This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 001460 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2015 
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV PINR IZ FJ AS UNSC
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN DOD READOUT ON FIJI GUARD UNIT 
DEPLOYMENT TO IRAQ 
 
REF: A. SUVA 447 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶B. USUN NEW YORK 1997 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Woo Lee.  Reasons: 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Australian Department of Defense (ADOD) 
officials told us on August 29 that they were exasperated by 
Fiji,s threat to renege on its commitment to provide guard 
units to the UN in Basra and Erbil, and they planned to 
advise Defense Minister Hill and the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) to "call the Fijians, bluff" by 
holding firm on their refusal to pay the costs associated 
with equipping Fijian soldiers for duty in Iraq.  The 
Australians believe the costs should properly be paid by the 
Fijians or the UN.  It remains to be seen, however, whether 
the Minister and the PM will follow ADOD,s advice.  End 
Summary 
 
¶2.  (C) ADOD International Policy Division Pacific Branch DG 
Brigadier Paul Symon and Pacific Director Sari Sutton told us 
on August 29 that in April 2005 the Fijian ambassador to 
Australia had asked ADOD to provide GOF troops deploying to 
Iraq this (northern hemisphere) autumn with military gear, to 
include everything from socks to body armor to high-fashion 
sunglasses.  Symon declined the request, telling the 
ambassador that the UN would help with such procurements if 
the GOF were to submit a request to DPKO.  Symon ended the 
April meeting by telling the ambassador that he would be 
willing to revisit the issue after the GOF had gotten what 
equipment it could via DPKO. 
 
¶3.  (C) Fast-forward to the week of August 22, when the GOF 
informed the USG and the UN (reftels) that Fiji was compelled 
to back out of its commitment to increase its presence in 
Iraq because the Australians had refused to deliver promised 
assistance.  Symon,s staff made some inquiries and learned 
from the UN that the GOF had never submitted a request for 
the basic gear Fijian soldiers needed for service in Iraq. 
Sutton surmised that GOF officials had deliberately waited 
until the last minute to announce their problem in order to 
provoke a crisis that would play the Australians and the 
Americans off each other and see one of the two pay expenses 
that would rightfully have been covered by Fiji or the UN. 
This scenario was plausible, Sutton argued, particularly 
since the cost of the gear funded by DPKO would have been 
deducted from the fees the UN was to pay to the GOF for the 
"inner ring" guard force's service. 
 
¶4.  (C) Sutton pointed out that the U.S. and Australia faced 
two competing objectives in dealing with Fiji.  On one hand, 
she argued, it would be good for us, and for the UN, to have 
even more Fijian troops in Iraq.  On the other hand, we 
risked creating the expectation in Fiji that the U.S. and 
Australia would cover costs that the GOF should rightly 
cover, and for which there is an extant UN funding mechanism, 
when a given mission was of critical importance. 
 
¶5.  (C) Sutton acknowledged that there was a chance the GOA 
would decide to "roll over" and provide the equipment the 
Fijians asked for once again.  If they did roll, Sutton said, 
it would be done at the expense of fostering bad behavior on 
the part of the GOF.  Therefore, if either the GOA or the USG 
agreed to equip the Fijians again, Sutton argued, this time 
there should at least be conditions attached to ensure that 
later deployments are properly coordinated, provisioned and 
funded.  Symon said that he would argue to his minister that 
it is important, "at the very least, that we let the current 
impasse evolve through its natural course" at the UN to see 
what the Fijians bring to the table rather than "jump in" 
with funding in the next 24-48 hours. 
 
¶6.    (C) Comment: Sutton and Simon are frustrated by what 
they see as the GOF's attempt to milk the system and blame 
the GOA for a problem of its own making.  They are eager to 
cooperate with the U.S. to fix the planning and other 
systemic issues that led to the current problem.  It is 
uncertain, however, if Minister Hill and the PM will see 
things the same way as their bureaucrats, or if they will 
place greater importance in simply ensuring that the Fijian 
presence in Iraq continues and accede to the Fijian demands. 
STANTON