This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 004857 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2025 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS TU
SUBJECT: RUMBLINGS IN ULTRA-NATIONALIST MHP 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 1730 
     ¶B. 2004 ANKARA 7211 
     ¶C. ANKARA 1774 
     ¶D. ANKARA 0501 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS John Kunstadter; E.O. 12958, reasons 
1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Although the current Turkish political 
environment should provide right-nationalist MHP with an 
excellent opportunity to challenge ruling AKP, MHP has failed 
to gain much traction.  MHP leadership,s failure has 
contributed to a growing dissident movement within the party. 
 The core problem, however, is that MHP's ideology is rooted 
in the fear of the dissolution of the Turkish state-nation 
and it is unable to address the challenges of globalization 
and economic development.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The failures and missteps of AKP over the past several 
months (REFS A and B); the widespread anxiety regarding the 
future of the Turkish economy; the increase in PKK-related 
violence; and the anti-American and anti-EU tone in the media 
have stimulated the latest nationalist backlash.  Thus the 
current political environment provides an excellent 
opportunity for ultra-nationalist National Action Party (MHP) 
to mount a challenge against ruling Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) (REF C). 
 
 
------------------------------- 
IS SUPPORT FOR MHP ON THE RISE? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Many political commentators and Embassy contacts 
assert that support for MHP is on the rise.  MHP Vice 
Chairman Faruk Bal asserted to POLOFF that party functions 
are well attended and party leaders are well received when 
they deliver speeches to audiences around the country.  On 
August 7, MHP held its 16th annual campout and party rally at 
Erciyes Mountain in Kayseri.  Turkish newspapers reported 
that approximately 500,000 people attended the rally. 
 
¶4. (C) There is substantial evidence, however, that MHP,s 
popularity is not on the rise.  MHP deserves credit for 
hosting a rally with 500,000 attendees, but this is roughly 
the same number as have attended MHP,s Erciyes Mountain 
rallies in previous years.  ANAR pollster Ibrahim Uslu, 
moreover, recently told POLOFF that his polls indicate that 
MHP is still below the 10 percent threshold for 
representation in parliament.  Ozgur Unluhisarcikli of the 
ARI movement told POLOFFs that his liberal-nonpartisan 
organization,s recent surveys indicated that MHP is polling 
only around 6 percent.  A recent TNS/PIAR poll published in 
Radikal newspaper also placed MHP,s support at around 6 
percent.  MHP member and longtime Embassy contact Riza 
Muftuoglu also believes that MHP remains below the 10 percent 
threshold and he blames this on the failure of the current 
party leadership. 
 
 
------------------------- 
POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN MHP 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Party members outside the central administration are 
frustrated with party chairman Devlet Bahceli and the 
leadership,s inability to mount a successful challenge 
against AKP.  There are also lingering irritations over the 
leadership,s decision to join the DSP-led coalition 
government from 1999-2002.  By joining that coalition 
government, MHP shared the blame for the 2000 and 2001 
economic crises and was maneuvered into endorsing policy 
positions that had been anathema to MHP,s grassroots, e.g. 
joining the EU, abolishing the death penalty, supporting a 
life sentence instead of execution for PKK terrorist leader 
Abdullah Occalan, and lifting legal restrictions on the 
Kurdish language.  Muftuoglu told POLOFFs that MHP should 
never have joined the DSP-led government, but even after 
joining they should have left the government during the 2001 
economic crisis or in the summer of 2002 before the 
elections. 
 
¶6. (C) Party dissidents led by former minister Namik Kemal 
Zeybek and former party vice chairman Ramiz Ongun have 
accumulated at least 265 signatures calling for an 
extraordinary party convention, more than the 238 signatures 
required.  (Comment.  Some party dissidents claim that they 
have collected over 550 signatures.  End Comment.)  The party 
administration is trying to resist the call for an early 
convention by claiming that some of the signers have changed 
their minds since signing the petition, but a low-level 
Turkish court ruled that MHP must hold a convention.  Whether 
or not MHP will be forced to hold a party convention this 
year is still unclear. 
¶7. (C) Bahceli has responded to these internal threats by 
having the party make a propaganda film entitled "Orange 
Revolution, Purple Violets" in which he accuses internal and 
external opponents of the party as being part of a global 
plot designed to weaken the Republic of Turkey.  (Comment. 
Bahceli's preference for blaming outsiders is similar to the 
approach of CHP leader Baykal.    Earlier this year, Baykal 
responded to internal challenges to his party leadership by 
accusing the USG being behind efforts to replace him (REF D). 
 End Comment.)  The film also accuses the US and EU of 
working together to expand their global power by fomenting 
recent revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and other countries. 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
THE FAILURE OF NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) There is a widespread recognition in the party that 
nationalism has failed to adapt to globalization and Turkish 
economic realities, but leading MHP theorists are unable to 
develop a detailed explanation of how Turkish nationalism 
should address the problems of globalization and economic 
development. 
 
