This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003565 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2015 
TAGS: PINS PREL MCAP MOPS PGOV IZ IR
SUBJECT: IRAQI PRIME MINISTER REINVIGORATES MILITIA 
REINTEGRATION 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 254 04 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 656 
     ¶C. BAGHDAD 1408 
     ¶D. BAGHDAD 2641 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ACTING DCM DAVID C. LITT FOR REASONS 1.4 ( 
b) AND (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  At a meeting with the Commanding General of 
the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq on 21 
August 2005, Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr gave LTG 
Petraeus a copy of a 10 August Prime Minister memorandum, 
which directs the Minister to implement CPA Order 91.  CPA 91 
prohibits militia "not under the command structure of the 
Iraqi Transitional Government...except as provided by federal 
law."  The Prime Minister's memorandum may represent initial 
action to reinvigorate the Iraqi Transitional Government's 
process for militia reintegration, which has been moribund 
since the transition of sovereignty last June.  The 
Transition and Reintegration Implementation Committee (TRIC) 
was also established by CPA 91, and the Minister intends to 
use the TRIC to execute the directive.  After seeing the PM 
memo, key TRIC members stated that they are wary as to the 
motivation behind the renewed interest in the implementation 
of CPA 91.  In his weekly meeting with LTG Petraeus on 28 
August, Minister Jabr promised to address TRIC concerns in 
execution of the process.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) At a meeting with LTG Petraeus and Senior IRMO-MOI 
Advisor AMB Yellin on 21 August 2005, Minister of Interior 
Jabr presented a copy of a directive from Prime Minister 
al-Jafari, instructing the Minister to implement the 
provisions of CPA Order 91. Order 91, the "Regulation of 
Armed Forces and Militias within Iraq," was signed into force 
by CPA Administrator L. Paul Bremer in June 2004.  It defines 
the process of militia transition and reintegration (T&R) for 
a set of nine politically-affiliated militia groups deemed to 
have supported the resistance against the Ba'athist regime 
(REFTEL A). At face value, the Prime Minister's memorandum 
potentially revitalizes the T&R program, which had stopped 
dead in the water from lack of political interest by the ITG 
and the political parties themselves (REFTEL D). 
 
-------------------------- 
MAKING A RUN FOR THE MONEY 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) What seemed to be a positive development was met with 
wary skepticism by senior members of the TRIC.  The directive 
is viewed by these members as a possible ploy for Shia-backed 
militias to accrue transition benefits without actually 
disarming.  At a meeting of the TRIC on 24 August, Chairman 
Saad al-Obeidi of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) stated that 
the committee, in response to PM al-Jafari's order, had 
resubmitted its proposal for energizing the T&R program to 
the Ministerial Council on National Security (MCNS).  The 
proposal included the committee's request for operational 
funds, stronger organizational structure and greater 
authority to enforce compliance. In a subsequent conversation 
with PolMilOff, Saad stated he was witness to an earlier 
meeting between Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Ameri and PM 
al-Jafari regarding militia integration.  Saad claimed PM 
al-Jafari was under pressure from al-Ameri and SCIRI's Abdul 
Aziz al-Hakim to effect pension benefits for aging Badr 
militiamen, ostensibly to ease the financial burden now 
carried by the Badr Organization. 
 
¶4. (C) Saad also indicated that Minister Jabr's principal 
concern upon receiving the order was the availability of 
funds for the T&R program.  Saad was subsequently tasked by 
the Minister to draft a request for the ITG to allot $60 
million to the MOI for T&R. Saad stated that the figure of 
$60 million did not stem from any estimates developed by the 
TRIC or other ministerial or Coalition advisors, making him 
suspect ulterior motives. 
 
--------------------- 
A DANGEROUS AMBIGUITY 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) General Nabil Khalil al-Obeidi, Director General of 
the Iraqi Veterans Agency (IVA) and member of the TRIC, met 
with PolMilOff on 27 August to discuss the PM directive. He 
was alarmed at the possibility that T&R funds of this 
magnitude could be allotted to the MOI. He stated that such 
an action would effectively eliminate transparency in the 
process and surmised that much of the funds would be used to 
support manpower positions in the MOI for 'integrated' Badr 
militiamen.  According to General Nabil, any process for 
militia pension disbursement would be administered by the 
IVA, and it would be unlikely that the IVA could develop the 
administrative systems and procedures to begin processing 
applications before the year-end elections. 
 
¶6. (C) General Nabil also expressed some trepidation about 
ambiguity in the PM's directive. According to Nabil, the 
directive's statement that CPA Order 91 bans all militias 
"...except those under government control" is a deliberate 
weakening of the order, leaving open the possibility of 
legitimized militia activity nominally under the control of a 
politically-affiliated government Minister.  (NOTE.  The memo 
accurately reflects CPA 91, which prohibits militia "not 
under the command structure of the Iraqi Transitional 
Government...except as provided by federal law."  END NOTE.) 
Nabil's comments are symptomatic of growing anxiety over a 
developing armed "neighborhood watch" concept promoted by 
several Shia ministers.  (NOTE. Minister Jabr has several 
times expressed his opposition to this proposal, seeing the 
"neighborhood watches" as little more than incipient 
militias.  END NOTE.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
MINISTER JABR CLARIFIES HIS VIEWS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) On 28 August 2005, LTG Petraeus and AMB Yellin again 
met with Minister Jabr and discussed militias.  Minister Jabr 
quickly stated that the $60 million estimate was not 
scientifically calculated (although it does equate to the 
monies that are budgeted for the MOI Qualifying Committee -- 
tasked to update accurately the MOI employment rolls -- which 
could be considered a complementary process).  The Minister 
mentioned an initial allocation of $9.7 million, which he 
found to be totally inadequate.  Minister Jabr agreed that 
success with militia T&R depends on ITG commitment to 
eliminating militia, not to subsidizing them.  He also agreed 
that the process must address all militia, which made him 
unhappy to be the head of the process, since he will be 
accused of partisanship by all involved.  Minister Jabr 
further said that he would address the TRIC transparency 
issue by fencing the money allotted to MOI for use by TRIC 
alone.  After studying militia reintegration in Afghanistan 
and Lebanon, Minister Jabr concluded that there will be no 
problem integrating individual militia into the Iraqi 
military and police.  He intends to spread former militiamen 
throughout the force so they will not be able to interact 
easily with their former comrades.  He expressed his concerns 
about how he can be sure people leave the militia and what 
happens if there are more militia members than his budget can 
accommodate.  As his closing comment on 28 August, Minister 
Jabr said, "We must totally finish the militia." 
 
------------------------------------- 
COMMENT: TAKING CAREFUL STEPS FORWARD 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The suspicions of the TRIC members are rooted in the 
intractability of the militia issue. From the perspective of 
the TRIC, with the Kurdish Peshmerga effectively legitimized, 
there is no incentive for Shia militias to entertain 
dissolution. As such, any interest in the process from the 
current Shia-dominated ITG appears - at least to the TRIC - 
to be dubious.  Nonetheless, the possibility for tangible 
results cannot be discounted, and this heightened interest on 
the part of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior 
should be encouraged with the following considerations:  (1) 
The government must be effectively committed to eliminating 
militia groups, and (2) any initiated program must genuinely 
serve to eliminate them and not recast them in some other 
form.  We will monitor the actions of the PM and the Minister 
to ensure they remain true to the policy of individual - not 
unit - integration of militia.  END COMMENT. 
Khalilzad