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Viewing cable 05KINGSTON2026, VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT HUGO CHAVEZ VISITS JAMAICA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05KINGSTON2026 2005-08-29 12:46 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kingston
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINGSTON 002026 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CAR, WHA/AND, WHA/MEX 
DEPARTMENT PASS USDEPT. OF ENERGY (SAMUEL BROWNE) 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG JM
SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT HUGO CHAVEZ VISITS JAMAICA 
 
REF: SIEBENGARTNER/COLLINS 8/23 E-MAIL 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Thomas C. Tighe.  Reasons 1.4(b) 
and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez visited Jamaica 
August 23 to conclude a 16-point agreement with Prime 
Minister P.J. Patterson, including a bilateral Petro-Caribe 
accord.  Chavez arrived the day after U.S. televangelist Pat 
Robertson called for the USG to assassinate him, raising the 
profile of a visit that Patterson would just as soon have 
kept more discreet.  At least one member of Patterson's 
Cabinet expressed misgivings to the Prime Minister about 
Chavez's motives, but Patterson evidently decided that 
Jamaica could ill afford to turn down the PetroCaribe offer. 
Senior Foreign Ministry officials insist that the GOJ's goal 
in signing the accord is to ensure access to cheaper 
petroleum, not make a political statement.  At Chavez's 
suggestion, the GOJ is considering playing host to yet 
another gathering of PetroCaribe nations, this one on 
September 6, in Jamaica, in part to commemorate the 190th 
anniversary of Simon Bolivar's 1815 "Letter from Kingston", 
in which the Libertador called for the political integration 
of Latin America and the Caribbean.  End Summary. 
 
------------------- 
The Visit Shapes Up 
------------------- 
 
2. (U) Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez visited Montego Bay 
on August 23 to sign a 16-point communiqu with Prime 
Minister P.J. Patterson (e-mailed to Desk per Ref), which 
included finalizing their bilateral PetroCaribe Energy 
Cooperation Agreement.  In the days prior to Chavez's 
arrival, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade 
Minister of State Delano Franklyn issued a statement 
welcoming the Venezuelan leader and pre-emptively offered 
that Franklyn saw no reason why the USG might object. 
According to the joint communiqu of August 23, Chavez was 
accompanied by an official delegation of 14, including 
Foreign Minister Ali Rodriguez, Interior Minister Jesse 
Chacon, and Minister of State for Integration and Foreign 
Trade Gustavo Marquez.  While in Jamaica, Chavez reportedly 
planned to look in on the Venezuelan military construction 
detachment in Brighton, Westmoreland, but he was hours late 
in arriving from Cuba and unable to do so.  U.S. 
televangelist Pat Robertson's August 22 call for the USG to 
assassinate the Venezuelan leader significantly raised the 
profile of Chavez's visit, to the chagrin of the GOJ. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Foreign Ministry:  It's About Cheap Oil, Not Politics 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
3.  (C) On August 25, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign 
Trade (MFAFT) Bilateral Affairs Director Courtenay Rattray 
(Jamaica's immediate former DCM in Washington) told Pol/Econ 
Chief that Jamaica's primary motivation in signing the 
PetroCaribe accord with the GOV is cheap oil and favorable 
terms of payment, not politics.  He said that Chavez had 
expressed a sense of obligation to help smaller, vulnerable 
neighbors such as Jamaica and other Caricom states, and that 
PetroCaribe is a concrete expression of that commitment. 
Rattray acknowledged that fellow Caricom states Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Barbados, had expressed concerns about 
PetroCaribe, and implied that their reservations were largely 
due  to domestic petroleum/competition issues (in the case of 
Trinidad) and to concern about potential negative U.S. 
reaction (Barbados).  Jamaica, he said, simply could not 
afford to let pass the opportunity offered by PetroCaribe to 
secure its energy future. 
 
