This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 006577

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/RA
NSC FOR ABRAMS AND POUNDS
USTR FOR DONNELLY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAID ETRD EG

SUBJECT: VISIT OF NEA ASSISTANT SECRETARY WELCH: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER NAZIF

Classified by Charge D´Affaires Stuart Jones, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary

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¶1. (C) NEA Assistant Secretary Welch met with Egyptian Prime Minister Nazif on August 18 to discuss bilateral and regional issues. Welch pointed out that the U.S. had delivered on its promise of greater engagement on the peace process and would engage further as both sides made progress. The international community would be carefully examining the upcoming elections in Egypt. Although the U.S. Administration was confident of the GOE´s handling of reform, Congress was more skeptical. Movement on the issue of QIZs could be affected by Congress´ perceptions of Egypt´s elections. Moreover, the issue of a license for Radio Sawa was an irritant in the bilateral relationship. The U.S. needed assistance in combating terrorism, particularly in Iraq. The U.S. would try to be fair and accurate in its advisory regarding the recent terrorist incidents in Sinai. Nazif stated that the message he wanted to convey about the elections was that the GOE had tried to make them as free and fair as possible. His staff was working on reform of the media reform and the Radio Sawa issue could be resolved in that context. He was hoping for greater reform of U.S. assistance to Egypt, and hoped to have issues in the Sinai sorted out soon. End summary.

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The Peace Process

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¶2. (C) Nazif noted that he had been asked during his visit to the U.S. last spring what the U.S. needed to do to improve its image in the Middle East. He answered that greater engagement on the peace process was the best thing the U.S. could do in the region. A/S Welch pointed out that he personally had made 7 trips to the region in the last 4 months, so the U.S was delivering on its promise of more engagement. The U.S. would increase its engagement as both sides continued to make progress on the roadmap. Special Negotiator Wolfenson was working to define the post-Gaza disengagement agenda, and had a plan for Palestinian economic development, which was a key component of that agenda. Egypt had been helpful in the process, and that was very much appreciated.

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Egypt´s Reform Agenda

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¶3. (C) Nazif said his visit to the U.S. had also helped him to focus his message about reform in Egypt. The key component of the message was that change was happening and would continue. The upcoming presidential election had solidified the reform agenda, which now included cancellation of the emergency law, creating a better balance between presidential and parliamentary powers, and increasing opportunities for the opposition in parliament. Nazif noted that each of these points came up during his meetings with the U.S. Congress last spring, and they were all now part of the reform agenda. Implementation of these reforms, however, would not be accomplished until after the next elections.

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Presidential Elections

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¶4. (C) Regarding the upcoming elections, Welch said that the international community would be looking at 4 things. First, the numbers: how was voter turnout and what percentage of the eligible population voted? Second, the visuals: were the visuals of happy voters at the polls or protestors being beaten in the streets? Third, the opposition: to what extent did the opposition participate in the elections? Fourth, transparency: when observers looked at the overall election process, what would they find, and who would they find behind the opposition when they looked closely? Welch noted that the entire region was talking about Egypt´s elections, and Al Jazeera had devoted a lot of airtime to the topic. Although elections were held in Lebanon, they would not have the same impact as the elections in Egypt.

¶5. (C) Nazif agreed that the entire region was interested in what was happening in Egypt, but real political reform would take time. The presidential elections were a first step, but Egypt was not going to be a Western democracy overnight. Some of the things the international community would be looking at were out of the GOE´s control. For example, the opposition needed to actually organize and get involved. The Al Wafd party had only recently begun developing a platform. Nazif pointed out that all political parties had free access to the media, and the GOE was airing an advertisement that would encourage people to vote. The print media, however, was uneven in its coverage of the candidates, giving too much coverage to Mubarak. Although he expected criticism of the election process, the message he hoped to convey was that the GOE had tried to make the elections as free and fair as possible. He also noted that although the GOE had rejected international monitors, interested observers and the media would be welcome. His staff was setting up a "welcome/help desk," which would provide information for observers and possibly conduct tours.

¶6. (C) Nazif expressed appreciation for Deputy Secretary Zoellick´s recent statement about Egypt, and said he hoped to continue coordinating with the U.S. on Egypt´s reform message. He noted that Minister of Foreign Trade Rachid would be visiting the U.S. soon to discuss reform and expansion of the QIZs. Welch replied that the Administration was confident that Egypt could handle reform, but would nevertheless have to comment on the elections. POTUS had already told Nazif his thoughts during their meeting last spring. Congress, however, was quite skeptical and would scrutinize the elections closely. It would be hard to change perceptions in Congress, especially if questions arose over the legitimacy of the elections. Rachid´s visit was timely, as trade was an area in which Congress could react negatively if the elections didn´t go well. Moreover, the Administration was moving cautiously right now, as CAFTA had just squeaked through Congress. Welch encouraged Nazif to travel to the U.S. himself after the elections. He also pointed out that the GOE needed to make better use of international media to get out the reform message. He noted that international media was present in Egypt and readily accessible. A good starting point would be explaining that the GOE had solidified its reform agenda. Nazif replied that he was exploring use of the media to convey the reform message and head off criticism of the upcoming elections.

