This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2097
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
DARFUR COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USLO TRIPOLI 
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L  NDJAMENA 001214 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, H, INR, INR/GGI, 
PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS 
FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, 
ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF CD SU
SUBJECT: OUTREACH TO DARFUR REBEL MOVEMENTS 
 
REF: STATE 137022 
 
Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  SuQ Liberation Movement (SLM) members 
say that they will not be ready to return to the negotiating 
table on August 24.  Special Representative to the Darfur 
Talks Ambassador John Yates, Ambassador Wall, and P/E officer 
delivered points per reftel to the SLM leaders on July 29 and 
in subsequent daily contacts.  SLM's divisions remain 
unresolved and now they have been "summoned" by the field 
commanders for a conference in Darfur prior to returning to 
Abuja.  SLM General Secretary Mini Minawi departed Libya for 
the field to prepare for a meeting.  SLM members believe that 
a delay of the re-start of Abuja by approximately two weeks 
may be enough time for them to hold the meeting and prepare 
for the talks. End Summary. 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  On July 29, Ambassador Wall, visiting Special 
Representative to the Darfur Peace Talks John Yates, and P/E 
officer met with Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) members 
returned from Tripoli on July 28.  The group included SLM's 
chief negotiator and head of delegation Abduljabar Dosa, 
Bahar Arabi, Trayo Ali Ahmed, Mohammed Harin, Magzoub 
Hussein, and several others.  SLM leaders remained in Abuja 
and met for three days after the signing of the Declaration 
of Principles (DOP) and the traveled to Tripoli for two 
weeks. 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
TRIPOLI AND ABUJA 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Ambassador Yates asked the SLM members about their 
time in Tripoli and sought their views on Libyan intentions. 
Bahar said that the Libyans provided a hotel and meeting 
facilities for both SLM and the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM).  The Libyans arranged for SLM and JEM to sign an 
agreement to cease hostilities between the two groups.  Some 
SLM members felt it necessary to go to Tripoli to keep an eye 
on their Chairman Abdelwahid Nur and JEM President Khalil 
Ibrahim.  While in Tripoli, the SLM held internal meetings 
and discussed options for resolving its leadership dilemma 
prior to the next round of Abuja talks.  However, SLM members 
do not view Libyan efforts as an alternative to the Abuja 
peace process and told Yates that the SLM remains fully 
committed to the current AU-led talks, despite the AU's 
weaknesses. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)   Yates described his consultations in Addis Ababa 
and plans for the next round of talks, including the AU's 
idea of running concurrent negotiating sessions on power 
sharing, wealth sharing, and security arrangements.  Yates 
asked if SLM would be able to name various negotiators for 
this type of arrangement.  Bahar said that given SLM's 
unresolved divisions, it would be difficult to make it to 
Abuja on August 24 to negotiate and even more difficult to 
split the delegation without a significant amount of 
preparation in advance.  Yates noted that time is running out 
on making preparations.  The SLM members present were 
discouraged by the lack of progress, particularly dealing 
with Abdelwahid, who sat in on at least one meeting and was 
"unhelpful".  Dosa, SLM's chief negotiator, agreed with 
Bahar's pessimism.  Over the weekend of July 30, the SLM 
delegation received a letter from a group of field commanders 
demanding that SLM members convene a meeting in Darfur prior 
to returning to Abuja.  Bahar said that it is critical for 
SLM members to attend.  He told P/E officer that SLM may 
respond to the AU invitation asking for a two-week delay so 
that SLM could hold its meeting.  He also requested that the 
AU give to SLM a clear agenda and experts to work with SLM's 
designated negotiators on the key issues for discussion. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
CHADIAN OUTREACH EFFORTS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C) On July 31, Daoussa Deby hosted the SLM members at 
his home to a day-long luncheon.  General Mahamat Ali, 
Special Advisor to the President for International Relations 
 
Allam-mi Ahmad, and Faki Badradine, a spiritual advisor 
assigned some Darfur tasks, were also present.  Daoussa, Ali, 
and Allam-mi work with the members of SLM on a regular basis. 
 The inclusion of Badradine is an interesting development. 
The rebels describe his relationship with Ali and Daoussa as 
frosty at best.  Badradine has unfettered access to President 
Deby and has arranged previous meetings between Deby and 
rebel movement members.  According to Bahar, the day was 
spent discussing SLM's options for resolving its leadership 
differences and preparing for a meeting with President Idriss 
Deby. 
 
¶6.  (C) On August 1, the SLM members met with the President. 
Deby spoke French, while the rebels spoke Arabic and Daoussa 
translated.  According to Bahar and Trayo, the President said 
that Chad would provide SLM whatever it needed to hold a 
meeting to resolve its differences.  Deby promised its 
members safe passage in and out of Darfur through Chadian 
territory and other logistics assistance as needed.  In 
addition, Deby told the SLM delegation that his invitation to 
Secretary General Mini Minawi remains open and that he would 
 
SIPDIS 
like to see Mini as soon as possible.  He also asked the 
delegation why Mini says he is afraid to travel to Chad. 
Deby assured the delegation that Mini is welcome and that as 
the guest of the President, would have no problems in Chad. 
Bahar told us subsequently that he and others present will 
urge Mini to come.  Bahar expects that Mini will accept this 
latest invitation. 
 