¶9. (C) Dr. Umit Ozdag is a thuggish nationalist intellectual, 
foreign policy theorist, and one of the individuals trying to 
replace Bahceli as chairman of MHP.  Ozdag recently stepped 
down as president of the Eurasian Strategic Research Center 
(ASAM) so he could devote more time to political activity: he 
told POLOFFS that he delivered over 100 speeches around the 
country in the past year.  The pistol-packing Ozdag is 
clever, but he is not a rigorous thinker and he wraps himself 
in conspiracy theories.  Intense and wily, he is utterly 
lacking in charm or charisma. 
 
¶10. (C) Ozdag has written a book calling for a renewal of 
Turkish nationalism, but the thin 100 page opus minimus is 
heavy on rhetoric and light on policy specifics.  He wants 
Turkey to be a wealthy and powerful country and he recognizes 
that this requires Turkey to embrace globalization, but he is 
unsure how to proceed.  He is skilled at recognizing the 
problems and at making nationalistic arguments in favor of 
addressing the problems, but he is unable to develop detailed 
or rational policy proposals that would address the host of 
socioeconomic issues facing Turkey.  (Comment.  In this 
regard he is no different from most Turkish intellectuals on 
the social democratic left and the center-right.  End 
Comment.) 
 
¶11. (C) His political ideas are a logically inconsistent 
combination of anti-European conspiracy theories, nationalist 
sentiments, statist solutions, and grudging recognition of 
the realities of globalization and American power.  Ozdag, 
for example, calls for an end to Turkey's EU membership bid 
and a termination of Turkey's Customs Union with the EU, but 
he also wants Turkey to sign a free trade agreement with the 
EU.  (Comment.  Unlike the Customs Union, a free trade 
agreement would allow Turkey and the EU to set different 
tariffs for non-EU countries.  End Comment.)  He states that 
Turkey should end its relationship with the IMF and that this 
step should be preceded by raising the domestic savings rate 
so that IMF loans are not needed, but he is unable to explain 
how the country could accomplish this goal.  He argues that 
Turkish agriculture needs to be modernized and he recognizes 
that this would require the consolidation of landholdings and 
cause social disruptions, but he is unable to propose any 
policies to address these challenges, other than recommending 
that new apartment buildings be built in smaller towns and 
cities.  Ozdag also calls for state-directed economic 
investment in "strategic sectors" and state-encouraged 
research into "high technology", but he is unable to 
elaborate on how this should be done. 
 
¶12.  (C) Ozdag also argues in his book -- and in 
conversations with POLOFFs -- that the Europeans are trying 
to create a "Turkish Milosevich," i.e. someone who will lead 
Turkey into an ethno-religious civil war that will result in 
the dismemberment of the country.  Ozdag says that Turkey 
must resist this; but given the relish with which he 
discusses this scenario, we suspect he harbors dark fantasies 
of being Turkey's nationalist leader during a time of 
ethno-religious civil war. 
¶13. (C) Dr. Riza Ayhan is a professor of international trade 
law at Gazi University in Ankara and another candidate to 
replace Bahceli.  In manner and demeanor he is the exact 
opposite of Ozdag: Ayhan is very smooth and self confident 
with a patrician (if not imperial) style.  Ayhan told POLOFF 
that nationalism must adapt to the realities of 
globalization, but he was unable to elaborate on what he 
meant by this phrase.  As with Ozdag, Ayhan recognizes many 
of the problems facing Turkey and Turkish nationalism, but he 
is unable to come up with more than vague policy 
recommendations. 
 
