baru is only excited about 
economics.  All the PMO staff are bureaucrats, they said; 
none are politicians with vision.  To prevent the bureaucracy 
from springing back to its anti-Pakistan modus operandi, said 
one contact, the PM must constantly express his political 
will.  Tarigami, too, insisted that status quo in Kashmir is 
not the answer, that mounting impatience in Delhi was fueling 
hard-line Hurriyat leader Geelani's increasing influence, but 
that the mood in the Valley still firmly backed peace 
(reftel).  Tarigami said he is urging the government to start 
any kind of dialogue right away, but the nature of coalition 
government hinders the PM's ability to act decisively. 
 
PAYBACK IN THE PUNJAB? 
---------------------- 
 
9. (C) Naqvi told us that "trust begets trust" and Musharraf 
has lost credibility over the last few weeks, as the 
terrorist incidents in Ayodhya, London and Egypt have led to 
doubt's about Musharraf's commitment to cracking down on 
terrorism.  Yet, he has kept terrorist activity in reserve to 
use as a bargaining chip against India.  Since Musharraf 
knows he is being watched in Kashmir, and that violence as a 
political weapon has lost its effectiveness there, Naqvi 
speculated that Islamabad may be "turning it up in the Punjab 
through Sikh terrorism."  Vohra, too, said Pakistan harbors 
Khalistani terrorists in Lahore and other areas with 
important Gurudwaras, and that there had been some rise in 
"mischief" in Indian Punjab, but he said the politics there 
are different from the 1990s.  Interestingly, one also does 
not find this same level of concern about terrorism in Punjab 
itself (septel). 
 
COMMENT: THE PM IS FEELING THE PRESSURE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) COMMENT:  Despite the GOI's positive spin on recent 
composite dialogue talks, the political vibe in Delhi is 
increasingly gloomy as people become convinced Pakistan is 
reverting to its old ways.  While there is a glimmer of light 
in the internal Kashmir dialogue, even that process is only 
just beginning and could be extinguished by additional acts 
of terror.  The PM is committed to rapprochement with 
Pakistan, but doubt is seeping into the Delhi consciousness, 
and the security establishment, especially if another big 
attack occurs, could play a spoiler role.  The barometer of 
the relationship is terrorism, and so far, this has been a 
long, hot summer for India.  If the public mood sours, the PM 
will, in democratic fashion, have to bow to their will. END 
COMMENT. 
BLAKE