This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 003677 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARPI, LONDON FOR TSAU, PARIS FOR ZEYA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2025 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KU PDEM
SUBJECT: REVIVED AL-SABAH DEBATE OVER SUCCESSION; 
LEADERSHIP CHANGE RUMORED TO BE POSSIBLE BY END OF YEAR 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 3669 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 3580 
     ¶C. 04 KUWAIT 4540 
     ¶D. 04 KUWAIT 3580 
     ¶E. 04 KUWAIT 3391 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S/NF)  Summary: Sources indicate a major change in 
leadership may take place in Kuwait, possibly before the end 
of August.  Although Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah Al-Ahmed 
Al-Jaber Al-Sabah is considered the primary candidate for 
Amir, his succession is not a foregone conclusion.  According 
to several sources, Shaykh Salem Al-Ali Al-Salem Al-Sabah is 
a serious contender.  "Everyone smells blood and wants a 
piece of the power," one Al-Sabah family member and 
self-described "close confidant" of the PM told PolOff.  The 
renewed debate on succession in Kuwait was sparked by the 
return of Amir Shaykh Jaber Al-Sabah on August 9 from 
extended medical treatment in the United States and the 
recent death of Saudi King Fahd.  If either the Amir or Crown 
Prince Shaykh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah dies without 
an appointed successor, the National Assembly would be drawn 
into the succession process, a possibility sources indicate 
the Al-Sabah family would like to avoid.  We believe a 
leadership change would have little immediate impact on U.S. 
interests in Kuwait.  End summary. 
 
An Al-Sabah Predicts Change Is Around the Corner 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) On August 13, PolOff met with Shaykh Mohammed 
Abdullah Mubarak Al-Sabah, who said he was a "close 
confidant" of Shaykh Sabah and was perceived to be one of 
three people capable of influencing the PM (ref B for 
additional bio information).  Asked about succession in 
Kuwait, Shaykh Mohammed confirmed that there was an internal 
struggle within the Al-Sabah family over the Amirship and 
that a decision on succession would most likely be made 
before the end of the year, or possibly sooner. "Everyone 
smells blood and wants a piece of the power," he said. 
Although he said he could not imagine anyone but the PM 
becoming Amir, Shaykh Mohammed acknowledged that "only Shaykh 
Sabah knows" who would succeed the Amir. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF)  Of the numerous factions within the Al-Sabah 
family, the Al-Ahmed line of the Jaber branch is currently 
the most powerful, particularly in numbers, Shaykh Mohammed 
confided, adding that the Salem branch was "out."  Echoing 
previous statements from Al-Sabah members (ref B), Shaykh 
Mohammed said that the alternation between the Jaber and 
Salem branches of the family was "only a historical 
coincidence."  He confirmed that the Al-Sabah family in 
general, and Shaykh Sabah in particular, was actively 
discussing succession.  (Note: Shaykh Mohammed received a 
phone call at the end of our meeting telling him that the PM 
had just met with the Amir.  Shaykh Mohammed said they were 
supposed to talk soon about succession and speculated that 
this may have been that meeting.  End note.) 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) Shaykh Mohammed mentioned rumors that Shaykh Salem 
Al-Ali Al-Salem Al-Sabah, who was recently given the title 
"His Highness" and is the third most senior member of the 
Al-Sabah family after the Amir and the Crown Prince, was a 
potential candidate.  He dismissed this possibility saying 
Shaykh Salem had publicly stated that he did not desire the 
Amirship.  In a meeting with the Ambassador on August 15, 
Shaykh Salem confirmed that changes could come in the near 
future, but he was not specific about who might take on new 
leadership roles (ref A).  (Note: Estimated to be 81 years 
old, Shaykh Salem might be a short-term solution to the issue 
of succession, placating the Salem branch of the Al-Sabah 
family by allowing the traditional alternation with the Jaber 
branch.  If this scenario happens, the key questions will 
then be who becomes Crown Prince, and will the positions of 
Crown Prince and Prime Minister, separated in 2003, be 
re-merged.  End note.)  Also, Foreign Minster Shaykh Dr. 
Mohammed Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah would like power at some 
point, Shaykh Mohammed added, "but we are not sure where this 
will go." 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) Commenting that there are "murmurs" a decision on 
succession would be made before year's end, Shaykh Mohammed 
expressed hope that a new Amir would be announced before 
Ramadan, which begins October 3, so that Kuwaitis could 
celebrate the new Amir during the Ramadan festivities. 
 
Media Contacts Suggest Imminent Succession Meeting 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶6.  (C)  In recent meetings, various media contacts 
independently suggested that leadership changes in Kuwait 
were imminent.  On August 2, Mohammed Al-Jassem, former 
editor-in-chief of Al-Watan newspaper and the host of the 
Al-Hurra program Al-Majlis, speculated that both the Amir and 
the Crown Prince would step aside in late August.  Al-Jassem 
predicted that Shaykh Salem would become the new Amir, not 
the PM.  Al-Jassem cited anecdotal evidence to support his 
claim: a friend recently told him that Shaykh Salem told the 
friend of changes he was planning on making when he became 
Amir.  Al-Jassem also said he heard that Shaykh Sabah had 
begun informing Shaykh Salem of his actions, suggesting a 
possible shift in power.  He cited other anecdotal evidence 
that two powerful shaykhs, whom he did not name, were 
developing closer ties with Shaykh Salem in the hopes of 
gaining influence with the future Amir. 
 