¶14. (C) Ayhan initially told POLOFFs that he was not looking 
to replace Bahceli as leader of MHP, but later admitted --- 
with an air of noblesse oblige --- that other nationalists 
may put him in a position where he is forced to challenge the 
party leader.  When POLOFF asked him to describe Turkish 
nationalism, Ayhan started by stating what it was not, e.g. 
not racist, not undemocratic, not anti-American, and not 
fascist.  (Comment.  This is a mantra that POLOFFs have heard 
repeatedly during their meetings with MHP party members.  End 
Comment.)  Ayhan was very critical of the EU, but he avoided 
--- at least in initial conversations with POLOFFs --- any 
conspiracy theories and, moreover, he expressed the hope that 
Turkey would join the EU in time for the 100th birthday of 
the Republic (i.e. 2023). 
 
¶15. (C) Sevket Bulent Yahnici is considered by many Turkish 
observers to be another leading MHP intellectual.  Yahnici is 
a former MHP MP from Ankara, but he is not a candidate to 
replace Bahceli.  Yahnici is slovenly and disorganized.  He 
met POLOFFs in his office/apartment which was littered with 
books and papers.  He sat in a large chair next to a nargile 
(Turkish water pipe) with ashes on the floor.  He started the 
conversation by trying clumsily to bait POLOFF with 
anti-Christian rhetoric.  He then complained about rural 
migration to Ankara and lamented that he was one of the few 
Ankara-born MP to represent the province in the last 
parliament.  (Note.  He claimed that most of Ankara's 
twenty-nine MPs were born elsewhere.  End Note.) 
 
¶16. (C) This was followed by a long rant about the Iraq war 
in which Yahnici blamed ethnically Kurdish MPs for voting 
against the failed 1 March 2003 resolution authorizing the 
deployment of U.S. forces into Iraq via Turkey because the 
Kurdish MPs wanted to sabotage US-Turkish relations and 
provide a catalyst for the creation of an independent 
Kurdistan in northern Iraq.  He then eagerly launched into 
another long rant about the threats the EU reforms pose to 
the unity and survival of the Republic of Turkey.  Yahnici 
was completely unable to provide POLOFF with a definition of 
Turkish nationalism, other than to repeat the standard MHP 
mantra that nationalism isn't racist, fascist, etc.  Yahnici 
agreed with other nationalists that economic issues and 
globalization are serious challenges, but he was unable to 
explain how nationalism relates to these topics.  Near the 
end of the conversation, Yahnici blamed the MHP leadership 
for failing to develop and adequately explain the nationalist 
ideology. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
TURKISH NATIONALISM ROOTED IN FEAR AND PARANOIA 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶17. (C) Ultimately, MHP's ideology is rooted in fear and 
paranoia.  Turkish nationalists inside and outside of MHP 
have told POLOFFs that they believe that the Turkish 
nation-state formation process is incomplete and that 
enhanced democratic and minority rights could result in the 
dismemberment of the country.  Many nationalists, moreover, 
do not trust the EU or the U.S.  Some believe that the West 
European countries have deviously designed the EU membership 
reforms in a way that would weaken the Turkish state/military 
and result in the formation of an independent Kurdistan in 
southeastern Turkey.  They also choose to believe --- as do 
many Turks --- that the USG orchestrated the rise of the AKP, 
supports the PKK terrorist organization, and is bent on a 
policy of world domination.  In fact, when Turkish 
nationalists tell POLOFFs that Turkey and the U.S. need to 
form a strong alliance it is because they want Turkey to be 
on the side of the global hegemon, not because they share 
specific U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives. 
 
¶18. (C)  Comment.  As Turkey moves down the EU road --- and 
especially once the EU requires reforms that will result in 
short-term economic pain --- the MHP will have many 
opportunities to build a powerful political movement 
galvanized around Turkish fear, paranoia, and opposition to 
the EU.  MHP's leadership, however, has been unable so far to 
capitalize on this opportunity because it is mired in the 
policy mistakes of the DSP-led coalition government.  If a 
new leadership is able to gain control of the party; overcome 
the mistakes of the past; reform the party's ideology so that 
it can address the challenges of economic modernization and 
globalization in a persuasive manner; attract a large number 
of ideologically motivated young people to the party; and 
build a loyal cadre of hardworking grassroots activists, then 
MHP will be in a position to challenge AKP.  The degree to 
which this revitalized MHP will also contribute to 
anti-Americanism will be directly linked to how clearly 
nationalists perceive the U.S. to be on Turkey's side in the 
fight against the PKK in northern Iraq.  End Comment. 
MCELDOWNEY