¶7.  (C)  On the subject of Abdelwahid, Deby said that he has 
difficulty understanding the SLM's Chairman, but his 
invitation is also open.  (Note: On previous occasions, 
Chadian officials, including Deby, have described Abdelwahid 
as "unstable".  End Note.) The President also expressed his 
concern about Libyan meddling and asked the SLM why it 
continually travels to Tripoli.  SLM members told Deby that 
the Libyans provided them with a venue to hold consultations 
and often give them transport, but that the SLM does not 
trust Libyan intentions. 
 
- - - - - - - - 
FED UP WITH JEM 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (C) In several meetings with P/E officer, Bahar, Dosa, 
and others said that SLM is highly concerned about Dr. Khalil 
Ibrahim's intentions and JEM's lack of presence on the 
ground.  In Tripoli, Khalil's largesse was more evident than 
ever, according to Trayo.  SLM members confirmed reports of 
Khalil's alleged 50 million USD deal with the Sudanese 
Government and the Libyans.  Khalil allegedly received 6 
million USD already and will get the rest after the final 
peace deal is signed.  As a result of some additional 
"fact-finding" about Abdelwahid's relationship with Khalil, 
the SLM wants the African Union to revisit JEM's presence at 
the negotiating table.  The SLM will likely request a 
verification of forces on the ground to prove that Khalil and 
JEM have no field presence.  Another SLM effort underway 
includes meetings between SLM members and ex-JEM commander 
Mohammed Saleh to persuade him to join his forces with 
theirs.  (Comment: Mohammed Saleh, however, may have other 
plans.  He may sign a deal to bring disgruntled Movement for 
National Reform and Development (MNRD) to his camp.  End 
Comment.) 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
THE VIEW FROM ABDELWAHID 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (C) Abdelwahid Nur, who left Tripoli for Nairobi two 
weeks ago, continues to complain about Libyan meddling 
despite reports that he has also profited financially from 
his relationship with Libya.  He claims that Mini has 
accepted Libyan material support in the form of uniforms and 
vehicles.  In several telephone conversations and other 
communications, Abdelwahid expressed his fear of 
participating in "rigged" leadership discussions.  He says he 
will not go to the field and insists on having a leadership 
conference after the Abuja process is completed.  On Tripoli, 
Abdelwahid claims that Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha 
and Daoussa Deby were both there to consult the Libyans and 
Mini Minawi on the issue.  According to Abdelwahid, the aim 
 
of these consultations was to develop a leadership equation 
for SLM based and weighted on ethnic representation.  He 
claimed that one of the reasons behind this included 
Abdelwahid's relationship with Dr. John Garang.  From 
Abdelwahid's perspective, such a formula would be heavily 
weighted toward the Zaghawa, leaving Fur, Masselit, and Dadjo 
with less representation.  Rather than a field conference, 
Abdelwahid is suggesting a meeting of key leaders in Asmara 
prior to Abuja.  (Comment: Abdelwahid fears being voted out 
at a field conference.  End Comment.) 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
PERSPECTIVES FROM "OTHER" CAMPS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10.  (C) On July 19, another non-Zaghawa SLM leader, Dr. 
Sanusi El Sanusi told P/E officer that he supports holding a 
conference in three months, after the rains stop.  He does 
not believe SLM's differences will be settled by any other 
way and is pessimistic that they can be papered over enough 
to resume in Abuja on August 24.  Sanusi wanted to travel to 
N'Djamena after Tripoli, but claims that the Libyans are 
"holding" him and his delegation of some 40 members because 
they will not accept the deal being offered to them by the 
GOS through the Libyans.  (Note: The Libyan Government is 
dragging its feet on preparations for the SLM members' 
departure.  End Note.) 
 
¶11.  (C) On another Zaghawa front, SLM members Adam Shogar 
and Sharif Harir have been on the Chadian-Sudanese border 
near Bahai.  The SLM leadership and the Chadian Government 
have contacted them to come to N'Djamena.  They reportedly 
have a great deal of cash and are recruiting intellectuals, 
traditional leaders, and some fighters.  They intended to go 
into Darfur to garner support in advance of an all-SLM 
conference.  Having run into difficulty in the form of Mini 
Minawi's commanders, they have moved between Tine and Bahai 
for the past month.  JEM members and some SLM members have 
expressed concern for their safety and fear that there could 
be a clash between them and Mini's commanders in coming 
weeks.  Mini's camp's suspicions that Shogar and Harir's 
moves are an attempted leadership grab are likely correct. 
Harir told P/E officer prior to his departure on June 26 that 
his intention was to build support among Zaghawa disaffected 
with Mini to participate in SLM's leadership structure. 
However, humanitarian workers report various sightings of the 
group.  Shogar and Harir appear to be recruiting soldiers and 
Harir has been seen in a military uniform.  P/E officer is in 
regular contact with both Shogar and Harir and has urged them 
not to undertake any military actions.  Mini's camp is 
willing to accept Shogar and Harir back into the fold if they 
return to N'Djamena, according to Bahar. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶12.  (C)  It is clear that many SLM representatives believe 
they will not be ready to return to the negotiating table on 
August 24.  The momentum is building for the SLM to gather in 
Darfur to settle their leadership issues.  We expect that SLM 
will request a delay in the re-start of the talks. 
 
¶13.  (U)  Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
WALL 
 
 
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