¶7.  (S) Adnan Qaqoon, the chief of local news for the 
pro-government Arabic daily Al-Qabas, told PDOff in July that 
ruling family members had been ordered to return to Kuwait by 
late August for an important Al-Sabah family meeting, perhaps 
to oversee the voluntary stepping-down of the Amir and/or the 
Crown Prince, who are widely acknowledged as medically unfit 
for their positions.  Although such a move would be 
unprecedented, Qaqoon said the Al-Sabah family would prefer 
to avoid a messy, public confrontation over succession if 
either leader passed away without a capable successor in 
place.  Qaqoon predicted that Shaykh Sabah would become Amir, 
but said he was unsure what other changes might occur. 
 
¶8.  (C) Longtime columnist for Al-Rai Al-Aam newspaper and 
author of a book on succession in Kuwait, Ahmed Al-Deyain 
told Emboffs that a leadership change in Kuwait was possible, 
but questioned whether a change would actually take place 
before the death of either the Amir or the Crown Prince. 
Although the death of King Fahd was a wake-up call to some 
Al-Sabah, Al-Deyain said, given a choice between action and 
inaction, the Al-Sabah usually choose inaction.  Jassem 
Boodai, owner and editor-in-chief of Al-Rai Al-Aam and a 
close confidant of the PM, also intimated that there would be 
a major Al-Sabah family meeting in August to discuss 
succession.  He did not offer any additional details.  (Note: 
We have noticed that most of the senior family members have 
not gone abroad for vacation as of mid-August.  End note.) 
 
Amir and Crown Prince "in God's Waiting Room" 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The Amir's frail appearance on his return to Kuwait 
August 9 from medical treatment in the United States and 
unusually intense media coverage of the event renewed 
speculation over succession in Kuwait.  The Amir looked very 
weak and was whisked in a wheelchair to a waiting car soon 
after his plane landed (ref A).  State broadcast media 
carried continuous coverage of the Amir's life and rule 
accompanied by patriotic songs the day of his return.  On 
August 10, all local newspapers published the same photo of 
the Amir's return, portraying the frail leader with gray 
hair.  Although most pictures of the Amir continue to depict 
him in good health and with black hair, when he returned to 
Kuwait in 2004, his beard and hair were gray and undyed. 
According to Foreign Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed Al-Sabah, 
the Amir is suffering from Parkinson's disease. 
 
¶10.  (C) The Crown Prince also has serious health problems. 
In 2001, he suffered serious brain damage from a stroke and 
is now confined to a wheelchair.  He does not speak and does 
not appear to comprehend others' speech.  Nonetheless, the 
charade that he still exerts influence continues.  There are 
almost weekly news items of cables from the Crown Prince to 
world leaders and pictures of him receiving senior Al-Sabah 
family government officials.  More recent newspaper photos 
showed him being propped forward by an aid/bodyguard to kiss 
the Amir after the Amir's return to Kuwait. 
 
Succession Process A Family Matter 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) The unforeseen death of either the Amir or the Crown 
Prince without a capable, appointed successor would initiate 
a complex constitutional process involving the National 
Assembly in the succession.  Shaykh Mohammed emphasized that 
the family should do something before such an event occurs. 
With Kuwait's free media, the process would be open to 
extensive public scrutiny, an uncomfortable proposition for 
the Al-Sabah family, Shaykh Mohammed concluded. 
 
¶12. (U)  Article 4 of Kuwait's 1962 Constitution clearly 
details the succession process.  Only descendants of Mubarak 
Al-Sabah, the founder of modern Kuwait, are permitted to 
become Amir.  Although there are four branches of the Mubarak 
family, tradition dictates that only the descendants of the 
two main branches, Jaber and Salem, are considered candidates 
for Amir.  With one exception in 1965, succession has 
alternated between these two branches of the family.  Per 
Article 4, a Crown Prince must be appointed by the Amir 
within a year of accession and approved by a majority of the 
National Assembly.  If the Amir fails to designate a Crown 
Prince or if the National Assembly vetoes his first choice, 
he must nominate three descendants of Mubarak Al-Sabah, one 
of whom is chosen by a majority of the National Assembly.  If 
the Amir dies before nominating a Crown Prince, the matter is 
referred to the Cabinet, which votes on a new Amir in a 
special session.  While this is the formal procedure, the 
real succession decisions are made by the Al-Sabah during 
private family meetings. 
 
¶13.  (C) Al-Sabah family members are clearly aware of the 
potential problems of succession in Kuwait if either the Amir 
or the Crown Prince died without appointing a capable 
successor.  The issue of succession, however, is complicated 
by internal family politics, as different factions compete to 
place their candidate(s) in positions of power.  Sources have 
argued that the Crown Prince, incapable of assuming the 
throne, should step aside of his own accord, (although it is 
not clear to us that he is capable of independent action due 
to his illness).  If he refuses, the Amir could declare him 
physically unfit for his position.  The matter would then be 
referred to the National Assembly, which would vote to remove 
the Crown Prince after an independent medical examination.  A 
new heir would be chosen through the process outlined above. 
Obviously, the Al-Sabah family would prefer to avoid such a 
public spectacle.  The Amir may avoid addressing the question 
of succession and die in office; however, if, as our sources 
indicate, the Al-Sabah family forces a decision be made on 
succession, the Amir is likely to convince the Crown Prince 
to step aside himself, clearing the way for the appointment 
of a new heir. 
 
Implications for U.S. Policy 
---------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (S/NF) A change of leadership in Kuwait would have 
little immediate impact on U.S. interests in the country, 
particularly if Shaykh Sabah, considered the de-facto ruler, 
becomes Amir.  Shaykh Sabah would likely continue to pursue 
pragmatic policies, particularly with regard to Iraq, 
regional security, and oil exports.  Kuwaitis often attribute 
slow decision-making in Kuwait to intra-family jockeying for 
future position and influence.  If a change at the top 
eliminates some of the stagnation, as many believe, this 
could serve U.S. interests in more rapid economic 
liberalization and accelerated political reform. 
 
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