This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 006011 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MNUC MASS KNNP ENRG EPET KDEM NSSP
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON US-INDO NUCLEAR DEAL 
 
REFLECTS PARTIES' VISIONS OF INDIA'S FUTURE 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 5879 
     ¶B. NEW DELHI 5815 
     ¶C. NEW DELHI 5616 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: The much-anticipated Lok Sabha debate on PM 
Singh's visit to Washington and his July 28 statement in 
Parliament (Ref A) contained few surprises: the BJP called 
for a national debate and nit-picked over technicalities of 
the agreement while the Communist parties decried the 
Congress shift away from a non-aligned foreign policy.  The 
BJP's criticism, led by a statement from former PM Vajpayee, 
could not hide the bitterness in the party that Congress 
achieved a nuclear victory that rode on their own progress 
with the US over the past five years.  Emphasizing the need 
for an independent foreign, military and nuclear policy, the 
Left Front criticized the Congress for making India a "junior 
partner" of the US.  These arguments are both expected and 
manageable, and demonstrate how the Communists stubbornly 
cling to an outdated past while the BJP and Congress are 
working for a closer relationship with the US.  Lurking 
behind this debate is a broader Indian public concern that 
despite all the progress in US-India relations, the GOI 
cannot trust the Americans.  End Summary. 
 
BJP: (IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN US) BUT OUR DUTY IS TO OPPOSE 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶2.  (U) The thrice-delayed Lok Sabha on the PM's July 28 
speech debate began with a statement from BJP former PM 
Vajpayee, who called for a national debate to achieve 
consensus on US-Indo nuclear cooperation and questioned 
whether the deal was in India's best interest.  His first 
complaint was that the Congress government should have taken 
the Parliament into confidence on the matter before making 
any commitments.  In line with his earlier statements, he 
also questioned whether India should separate its civilian 
and military facilities, charging that it would be too costly 
and difficult a task and could harm India's security.  Third, 
Vajpayee worried that India made significant commitments that 
could stifle its nuclear program without extracting any 
guarantees from the United States.  He asked the Congress 
government to clarify whether any "indirect conditionalities" 
had been imposed on India for the deal, and worried that 
inspections could limit production of nuclear materials. 
 
COMMUNISTS: FROM NAM LEADER TO US FLUNKY 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) Continuing the argument they made after Defense 
Minister Mukherjee's US visit (Ref B), the Left Front 
assailed Congress for deviating from Jawaharlal Nehru's 
vision of non-alignment as the foundation of Indian foreign 
policy.  In an impassioned speech, CPI leader Pramodh Panda 
questioned whether the US and India had any common interests, 
given the disagreements over the invasion in Iraq, gas from 
Myanmar and Iran, support for Pakistan and India's bid for a 
UNSC seat.  Ideologically opposed to American foreign policy, 
he said that India was becoming a "junior partner" of a 
country that "by fighting terrorism, was actually creating 
it, and in the name of spreading democracy, was actually 
destroying it."  Protecting India's interests, according to 
the Left, requires maintaining an independent foreign and 
nuclear policy, which PM Singh sacrificed in Washington.  In 
a surprising and bizarre argument, Panda also attacked the 
agricultural agreement for imposing an American corporate 
agenda which will "destroy the Indian farmer" and lead to 
terrorism, as demonstrated, he claimed, by the terrorism 
explosion in the Punjab after the first US-sponsored green 
revolution.  Comment: Huh? End Comment. 
 
CONGRESS:  ON OUR OWN TERMS AND IN OUR BEST INTERESTS 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶4.  (U) In response to these accusations, Congress MP Pawan 
Bansal defended the Prime Minister and the joint statement as 
the best way forward for India's foreign policy and domestic 
development.  He allayed BJP concerns and echoed the PM by 
clarifying that the GOI would undertake all commitments on a 
reciprocal basis and emphasizing that it was India's 
prerogative to decide which facilities would be set aside for 
military use.  In a dynamic world, Bansal argued that nuclear 
technology was a priority and India should take advantage of 
a changed attitude in the US for its own energy development. 
Calling it "the best agreement for India's future," he 
criticized the Left Front for being stuck in the past.  Even 
Samajwadi Party MP Rup Chand Pal defended closer cooperation 
with the US, saying that the non-aligned movement was 
irrelevant in today's world.  Both the Congress and Left 
parties questioned whether taking Parliament into confidence 
was feasible, and cited examples of the BJP's "secret deals" 
during their term in power. 
 
¶5.  (U) On August 2, Defense Minister Mukherjee also made a 
statement in the Lok Sabha clarifying the "New Framework for 
the US-India Defense Relationship," the text of which is 
copied below in paragraph 7.  Several Communist leaders took 
the opportunity to criticize closer defense cooperation, 
charging that the US is eyeing another market for its 
military hardware and hoping to "use India against China." 
 