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Radio Sawa

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¶7. (C) Continuing on the issue of media, A/S Welch raised the issue of a license for Radio Sawa. Nazif explained that Mubarak had rejected issuing a license to Radio Sawa as a condition for U.S. assistance. Had the licensing issue not been tied to assistance, it might have been resolved. A/S Welch pointed out that the issue had been on the agenda for a long time, but there had been no movement, and this is what prompted Congress to tie the issue to assistance. Nazif repeated that Mubarak would not accept licensing as a condition for continued assistance. He pointed out that his staff was working on reform of the regulatory framework of the media. The current law, which permitted only government media, would be changed and the Radio Sawa issue could be resolved in the context of overall reform. Nazif noted that Nile TV was undergoing privatization and that a regulatory body was being created to separate media regulation from production. Once this new body was in place, licenses would be issued, including to Radio Sawa.

¶8. (C) Welch asked if it would be possible to receive assurances that the Radio Sawa issue would be resolved in the context of media reform. Nazif replied that a decision on that would have to come from President Mubarak. He was not sure if assurances were possible, but offered to share his staff´s plan for media reform. Charge pointed out that the message that reached the U.S. was that media reform would take at least 5 years. Nazif replied that he thought it would happen much sooner and that he had already signed one Prime Ministerial decree related to the reform. Welch said that Rachid should prepare to explain the issue during his visit to the U.S., as it would be raised in his meetings with U.S. officials.

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U.S. Assistance

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¶9. (C) Continuing on the issue of U.S. assistance, Nazif said that he would like to see additional review of how U.S. assistance funds were spent. A/S Welch replied that the U.S. was eager for more reform of the assistance program, and that tying assistance to the GOE´s reform agenda would be well received in Congress. U.S. support for political reform was now narrowly focused, so additional reform of the assistance program should include support for broad socio-economic reforms. A/S Welch pointed out that the USAID Director in Cairo was very supportive of increased reform of the assistance program.

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Progress in Iraq

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¶10. (C) Turning to Iraq, Nazif asked how the political process was progressing. Welch replied that progress had been made; importantly, it was now an Iraqi process. Security was really the main issue. Jihadis were coming into Iraq through Syria. Saudi Arabia understood the importance of controlling the border, and even Iran was doing a better job controlling its border than Syria was. The jihadis saw Iraq as the new frontier in the fight against the "infidel." The U.S. needed support from its friends, not just on security issues but in the political and intellectual realm as well. Welch noted the positive outcome of the recent Islamists´ meeting in Jordan. Nazif replied that terrorism was a concern for everyone, as it was growing and occurring everywhere now. Terrorist cells could now get to new recruits without even meeting with them face to face.

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Sinai Attacks

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¶11. (C) Regarding recent events in the Sinai, Welch said that the U.S. would try to be accurate and fair in its advisory about travel to the Sinai. Although the GOE did not believe an advisory was necessary, one had been issued after the London bombing, so one was needed for Sinai too. Charge Jones noted that the U.S. advisory would essentially caution U.S. citizens to avoid the Sinai until the GOE had the situation under control. In that regard, Jones inquired how the GOE investigation of the attacks was proceeding. Nazif replied that while the GOE was investigating the actual attacks, it was also looking at the socioeconomic issues underlying the outbreak of violence. South Sinai was prosperous and developed, while the north was poor and filled with petty crime such as drug and migrant smuggling.

¶12. (C) Nazif said he didn´t think the overall economy would be affected by the July 23 bombings in Sharm el Sheikh. Gulf businessmen were moving conferences to Sharm el Sheikh to support Egypt after the terrorist attacks, as nobody wanted to see Egypt´s economy falter. Although Sharm itself was running at 40% capacity, the rest of the country´s hotels were full of visitors from the Gulf. He hoped the U.S. advisory would not include areas other than the Sinai, such as the Red Sea coast, to which Charge Jones replied that it wouldn´t. A/S Welch asked if there would be an Arab League summit in Sharm. Nazif replied that there would be, but probably after the presidential elections. Welch asked if the GOE planned to do anything on the tenth anniversary of former Israeli Prime Minister Rabin´s death. Nazif said that if Gaza disengagement went well, the GOE would consider doing something positive.

¶13. (U) This message was cleared by A/S Welch.

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