This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001853 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2015 
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV AG SOFA
SUBJECT: ALGERIA DECLINES OFFER OF DELEGATION TO DISCUSS 
SOFA 
 
REF: A. ALGIERS 1804 
 
     ¶B. STATE 158268 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, 
for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, called on 
MFA Americas Director Chikhi August 30 to press the need for 
SOFA protections for U.S. personnel involved in exercises in 
Algeria and to seek clarification on the issue of a SOFA team 
visit in September.  Chikhi doggedly adhered to the language 
of the Ministry's recent note (Ref A) rejecting a SOFA on 
sovereignty and constitutional grounds and, when asked 
directly, said the GOA was not prepared to receive a visit by 
a SOFA team in September.  Ambassador stressed the need for 
SOFA protections for U.S. personnel participating in mutually 
agreed joint exercises and said if a general SOFA would not 
be possible at this time, we then needed SOFA protections, 
exercise by exercise.  Chikhi seemed to suggest this might be 
possible.  Ambassador will seek greater clarity on this point 
from Foreign Minister Bedjaoui in their next meeting.  We 
suspect the more negative tone reflects input from former FM 
Belkhadem, currently a Minister of State, who had an icy 
conversation concerning a SOFA with the previous ambassador 
in 2002.  We should also continue to work this issue with the 
Algerian military, which has the greatest stake in seeing 
joint exercises go forward and make a SOFA a continuing 
agenda item in the Joint Military Dialogue. (End summary) 
 
 
SOFA TEAM VISIT WAS TO DISCUSS, 
NOT NEGOTIATE, A SOFA AGREEMENT 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador, during August 30 call on other issues, 
pressed hard on the need for SOFA protections for U.S. 
personnel involved in exercises in Algeria and sought 
clarification on the issue of a SOFA team visit.    He said 
we had received the Ministry's diplomatic note explaining 
that a SOFA would contravene Algeria's sovereignty and 
Constitution.  The purpose of a SOFA team visit was not to 
negotiate a SOFA, Ambassador stressed, but to discuss what a 
SOFA entailed and to address and assure the GOA on precisely 
the kind of sovereignty concerns it had raised.  Furthermore, 
the issue at hand was not a permanent troop presence or 
bases, but SOFA protections for personnel engaged in periodic 
military exercises that were increasingly in our two 
countries' mutual interest and benefit. 
 
"SOFA WOULD CONTRAVENE SOVEREIGNTY" 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Chikhi predictably stuck closely to the mantra of the 
diplomatic note, simply repeating that a SOFA would 
contravene Algeria's sovereignty, its Constitution, and its 
laws.  Algeria was striving to establish rule of law and 
could not be asked to violate its own laws.  The Vienna 
Convention contained no such provisions extending immunities 
to military personnel.  He said Algeria's position had been 
made very clear in a diplomatic note to the Embassy in 2002 
(Number 405/DGAM/2202) and that Algeria could under no 
circumstances accept a permanent military presence on its 
soil.  (Comment:  Embassy Algiers does not have a copy of 
this 2002 note in its files and the MFA has also sheepishly 
acknowledged to us that it cannot locate a copy either!) 
There was no need for a SOFA team, he said, because the issue 
had already been discussed in 2002. 
 
WE HOPED ALGERIAN SIDE WOULD HEAR 
US OUT BEFORE TAKING A DECISION 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador replied that so far as he was aware, 
the 2002 discussion had been between the Ambassador and then 
FM Belkhadem.  There had been no team of SOFA experts and no 
opportunity to provide background on SOFA agreements and 
issues that might have allayed Algerian concerns.  The 
purpose of the proposed team visit, which had been discussed 
positively both in Washington and subsequently in 
Ambassador's meeting with Foreign Minister Bedjaoui, was not 
to negotiate but to discuss.  We had hoped that before taking 
a decision, the Algerian side would at least hear us out. 
Extending Vienna Convention-like protections to military 
personnel engaged in mutually beneficial joint exercises 
should be viewed as an exercise of sovereignty, not a 
violation of sovereignty. 
 
¶5. (C) We understood and respected Algeria's unique history 
and its sensitivity toward the idea of a permanent troop 
presence, Ambassador said.  But at issue here was not bases, 
but the ability to carry out joint exercises, which were of 
increasing importance to Algeria, given developments in the 
region.  As for the 2002 note, this was 2005, not 2002.  Much 
had changed both in our relations and in the region in the 
meantime, including our counterterrorism cooperation, 
especially in the Sahel.  Chikhi agreed that bilateral 
cooperation had expanded since 2002, adding that Algeria was 
very pleased with the relationship it currently enjoyed with 
the United States. 
 
CHIKHI IMPLIES GOA READY TO 
CONSIDER CASE-BY-CASE PROTECTIONS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The problem, Ambassador continued, was that U.S. 
military personnel would not be able to participate in joint 
exercises with Algerian troops in Algeria without SOFA-type 
protections.  At a minimum, we would need an agreement for 
each military exercise, although this would be less efficient 
and more work for all of us than a general SOFA that covered 
all mutually agreed exercises.  Chikhi implied the GOA would 
consider a case-by-case approach.  (Comment:  Ambassador will 
press for greater clarity on this point in his next meeting 
with FM Bedjaoui.) 
 
GOA NOT PREPARED TO RECEIVE SOFA TEAM 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Returning to the issue of a SOFA team visit, 
Ambassador said the MFA note had addressed the issue of a 
SOFA but had not addressed explicitly the idea of a SOFA team 
visit to discuss what a SOFA actually entailed.  Would the 
GOA be prepared to receive such a team?  Chikhi confirmed the 
GOA did not want a SOFA team to come, reiterating that 
Algeria takes its sovereignty seriously.  Ambassador 
concluded by noting that the U.S. had much experience in how 
such arrangements function, whereas Algeria had none. It 
would have been useful to have had an opportunity to share 
these experiences with Algeria before reaching decisions on 
this important issue. 
 
COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The proposal for a SOFA, made in 2002 to then Foreign 
Minister Belkhadem by then-Ambassador Sandersen, was the 
occasion for an icy exchange.  We suspect that the very 
different tone of the current negative response, compared to 
FM Bedjaoui's initially favorable reaction to a SOFA team 
visit, reflects input from Belkhadem, who may have been 
consulted as new MFA players looked into the history of the 
issue.  In any case, we are where we are and the aversion to 
the notion or suggestion of permanent basing or a permanent 
troop presence is very real, given Algeria's colonial 
experience with France, and will not go away anytime soon. 
Our best bet will be to keep pressing the idea that we are 
talking about SOFA protections for joint exercises, where 
they have clear interests at stake, and that at a minimum we 
will need case-by-case SOFA protections in order to engage in 
such exercises with Algeria. 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador will seek a clearer commitment on this 
point in his next meeting with FM Bedjaoui.  That said, until 
the Algerians get more used to doing business with us -- and 
they have a long way to go -- they may well be skittish about 
moving beyond the kind of oral assurance Bedjaoui gave us for 
the Flintlock Exercise earlier this year.  Since the Algerian 
military has the greatest stake in seeing joint exercises go 
forward, we should also focus our efforts on that institution 
and make SOFA protections a continuing part of our Joint 
Military Dialogue agenda. 
 
ERDMAN