COMMENT: NOTHING NEW TO SOUR PUBLIC OPINION 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Watching this debate unfold, Poloff found the mood 
generally sedate, with many spectators dozing off and none of 
the fisticuffs that are common in the Indian Parliament.  The 
most vociferous arguments ironically came from the ostensible 
coalition partner Communists, who oppose the joint statement 
as a manifestation of closer relations with the US, even 
though they generally support many of achievements of the 
PM's visit.  The BJP's hands are tied, since nuclear 
cooperation through the NSSP was its own brainchild, as a 
result, it limited questioning to whether India got the best 
deal.  The press has pointed out that former NSA Mishra 
previously proposed a similar nuclear deal to the US during 
BJP rule (Ref C), thus their arguments are largely viewed as 
politically motivated, with sour grapes mixed in.  Throughout 
the debate, US support for Pakistan and opposition to the 
Iran pipeline and India's UNSC campaign came up again and 
again, and served to demonstrate where our interests diverge. 
 Nevertheless, the Congress party and the scientific 
community are addressing the BJP's nuclear questions, and 
elite opinion is quickly moving ahead of the Communists' 
archaic foreign policy views.  A deeper problem, which came 
out strongly during PolCouns' recent visit to West Bengal, is 
the belief among many Indians that despite much progress in 
bilateral relations, the US is not to be trusted.  Turning 
around this grassroots skepticism will be easier as we 
proceed with implementation of the July 18 framework, and 
will be facilitated by the favorable turn of elite opinion. 
For now, the hub-bub in Parliament appears manageable.  End 
Comment. 
 
FULL TEXT OF MUKHERJEE'S STATEMENT 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (U) Begin GOI text: 
 
¶A.  I made an official visit to the United States of American 
(USA) recently at the end of June 2005 at the invitation of 
the US Secretary of Defense.  The visit provided an 
opportunity for an exchange of views with the US leadership 
on international security issues and to promote cooperation 
with the US to strengthen and modernize our armed forces and 
our defense industries through increased professional 
interaction in the military sphere and collaboration in the 
sphere of defense equipment and technology in the mutual 
interest of both countries.  A document entitled "New 
Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship" was signed 
during the visit.  The 'Framework' contains only enabling 
provisions.  It does not contain any commitments or 
obligations. 
 
¶B.  The 'Framework' updates the 'Agreed Minutes on Defense 
Relations between India and the United States' signed in 
January 1995  It identifies global security threats that have 
seriously affected our security, such as terrorism and 
violent religious extremism, and the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials, data and 
technologies as areas of shared concern, and provides for 
cooperation with the US to enhance our capabilities in 
responding to these and prospects of cooperation in advanced 
and sensitive technologies and other challenges like natural 
disasters.  It reflects our interest in the security of the 
sea-lanes and regional and global security and stability.  It 
establishes a new Defense Procurement and Production Group 
under the existing Defense Policy Group to promote a defense 
trade, production and technology relationship with the US. 
It also provides for a dialogue on internal security issues, 
and cooperation with the international community to promote 
regional and global stability through cooperative actions in 
the mutual interest. 
 
¶C.  The visit builds on ongoing efforts to expand cooperation 
with the US in the field of high technology by opening up the 
US as a potential source of advanced defense equipment and 
technology, increasing our options and leverage vis-a-vis 
suppliers in the acquisition of defense technology, promoting 
cooperation with the US to enhance the capabilities of 
India's Armed forces and defense industries, and increasing 
our strategic maneuverability in international affairs. 
 
¶D.  The 'Framework' document should be seen in this context. 
Concerns expressed in Parliament and in the press on the 
implications of the document have included apprehensions that 
it commits India to deploying troops in support of US-led 
coalition operations in Iraq and possibly elsewhere; that it 
adopts vocabulary and language, and therefore the world view 
of the United States and that it promotes US security 
interests and not ours, and therefore compromises our 
security.  None of these apprehensions are justified.  The 
document, more than anything else, signals US willingness to 
enhance defense cooperation with India and strengthen our 
defense capabilities.  It is in our interest to see how we 
can exploit this change of attitude to our advantage.  It is 
an enabling document that provides a framework within which 
specific cooperation can take place.  It is up to us how we 
develop this.  This will not be dictated to us.  It will be 
decided by mutual agreement. 
 
¶E.  The presumption that "shared" interests involving the US 
must necessarily mean primacy to US interests, reflects a 
lack of self-confidence in ourselves.  As a trustee of the 
legacy of independence, secularism, non-alignment and 
autonomy and independence on our domestic and foreign 
policies, we have the self-confidence that will be able to 
recognize and resist anything that is not in our national 
interest, not confuse US interests with ours, or subordinate 
our interests to US interests. 
BLAKE