This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 001453 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL MARR ASEC EAID XD AF NL AS
SUBJECT: AFGHAN FM VISITS AUSTRALIA: GOA MOVING TOWARD 
DECISION TO DEPLOY PRT 
 
REF: A. CANBERRA 1193 B. IIR 6 805 0203 05 C. 
 
     CANBERRA 1098 
 
Classified By: Polcouns Woo Lee.  Reason 1.4 (B/D). 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 8. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary: Australia strongly supports the process of 
bringing stability and democracy to Afghanistan.  During his 
August 17-20 visit to open the new Afghan embassy in 
Canberra, Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah lobbied GOA 
officials on Australian troop deployments, additional 
financial assistance, a counterterrorism memorandum of 
understanding (CT MOU), and a potential Australian Embassy in 
Kabul.  FM Downer said Australia hoped to send a provincial 
reconstruction team (PRT) to Afghanistan but would need to 
work out the details first.  Australia also agreed to begin 
discussions on a CT MOU and announced an additional U.S. $5.3 
million in aid.  GOA officials seek Washington's views on the 
way forward in Afghanistan -- specifically, on the post-Bonn 
Agreement role of the international community and on 
counter-narcotics strategy.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (C) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) India 
and South Asia Director Peter Howarth told us on August 24 
that treatment accorded to the Afghan Foreign Minister during 
his visit demonstrated the importance the GOA placed on its 
relationship with Afghanistan.  FM Abdullah was treated as a 
"Guest of the Government," a rare honor which he has received 
twice since taking office in 2001. 
 
GOA Likely to Send Reconstruction Team 
-------------------------------------- 
¶4. (C) After adding another 40 Special Forces troops to the 
150 it had committed in July, the GOA reiterated during FM 
Abdullah's visit that it was also considering sending a 
200-strong provincial reconstruction team (PRT) to 
Afghanistan in mid-2006 for a period of up to two years 
(reftels A,B).  Howarth said that the Cabinet had decided in 
principle on July 30 to send the team and would make a final 
decision in early November.  The GOA would not send an 
independent team and would instead look at partnering with 
the U.S., the UK, or the Netherlands, attempting to maximize 
the advantages of interoperability and opportunities to use 
specific Australian expertise at partner locations.  Types of 
troops and deployment details would be dependent on the 
partner country and location selected.  The Dutch need 
additional troops to complete a PRT and thus are very 
interested in an Australian partnership, Howarth said. 
 
$5.3M in New Aid 
---------------- 
¶5. (U) Australia announced U.S. $5.3M (A$7M) in new 
assistance to Afghanistan during FM Abdullah's visit.  A 
$3.8M (A$5M) non-earmarked donation will go to the World 
Bank-administered Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, and $1.5M 
(A$2M) will go to the UN Development Program to further 
support the September National Assembly elections. Australia 
contributed $83.3M (A$110M) towards Afghan reconstruction 
from September 2001 through June 2005.  GOA forward estimates 
had allocated $19.7M (A$26M) for the 2005-06 fiscal year, of 
which the $5.3M is the first installment. 
 
CT MOU Discussions 
------------------ 
¶6. (C) One of Abdullah's primary goals for the visit was to 
start negotiating a counterterrorism memorandum of 
understanding (CT MOU) with Australia.  Howarth confided that 
Australian officials had not been keen to begin discussions 
on a CT MOU because they did not believe Afghanistan's 
institutions were ready for substantive engagement on CT 
issues.  Nevertheless, PM Howard agreed to negotiate the MOU 
as a symbolic gesture, and DFAT passed a draft model of its 
CT MOU framework to the Afghans for consideration.  Howarth 
indicated that if PM Howard or FM Downer were to visit 
Afghanistan in the near future, which was likely due to the 
recent troop deployments, the signing of the CT MOU would 
make a timely deliverable.  (Note:  The GOA signed its 11th 
bilateral CT MOU with Pakistan during President Musharraf's 
June visit (ref C).) 
 
Political Will, But No Money for Embassy Kabul 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶7. (C) Dr. Abdullah's other major request during his visit 
was that Australia establish an embassy in Kabul.  FM Downer 
said publicly that given the "intensity of the relationship" 
Australia had with Afghanistan, the embassy was something the 
GOA was considering funding in the context of next year's 
budget.  DFAT's Howarth, however, told us that while the 
issue was "dear to Downer's heart," it was unlikely that DFAT 
would be able to provide the funding needed to meet the 
security requirements for an Embassy in Kabul. 
 
Comment and Action Request 
-------------------------- 
¶8. (C) The increased Australian commitment, both military and 
political, to Afghanistan is just the latest affirmation that 
the GOA continues to be one of our strongest allies in the 
war on terror.  When asked by the press why Australia was 
sending more troops to Afghanistan, PM Howard replied, "The 
Australian national interest is in making sure that the 
democratic Afghanistan continues.  If the democratic 
experiment in Afghanistan fails then that's a huge victory 
for terrorism."  DFAT's Howarth was cautiously hopeful that 
the upcoming elections in Afghanistan would contribute to the 
stability of the country.  With the elections marking the end 
of the Bonn Agreement, he asked what Washington's views were 
on the future structure of the relationship between the 
international community and Afghanistan.  Howarth also 
expressed concern about the illegal narcotics situation and 
asked for best practice information from the USG to assist in 
establishing the GOA's own counter-narcotics policy for 
Afghanistan.  He was particularly interested in lessons 
learned by the U.S. in Afghanistan and Colombia.  Howarth 
also expressed interest in USG thinking on Pakistan's "end 
game" in Afghanistan, saying he found Islamabad's treatment 
of the Taliban and other transnational fighters 
"inconsistent."  Post would appreciate Department guidance to 
assist in responding to Howarth's questions. 
STANTON.