This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 007712 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2015 
TAGS: KJUS PHUM PREL PGOV SNAR CO FARC ELN
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER DESCRIBES STATUS OF 
HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE AND PEACE TALKS WITH FARC AND ELN 
 
REF: BOGOTA 7415 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. 
Reasons: 1.4 (b,d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo told 
Ambassador Wood August 12 that the GOC was making a sincere 
effort to reach an agreement with the FARC on the terms of a 
humanitarian exchange, and with the ELN on peace talks, but 
Restrepo is not confident of the GOC's short term prospects 
for success.  Restrepo said the GOC has strengthened its hand 
with the FARC by, for the first time, obtaining support for 
its initiative from most of the hostages' families.  In 
Restrepo's view, the FARC is not interested in striking a 
deal and is likely to derail the talks if they get started 
("romper la mesa").  Restrepo believes the FARC will 
intensify its attacks if a Constitutional Court ruling 
permits President Uribe to run again because they are 
"obsessed" with preventing his reelection.  In a late 
development, the FARC has rejected the government's latest 
offer, saying the proposed meeting could not take place "for 
military reasons," and pressing for a suspension of 
government military action for 30 days (vice the eight days 
in the government's proposal).  On the ELN front, Restrepo 
characterized the GOC's latest offer as its strongest to date 
and argued that the ELN had no option other than negotiate, 
but internal divisions and uncertainty over Uribe's 
reelection could delay decisions.  End summary. 
 
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GOC HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE INITIATIVE GARNERING SUPPORT 
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¶2.  (C) Restrepo told the Ambassador that the GOC's latest 
humanitarian exchange initiative is sincere and is garnering 
more support than any of the previous five such initiatives. 
(Note: The GOC has agreed to a proposal by a group of 
hostages' families to meet the FARC at Aures, a town of about 
150 inhabitants some 23 km from Caicedonia in the Valle del 
Cauca.  In Restrepo's view, families of the 14 Cali deputies 
who have been held for about 40 months are behind the 
selection of Aures.  End note.) According to Restrepo, the 
FARC should be able to reach the proposed site of the meeting 
("lugar del encuentro") easily because Aures lies slightly 
north and east of traditional FARC strongholds and has three 
principal access roads.  The GOC military is satisfied that 
it can secure the area.  Restrepo said the GOC will continue 
to reject FARC demands for a demilitarized zone in which to 
conduct talks ("despeje"), and will insist that FARC 
prisoners exchanged as part of a deal do not return to 
guerrilla ranks. 
 
¶3.  (C) Restrepo was especially pleased with the support the 
GOC initiative is now receiving from a significant section of 
hostages' families.  In his view, the GOC has neutralized 
family criticisms and has four of the five principal groups 
of families on its side (with the exception of Neiva): those 
representing Bogota; Villavicencio; Valle; and police/armed 
forces detainees.  He noted that family members whom he met 
recently in Aures were wearing T-shirts with the GOC slogan 
("Caicedonia - lugar del encuentro") and they did not use 
FARC language ("despeje," or demilitarized zone) in their 
statements.  Restrepo characterized Yolanda Pulecio, mother 
of prominent dual Colombian-French citizen and former Senator 
Ingrid Betancourt, as being emotionally affected by her 
daughter's captivity and said many hostage families view 
Pulecio as being interested only in her own daughter's 
release. 
 
¶4.  (C) Restrepo said neither France nor President of the 
Colombian Episcopal Conference, Monsignor Luis Augusto 
Castro, have played a constructive role in discussions 
associated with the hostages.  Restrepo characterized the 
Monsignor's efforts as naive and unhelpful, in part because 
he frequently tells the GOC that the FARC will not budge 
therefore the GOC must make additional concessions.  Restrepo 
insisted that, as in the paramilitary negotiation, force in 
the field and firmness at the table were necessary. 
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PROSPECTS FOR SHORT TERM SUCCESS ARE SLIM 
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¶5.  (C) Restrepo doubted the FARC is interested in a 
humanitarian exchange.  They are "obsessed" with preventing 
President Uribe's reelection.  For the FARC, Restrepo said, 
defeating Uribe would mean defeating Colombia's leadership 
class and would force Uribe's successor to negotiate.  Even 
if the FARC were to agree to meet the GOC at Aures or 
elsewhere, Restrepo said the two sides would need weeks or 
months of discussions on security guarantees and other 
matters before substantive meetings took place.  Even if they 
did take place, the FARC would seek to derail the talks 
("romper la mesa").  In Restrepo's view, it would be logical 
for the FARC to wait until the Constitutional Court has ruled 
on Uribe's right to seek immediate reelection before making 
significant decisions.  In a statement dated August 14 from 
"the mountains of Colombia," the FARC rejected Aures as a 
meeting place for "military reasons".  The FARC asked the 
families who had proposed Aures to now press the GOC to 
demilitarize the municipalities of Florida and Pradera for 30 
days so that a meeting could take place there. 
 
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FARC PREPARING TO INTENSIFY ATTACKS 
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¶6.  (C) Restrepo said the FARC may be planning 18-25 
simultaneous attacks throughout Colombia.  Their strategy 
would be to "make Colombia ungovernable" and thereby persuade 
Colombians that Uribe is incapable of ensuring their security 
and delivering government services.  The attacks would 
include further operations against mayors, councilors, and 
armed forces detachments. 
 
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RESTREPO SAYS GOC OFFER TO ELN STRONGEST YET 
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¶7.  (C) Restrepo said the latest offer to talk with the ELN 
is the GOC's strongest to date.  The GOC offer, broached 
about a week ago, includes discussions to be held outside the 
country and a military cease-fire against ELN militants if 
the ELN agrees to stop kidnapping and attacks against 
civilians.  Restrepo expressed the view that the ELN would 
find it difficult to say no to an offer that included a 
cease-fire.  The ELN has yet to respond.  The Peace 
Commissioner was grateful for the Ambassador's reiteration of 
USG support for the GOC effort. 
 
¶8.  (C) Restrepo said the GOC has offered to release 
imprisoned ELN leader Francisco Galan into Medellin for two 
months to try to persuade the group's leadership and other 
ELN sympathizers to accept the GOC offer, and Galan seems 
inclined to agree.  Restrepo downplayed concerns that Galan 
would "escape" since this is not the first time Galan has 
been granted "parole" of this nature.  Moreover, Galan enjoys 
a spacious two-level "prison" with eight bedrooms, exercise 
equipment, internet, and telephone services, and relishes his 
status as a key player in peace talks. 
 
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ELN HAS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT COULD DELAY DECISIONS 
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¶9.  (C) Restrepo compared the current state of the ELN with 
the AUC of a few years ago; it is vulnerable and has no 
alternative but to negotiate with the GOC.  The ELN's 
leadership is weak and Colombia's legal leftist parties are 
increasing their pressure on the ELN to come to the table. 
Restrepo warned, however, that divisions within the ELN could 
make it difficult for the GOC to manage the process.  For 
example, the influential Occidental Bloc, known as the "war 
bloc," is against discussing peace with the government.  A 
location for discussions has not been agreed upon, but 
Restrepo said the ELN's preference for Venezuela as a meeting 
place could cause problems for the GOC.  As with the FARC, 
uncertainty over Uribe's reelection could delay the ELN's 
decisions. 
 
WOOD