4.  (C) Rattray said that the GOV was quick to provide 
Jamaica with disaster assistance following Hurricane Ivan in 
September 2004, sending a Venezuelan military construction 
detachment to rebuild housing in Westmoreland.  He also cited 
a number of other building projects in which GOV financing 
has been instrumental:  the Montego Bay Civic Center; Port 
Maria Civic Center (Phase I of II has been completed); and 
the Greenfield Multi-purpose Sports Complex in Trelawny. 
Unspecified work- and poverty alleviation programs have also 
received GOV funding, said Rattray.  Asked about the planned 
activities by the "Bolivarian Institute for Cultural 
Cooperation" (Point 12 of Ref communiqu), Rattray replied 
that planning is well advanced for a building in Kingston to 
house the Institute.  He could not specify what the 
Institute's primary purpose would be, but speculated that it 
would include Spanish language instruction and serving as a 
repository for information on Bolivar. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Another PetroCaribe Event on September 6? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) According to Rattray, Chavez suggested to Patterson 
that Jamaica host PetroCaribe countries at another ceremony 
(most likely in Kingston or Montego Bay) on September 6, to 
mark the conclusion of the CARICOM PetroCaribe deals being 
concluded bilaterally in capitals.  The GOV-hosted 
PetroCaribe event in Puerto La Cruz, he explained, had been a 
"framework" ceremony after which individual states finalized 
their bilateral accords with the GOV, which is why Chavez 
visited Jamaica.  The significance of the September 6 date, 
he explained, is that it is the 190th anniversary of Simon 
Bolivar's 1815 "Letter from Jamaica" in which the exiled 
Libertador laid out his thoughts on republican government and 
political integration throughout the hemisphere. 
 
6. (C) Asked whether Cuban President Fidel Castro would 
attend the September event, Rattray professed not to know. 
Pol/Econ Chief raised the possibility that Chavez's petroleum 
generosity might come with strings attached, such as GOV 
expectations about how Jamaica should vote at the UN or OAS; 
Rattray replied that there had been no hint of such 
conditionality by the GOV:  "We must take at face value" that 
the GOV has no ulterior motives in offering PetroCaribe's 
generous terms, he said.  Rattray then asked the USG's 
perspective on PetroCaribe arrangements.  Pol/Econ Chief 
acknowledged the seeming attractiveness of the agreement but 
observed that it seemed highly unlikely that the GOV would 
offer such favorable terms with no expectation of quid pro 
quo.  He then outlined USG concerns about Chavez's 
destabilizing activities in neighboring states, and his 
undermining of democratic institutions at home. 
 
7.  (C) In an August 25 meeting with Charge and Pol/Econ 
Chief, Ambassador Douglas Saunders, MFAFT Permanent 
Secretary, described the Chavez visit as "largely bilateral." 
Previous arrangements with Mexico governing concessional 
petroleum financing under the San Jose Accord, he said, had 
become so cumbersome that Jamaica and other prospective 
beneficiaries find themselves unable to access the funding 
set aside for their use.  The GOJ raised this with Mexican 
President Vicente Fox during his visit to Jamaica earlier in 
2005, but PetroCaribe is a way of securing petroleum at 
favorable prices, as well as development funding.  Saunders 
said that the GOJ is willing to send a representative to 
Mexico City to testify before the legislature about the 
importance of the Mexican petroleum agreement, and the 
problems with it, and that PetroCaribe provides leverage for 
changes in the Mexican oil agreement.  Meanwhile, the GOV 
deal will not only help to expand Jamaica's refining 
capacity, but to expand the types of petroleum it can refine 
here. 
 
---------------------------------- 
PNP Loyalists Discuss Chavez Visit 
---------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Balfour Denniston, a member of the ruling Peoples 
National Party (PNP) National Executive Committee (NEC - the 
party's  highest decision-making body outside of the annual 
convention) told Pol/Econ Chief and poloff August 25 that 
Patterson was the driving force in the GOJ behind concluding 
the PetroCaribe agreement with Chavez, overriding some in his 
Cabinet who raised concern that the benefits of the deal with 
Venezuela might come at the cost of worsened relations with 
the U.S., something that Jamaica could ill afford.  In this 
regard, Denniston specifically mentioned National Security 
Minister Phillips, although he implied that there had been 
others who shared his wariness of Chavez.  Like the MFAFT's 
Rattray, Denniston cited favorable oil prices, not politics, 
as the GOJ's primary motivation in concluding the deal. 
Later in the conversation, however, Denniston implied that 
Patterson might have had additional reasons for agreeing to 
the deal with Chavez.  According to Denniston, there are 
"rumors" in some PNP circles that the USG greatly dislikes 
Patterson and wants to be rid of his government.  According 
to the rumor, said Denniston, the USG "has cut a deal" with 
the opposition Jamaica Labor Party to engineer a PNP defeat 
at the polls during the next general elections, which must be 
held by 2007.  Emboffs pressed for specifics about the rumor 
but none were forthcoming. 
 
9. (C) Pol/Econ Chief emphasized to Denniston that the USG 
does not have a party preference in Jamaica and that, in 
fact, we have worked closely with the current GOJ on a number 
of significant issues.  USG interests are in strengthened 
democratic institutions and in transparent processes in 
Jamaica, not in which political party governs the country. 
He also suggested that Denniston and others hearing such 
rumors ask tougher questions of those circulating them rather 
than accepting them uncritically.  Denniston seemed to take 
the point. 
 
10. (C) In an August 24 meeting with Labor Minister Horace 
Dalley on other matters, poloff asked the Minister for his 
views on the Chavez visit.  Dalley, a PNP insider who is 
among the less ideological of senior GOJ officials, replied 
that Mexico has been an unreliable partner in the San Jose 
Accord, which is why Jamaica is looking more toward Venezuela 
for preferential oil arrangements.  Without offering 
specifics, Dalley mentioned that Mexico "owes" Jamaica USD 95 
million under the San Jose Accord, but has not delivered the 
money.  Dalley agreed that PetroCaribe is a very generous 
deal that does not ask much of the GOJ, and explained for 
that reason, the Patterson government was very keen to sign 
it as quickly as possible, while the terms were still very 
favorable. 
 
11. (C) Offering what he termed a personal assessment of 
Chavez, Dalley said that he does not think the Venezuelan 
president is a very strong or intelligent leader.  When 
poloff pointed out the problems the USG has with Chavez' 
frequent anti-American diatribes, Dalley replied that PM 
Patterson is also uncomfortable with Chavez's rhetorical 
excesses.  He suggested that Patterson looked a bit stiff in 
the media photo of their encounter, which shows the smiling 
Chavez with his arm around a seemingly reticent Patterson. 
Dalley also mentioned that the governments of Trinidad & 
Tobago, Barbados, and Curacao recently had all expressed 
their concern that there has been an increase in drug traffic 
from Venezuela to their respective countries.  He also 
maintained that he heard the Venezuelan army was overhauling 
its stock of weapons, and observed that, while he believes 
most of the illegal firearms arriving in Jamaica today come 
from Haiti, many of the Venezuelan military's old weapons 
could find their way to the Caribbean. 
 
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Comment 
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12. (C) Temperamentally, Patterson and Chavez seem polar 
opposites, an impression unwittingly reinforced by the 
photograph of their awkward "embrace" shortly after signing 
the PetroCaribe agreement.  Patterson is well aware of 
current difficulties between the USG and the GOV, and of 
potential downsides to concluding the agreement, particularly 
as some in his Cabinet expressed unease about Chavez's 
motives.  Notwithstanding the rumored USG unhappiness with 
Patterson as cited by Denniston, the Prime Minister likely 
concluded that the expected benefits to Jamaica of an 
attractive petroleum deal with Venezuela outweigh the 
potential risks of making Jamaica overly reliant on Chavez. 
Pol/Econ Chief is scheduled to meet on August 29 with a 
senior Commerce Ministry official for additional background 
on the PetroCaribe agreement and will report further at that 
time. 
TIGHE